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Summary 
This thesis critically examines the debate in Britain about the involvement of different 
ethnic groups in crime. It describes the origins and development of this debate and the 
broad schools of thought within it, along with the main findings of research and 
statistics to date. This overview provides the context for new empirical material 
generated during research into the ethnic monitoring which became mandatory for all 
police forces in England and Wales in 1996. 
In the light of this evidence, the thesis re-visits the three main 'explanations' 
traditionally offered for the apparent disparity between the ethnic composition of 
crin-dnal justice statistics and that of the population at large. It concludes that both 
structural and cultural factors are important but that the nature and interaction of their 
effects are more complex than has been appreciated. Discrimination by the police, 
though, plays only a very limited role relative to the other two 'explanations; and 
direct discrin-driation is probably now rare. However the 'race' and crime debate has 
largely failed to recognise the effect of the legitimate exercise of police discretion in 
considerably amplifying real ethnic differences in offending. 
Ethnic monitoring, it concludes, will not only fail to discover any significant level of 
discrimination, it could rebound by reinforcing negative stereotypes. To avoid this, the 
data need to be interrogated on the basis of more sophisticated understandings both of 
the processes which produce them and of the problems they are intended to address. 
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April 1997 
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Chapter One 
The 'Raceand Crime Debate in Britain 
THE QUESTION OF DISCRIMINATION 
In 1991 the Urninal, Justice BW was amended in the House of Lords to include a new clause 
requiring the Home Secretary annually to publish: 
'.... such information as he considers expedient for the purpose of - 
a) enabling persons engaged in the administration of criminal justice to become aware of 
the financial implications of their decisions; or 
b) facilitating the performance by such persons of their duty to avoid discriminating 
against any persons on the ground of race or sex or any other improper ground. ' 
ne requirement (Section 95 of the 1991 OfiTfinal Justice Act) was symbolical. ly significant in two 
main ways. Implicitly it signalled Government concern about 'race' and the criminal justice 
process; and, more specifically. it formally recognised that discrimination was a possible cause for 
this concern. That is, it gave statutory recognition to anxiety about unequal treatment of ethnic 
minorities by the crin-dnal justice system some thirty years after this anxiety was first expressed 
pubficly. 
S. 95 seemed unlikely, however, to satisfy the needs of those working within the criminal justice 
system or to meet the expectations of those who have been campaigning on issues of 'race' and 
crin-dnal justice. For the 'information' available at the time it was passed provided extensive 
empirical corroboration of the cause for concern - but it was of very limited value in showing how 
this occurred; and, by the same token, it was largely incapable of identifying what part 
discrin-dnation played in this. 
It is beyond the scope of this study definitively to prove where and precisely how racial 
discrimination may occur in the criminal justice process. Rather, in the context of developments 
since s. 95 was passed, it aims to refine current understandings about: 
the range and interrelationship of possible explanations for apparently different 
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ethnic outcomes; and 
b) the likely role of discrimination in relation to other factors. 
This chapter begins by providing an outline of the historical background to the concerns in 
question and by sketching some of the more theoretical interpretations of the apparent ethnic 
differences shown by official statistics in both rates and patterns of criminal activity. Chapter 2 
then reviews the empirical evidence currently available on ethnic minorities and the criminal justice 
process. Chapter 3 describes developments since s. 95 was passed and outlines the research 
approach taken to exploring the extent to which these may shed light on the questions raised at 
both the theoretical and empirical level. Chapters 4 and 5 present the findings of the research. 
Chapter 6 discusses their implications for developing our understandings about'race', crime and 
the criminal justice process and concludes by drawing out specific implications: for future 
developments in the patterns revealed by ethnic statistics and for the role of ethnic monitoring. 
Before proceeding farther. however, it is necessary briefly to clarify some of the terms used in the 
thesis. 
TERMINOLOGY 
The meaning - and indeed, the validity - of the term race has been extensively discussed; so too 
has the concept of ethnicity-, and fin-ther controversy inevitably surrounds the relationship between 
the two. Rex and Mason! s 'Tbeories of Race and Ethnic Relations' (1986) usefully draws together 
many of the elements of this debate. It does not, however, attempt to reconcile them but rather 
confirms that any usage is bound to be contested. For, as Ratcliffe has commented in respect of 
% racef: 
'The major debate in Britain .. concerns radically different theoretical and epistemological 
paradigms. This is seen most clearly in the con&ting approaches to the matter by scholars 
such as Rex and Miles; a conflict grounded at one level in the fundamental division 
between Weberian and Marxian forms of analysis. But this very clear delineation of 
academic "battle lines" should not be allowed to conceal major internal divisions within 
these camps or to obscure the work of those who are aligned to neither. ' 
(Ratcliffe 1991 p. 214) 
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Mason himself makes a similar point with regard to ethnicity -a simple, universally acceptable 
definition of which, he says, 'is not possible, not least because of the range of theoretical traditions 
from which the issue can be approached' (Mason 1991 p. 198). 
Constraints of space, in any case, do not permit an extensive defence of the usage which I intend 
to employ here. Briefly, and without claiming that it is definitive (or problem-free) this may be 
explained as follows. 
In a discussion of sociological questions, there is no biological justification for the use of the term 
I race'. Yet it is already pervasively used in popular and acadernic discourse and is the basis of 
legislation'. As such, it is impossible to avoid in discussing what are commonly referred to as 
issues of 'race and crime'. This is not to dismiss the objections of writers such as Miles who, 
essentially, argue that such usage reinforces unfounded notions of inherent biological difference, 
thereby distracting attention from the ways in which the term has been socially constructed and 
perpetuating the forms of exclusion and discrimination which result from this social construction 
(Miles 1982,1987,1989). Indeed, the approach adopted here acknowledges Miles' concerns by 
following the convention of using the term only in inverted commas. This is not necessarily to 
endorse his view of the processes by which 'race' is socially constructed; it simply reflects 
McEwen's neat description of the conceptual world with which I am concerned. In this world 
'.. the term race is applied more often to phenotype - the physical characteristics, such as 
colour, more frequently found in particular ethnic groups - than genotype - those 
distinctions which have some biological underpinnning. Socially race has a significance 
dependent not upon science but upon belief. 
(McEwen 1991) 
However, I hope to avoid many of the pitfalls associated with the term 'race' since one of my 
concerns is to draw out important dfferences benwen the many groups to whom simplistic 'racial' 
labels have been applied. Yet the fact that these are conunonly referred to as 'ethnic minority 
groups' poses a further set of problems. In UK usage, the term implicitly refers to groups of 
people who are phenotypically distinctive from the majority population. By far the greatest 
Thus anti-discrimination legislation is embodied in the Race ReMons Act 1976 and the term is used 
in s. 95 of the Criminal Justice Act 1991 (as cited). 
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number of these have their ancestral origins in sub-Saharan Africa (and, more recently, the 
Caribbean) and in the countries of the Indian subcontinent. They have tended to be referred to 
respectively as 'Afro-Caribbeans' - or, more recently, 'Blacks' (see references below to 1991 
Census) - and 'Asians'. But People from the Middle and Far East are also sufficiently numerous 
occasionally to feature in official statistics as ethnic minorities. (For more detail, see Chapter 
Two). And more fundamental objections may be raised both to the use of the term 'ethnic group' 
and to the qualification 'minority'. An ethnic group, Yinger suggests: 
'... exists in the full sense when three conditions are present: a segment of a larger society 
is seen by others to be different in some combination of the following characteristics - 
language, religion, race and ancestral homeland with its related culture; the members also 
perceive themselves in that way, and they participate in shared activities built around their 
(real or mythical) common origin and culture. ' 
(Yinger 1986 p. 22) 
Tbs definition challenges current U. Y, usage in at least three ways. Firstly, the 'Black' and 'Asian' 
categories are too large to be considered 'ethnic groups'; for they subsume nearly two and a half 
million individuals differentiated by a wide range of languages, religious affiliations, and 'racial' 
characteristics, and who identify with a variety of ancestral homelands across the globe. Secondly, 
many of those who are thought of - and, indeed, officially categorised - in this way may not, in 
fact, perceive themselves as sharing these characteristics and still less 'participate in shared 
activities'. And, thirdly, phenotype of itseýf is neither an essential ingredient of ethnicity nor a 
sufficient qualification for its ascription. Thus, while many 'Blacks' and 'Asians' might not qualify 
for ethnic group membership on Yinger's test, many whites would do so - including those who 
perceive their 'real or mythical common origin and culture' as Irish, Scots, Welsh or, even, 
English. 
And this, in turn, raises questions about the usefulness of the 'minority' qualification. Clearly - 
even if this excludes the 'English' from 'minority ethnic group' status - it does not restrict the 
logical application of the term to non-whites. Moreover, even if one accepts this limited use of 
the term because it reflects current practice, it is still inappropriate where the unit of analysis is 
such (for example, at the level of particular streets or certain enumeration districts) that 'ethnic 
minority groups'comprise the majority of the local population. 
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Notwithstanding these inconsistencies, the practice here will follow that adopted in respect of 
I race'. The term 'ethnic minority group' will be used to refer to people who are likely to be 
classified according to the 1991 Census (see Chapter Two) in any of the groups aggregated into 
the 'Black! and 'Asian' categories. As far as possible, relevant distinctions will be made within and 
between these groups; but it should be noted that the terminology used cannot always be 
consistent inasmuch as the data sources referred to use different definitions, particularly in respect 
of the 'Black'groups. The term'black'was often used in the recent past to cover all non-white 
minorities and there are still some who persist in this on political grounds. That is, they assert that 
these groups share a cornrnon experience of discrimination because of their colour and, implicitly, 
that to deny them a collective label which reflects this is to deny the discrimination. However, 
such a generic label masks important distinctions which, for the purposes of this thesis, are 
themselves already frustratingly obscured by the temis Slack' and 'Asian'. Also, there is increasing 
evidence that many Asians do not accept (and may, indeed, actively reject) being referred to in 
this way. Further problems arise because the groups now termed %black' by the Census were, until 
199 1, referred to variously in official classification and in the literature as 'West Indian', 'African' 
or 'Afro-Caribbearf; and though the latter term should, strictly speaking, be used to subsume both 
groups, it was often used loosely to describe people mainly or exclusively of West Indian origin. 
In the interests of consistency and clarity, the thesis refers to these groups wherever possible as 
'black! (disaggregating further within this as appropriate), even though the original data source 
may use one of the alternative forms referred to. Where tables are drawn from such sources, 
however, the original classification is used - not least to avoid giving a spurious impression of 
comparability between data sets. 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
The origins of most of Britain's ethnic minorities can be traced to immigration from its former 
colonies following the second world war. 'Primary' immigration (that is of individuals - usually 
men) was encouraged at that time to fill manpower needs but began to be severely restricted from 
1962 onwards by legislation which selectively curtailed the rights of entry granted to overseas- 
bom British subjects by the 1948 Nationality Act. Symbolically, the culmination of this process 
was the passage of new nationality legislation in 1981; and, although further restrictions have 
continued to be imposed since then, these have targetted 'secondary' irrmýigration (that is, the 
process of reuniting their families with 'primary' immigrants) which has lagged behind 'primary' 
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immigration and which, in some cases, is still not complete. 
The history of this post-war immigration and of the development and impact of immigration 
controls has been covered extensively in the 'race relations' literature (e. g. Layton-Henry 1984, 
1992, Fryer 1984, Walvin 1984). For present purposes it is worth noting that the main primary 
immigration from the Caribbean was in the 1950s and 1960s. That from the Indian subcontinent 
(ISC) began up to ten years later and was further boosted in the late 1960s to the mid 1970s with 
the arrival of refugees of ISC origin from East African countries. The only further significant wave 
of immigration since that time has been that of limited numbers of Vietnamese in the late 1970s. 
The rate of family reunion has varied from one group to another for a variety of reasons; and 
relatively high levels of secondary immigration from Bangladesh still continue. (The broad 
patterns of primary and secondary immigration by different groups up to the end of the 1970s are 
captured in Table 5 of Brown 1984). 
In the early post-war period, tensions between the indigenous population and what then were 
almost universally referred to as 'coloured irnmigrants' received little public attention from 
politicians nationally. Certainly, extensive and overt discrimination against these minorities tended 
to be ignored, including the pattern of physical attacks against Asians which were already 
commonly referred to in the late 1950s as Taki-bashing'. But attacks by whites on West Indians 
sparked 'race riots' in 1958 in Notting HUI and Nottingham and began to force issues of 'race 
relations'onto the national political agenda. Although the police were subsequently commended 
by the Home Secretary for their peace-keeping r6le in these events (Rose et al. p. 355), the 
minorities themselves and others concerned with 'race relations' had already begun by this time 
formally and pubEcly to express their concern about police treatrnent of West Indians in particular. 
Meanwhile, the and-immigrant lobby seized on the riots to campaign for restrictions on 
immigration from the Caribbean specifically, explicitly linking West Indian imrnigrants with 
criminal activity' . 
Layton-Hcnry quotes the MIP for North Kensington. who told the Daily Sketch 
The government must introduce legislation quickly to end the tremendous influx of 
coloured people from the Commonwealth.. overcrowding has fostered vice, drugs, 
prostitution and the use of knives. For years the white people have been tolerant. Now their 
tempers are up. - 
(op. Cit. 1984 pp. 50-5 1) 
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The police themselves acknowledged a problem of deteriorating relations with West Indians in 
the 1960s and 1970s. Rose et al. cite Sir Joseph Simpson who, as Metropolitan Police 
Conunissioner, wrote in 1967: 
'Complaints of police "brutality", of West Indians afraid to complain to the police for fear 
of being "beaten-up", and protest marches and demonstrations in support of these 
allegations, have all been part of the deteriorating background to the pattern of police and 
immigrant relations during the last six months. ' 
(Rose et al. 1969 p. 349) 
Yet, at least at senior levels, the police do not appear publicly at this stage to have endorsed the 
links with crime being made by the and-inurdgration lobby. And this was still the case in 1972 
when the House of Commons Select Committee on Police/Imrnigrant Relations - which took 
evidence from a wide range of bodies including central government departments, local 
government and police forces themselves - acknowledged widespread concern about 'growing 
tensions', but concluded 'beyond doube that 
%. coloured immigrants are no more involved in crime than others; nor are they generally 
more concerned in violence, prostitution and drugs. Ile West Indian crime rate is much 
the same as that of the indigenous population. The Asian crime rate is very much lower. ' 
(Select Committee 1972. Main Report p. 71) 
However, only four years later when the Select Committee took evidence more generally on the 
situation of The West Indian Community', the Met subn-dtted a memorandum which concluded 
that, while further research was needed 'on this sensitive and emotive subject' 
.. already our experience has taught us the 
fallibility of the assertion that crime rates 
amongst those of West Indian origin are no higher than those of the population at large. ' 
(Select Committee 1977. Vol 11 p. 182). 
ChaUenged on this apparent departure from their previous position, they submitted a further 
memorandum, stating that 
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'-from current statistics available ... our overall experience of 1971 no longer holds good. ' 
(op. cit. Vol III p. 689). 
The 'current statistics' referred to by the Met - and the basis of their evidence to the two Select 
Committees - were derived from descriptions in that minority of cases where victims had had sight 
of the offender. From around this time, however, the Met fonnaHy introduced a system (based on 
visual assessment by the police) of the ethnic origin both of people they arrested and those against 
whom they subsequently took proceedings. ' 
Meanwhile, the 'politics of race' in their broader sense had, for a variety of reasons, begun to 
assume a higher profile at both central and local government level. 'Ilie first imrnigration controls 
were imposed on Commonwealth citizens in 1962, fbHowed in 1965 by the introduction of the 
first 'race relations' legislation and by the provision in the Local Government Act of 1966 of 
additional funding to help local authorities meet the 'special needs' of immigrants. The lobby 
against discrimination - symbolized nationally in the activities of the Campaign Against Racial 
Discrimination (CARD) (Heinemann 1972) - grew stronger. It began to raise public awareness 
of the issues and was backed by studies of prejudice and discrimination (Daniel 1968, Rose et al 
1969). But there was a parallel rise in manifestations of and-immigrant feeling, most famously 
and dramaticaUy captured in Enoch Powell's 'Rivers of Blood' speech of 1968. And further 
developments in the 1970s - including the rise in the electoral fortunes of far-right parties and the 
emergence of a strong anti-racist movement in response - combined in the context of relative 
political instability to perpetuate and reinforce the political salience of 'race' issues (FitzGerald 
1987). 
One specific form in which the theme of 'race' and crime came to be woven into these wider 
political developments was in a growing preoccupation with *mugging'. The origins and 
Ethnic information was also collected by the police on the sentences imposed on those they 
proceeded against but this has ceased to be available since the advent of the Crown Prosecution 
Service (whose court work subsumes some previous police functions). Although the figures 
continued to be gathered for operational purposes, the Met ceased collating ethnic statistics based 
on victim description. This decision was apparently taken on the twin grounds that the data did not 
cover the full range of offences and because of the danger of inaccuracy. Ibis information has begun 
recently to re-emerge, however - most dramatically in the launch of Eagle Eye* (see Chapter 3) - with 
apparently little or no comment on the implicit reversal of policy. 
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manifestations of this preoccupation have been extensively documented - most notably in 'Policing 
the Crisis' (subtitled 'Mugging, the State and Law and Order) by Hall et al. in 1978. In brief, the 
term was imported from the U. S. A. and applied very loosely (but emotively) in the media and in 
political discourse to a range of street crime (especially 'robbery or assault with intent to rob', but 
also 'thefts from the person). It was used with both explicit and implicit reference to black people 
(that is, those of Caribbean or African origin) (Ramsay 1982), such that Hall et al. concluded 
'For all practical purposes, the term "mugging" and "black crime" are now virtually 
synonymous. ' 
(op. cit. P. 100) 
Nor was this association confined to 'mugging'. Troyna in his study of 'race' reporting in the 
rnedia between 1976 and 1978 noted that'.. almost 25% of all items in which "West Indian" as a 
category was me-ntioned related to crime stories'and, that 'West Indians featured in 23% of crime 
items. '(Troyna 1981 p. 28) 
Meanwhile allegations of police discrimination and harassment of black youths in particular 
continued, receiving widespread media attention in the context of the campaign against s. 4 of the 
1824 Vagrancy Act (the 'Sus' laws)'. Yet, in parallel, a dichotomous strand of concern about 
police/ethnic minority relations began to receive public attention in the late 1970s as campaigning 
groups took up the issue of racial attacks. In this instance, the ethnic minorities in question were 
predominantly of Asian origin (FitzGerald and Ellis 1990); and they were of concern as victims 
rather than as alleged perpetrators of crime. While, in the case of black people, the police were 
accused of being too proactive, in the case of Asians, the main complaint was their alleged failure 
to act. 
In the 1980s, however, there has been a marked shift in the context which frames any discussion 
In a speech to a Police Federation serninu in 1976, Enoch Powell said of 'mugging' 
. to use a crude but effective word, it is racial: 
Under sA the police had powers to arrest without warrant a person whom they 'reasonably' 
suspected of 'loitering with intent to conunit a felonious offence. Metropolitan Police figures in 1976 
showed that black people accounted for 42 per cent of all arrests in tWs category, compared with 12 
per cent for all offences in 1975. (Demuth 1978). 
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of criminal involvement by ethnic minorities. 
The riots in Bristol in 1980 and in Liverpool, Brixton and elsewhere in 1981 were perceived as 
unprecedented on the British mainland (see Scarman 1981 para 1.2). They were also perceived 
to have disproportionately (not to say predominantly) involved black youth and to have been 
triggered by encounters between these youths and the police. Moreover, despite a high profile 
Government response, they recurred in 1985, this time with loss of life. 
If 'mugging' was the peg on which issues of 'race' and crime were hung in the 1970s, the riots 
were the filter through which they came to be viewed throughout the 1980s. Moreover, this 
transition has occurred within the context of major shifts in the broader political context, two 
aspects of which are worth highlighting here. In terms of the politics of 'race', the focus in the 
1980s has increasingly moved away from preoccupations with immigration control to concern 
about 'the enemy within' (see FitzGerald and Layton-Henry 1986) while 'race' issues theselves 
have also become more politicised (FitzGerald 1987,1989). Secondly questions of 'law and order' 
more generally have assumed a higher political profile as issues on which to score electoral points 
(McLaughlin 1991). 
It is therefore no coincidence that the 1980s have also seen a marked increase in academic interest 
in these areas, with a mushrooming of publications on aspects of 'race' and crime, some of which 
have been corranissioned by Government (both central and local) and by the criminal justice 
agencies themselves. The main institutional focus of these studies has tended to be the police, but 
concern has recently begun to extend to other agencies of the criminal justice system (and to the 
interaction between them). 
A factor in this broadening of academic focus has undoubtedly been the availability since the mid- 
1980s of national crime data broken down by ethnic origin. One important Government initiative 
in response to concerns over 'race' and crime was to begin keeping records of the ethnic origin 
of prisoners received by Home Office institutions from 1985 onwards. 7be collection of such 
information in the context of crime has been controversial - not least because of the publicity 
which resulted from a Metropolitan Police press release in 1982 selectively using their data on 
ethnic origin to highlight the 'disproportionate involvement' of young black people in street crime 
(Scotland Yard, Press Release, 10 March 1982). Yet the collection of this type of information 
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cannot simply be dismissed as a device for protecting the system against charges of discrimination 
or, even (as the more cynical would have it) as a means of reinforcing negative stereotypes of 
black people (Carr-Hill and Drew 1988). It is equally open to positive interpretation. Collecting 
ethnic data can be seen as a response to the lobby for statistical evidence capable of demonstrating 
discrimination. The Commission for Racial Equality, for example, has repeatedly urged the 
Government to extend this monitoring, as have bodies such as the National Association for the 
Care and Resettlement of Offenders (NACRO), echoing the conclusion of Rose et al. who, as 
long ago as 1969, wrote: 
'We therefore recornmend that the methods of collecting and presenting data be improved 
to allow accurate assessment of rates of crime and delinquency among ethnic and other 
minority groups; and that data and information be available about complaints against the 
police... ' 
(op. cit. p. 726) 
Until 1993, the Prison Statistics remained the only regular national data source of this type, 
supplementing the London figures for those arrested and proceeded against by the Metropolitan 
Police which had already been available for some eight years (see above). Inasmuch as either set 
of statistics can be regarded as an objective measure, they have indeed confirmed that there is 'a 
problem'; and this is further supported by evidence from a growing number of other sources, 
including national data from the first year's ethnic monitoring of police stops under the Police and 
Qin*W Evidence Act (1984) which the police Inspectorate (HMIQ have required all forces to 
undertake since 1993. Moreover, insofar as trends can be discerned, the data suggest that, since 
they first began to be published, the problem has not diminished and may, in fact, have been 
getting worse. 
MiE PROBLEWAND rrs INrERPRErA71ON 
The figures published in 1986 (HOSB 1986) already showed that black people were over- 
represented in British prisons (relative to their presence in the population at large) by a factor of 
about nine. However, there was no apparent over-representation of Asians. When broken down 
according to the crimes for which prisoners had been sentenced, the figures also suggested that 
different ethnic groups had different Patterns of offending. Full details are given in Chapter 2; but 
it should be noted here that a further bulletin on the ethnic origin of prisoners. published eight 
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years later (HOSB 1994) showed that the proportion of black people in the prison population had 
increased from 8 per cent for men and 12 per cent for women in 1985 to 10 per cent and 20 per 
cent respectively in 1992. From the outset, the prison figures appeared not only to confirm the 
picture which had been painted by the police data for London, they provided 'evidence' to the 
political Left that black people were being disproportionately 'criminalised' and to the political 
Right that they were disproportionately 'criminal'. 
As they stand, the figures appear to lend themselves as readily to either of these interpretations. 
In fact, four broad explanations have been offered in the media and in political and academic 
debate (Jefferson 1988, Reiner 1989, FitzGerald 1991). The over-representation of black people 
in British prisons has been attributed to: 
1) discrimination within the criminal justice system - with high levels of discrimination by the 
police having a knock-on effect at other stages of the crin-dnal justice process and being 
amplified in some cases by further discrimination by other agencies; 
2) structural factors (including the age structure and disproportionately high levels of socio- 
economic disadvantage among the minority groups); 
'cultural' factors - characteristics which are peculiar to individual ethnic groups, either 
because they are in some way inherent or because they have developed in response to the 
group's treatment by British society in general and the agencies of the criminal justice 
system in particular, 
4) a combination of any two or all three of these factors. 
At first sight, the parties to this debate appear to span a political spectrum from right to left and 
which can broadly be divided into three bands. These parallel Benyon's typology of 'perspectives' 
on the riots (Benyon 1987) which he characterises as 'conservative', 'liberal' and 'radical'. 
However. some strange bedfellows occupy the same bands; the divisions between the bands are 
by no means clear-cut; and there are some striking similarities in the positions held at opposite 
extremes of the spectrum. It is convenient in this first chapter, however, to summarise the main 
interpretations currently on offer under these heads, offering mininal comment but returning to 
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them as appropriate in the final chapter in the light of the evidence presented in between the two. 
Conservative interpretations 
On the right are those who argue that the statistics reflect actual levels and types of offending by 
different ethnic groups and that this, in turn, simply reflects broader, inherent ethnic differences. 
For the most part, these differences are now depicted in cultural rather than biological terms; 
what is important to note, though, is that such cultural differences appear to be conceived of as 
fixed and immutable. While those who hold this perspective (and who tend to be referred to as 
the New Right) assiduously eschew arguments of biological superiority, they nonetheless claim 
that cultural pluralism can never work. Their position is most starkly and famously illustrated in 
Enoch Powell's verdict that 
'The West Indian or Indian does not, by being bom in England, become an Englishman. 
In law he becomes a United Kingdom citizen by birth; in fact he is a West Indian or Asian 
still., 
(Speech to Greater London Rotarians 1969) 
Ethnic minority criminal activity and, by extension, involvement in civil disorder is seen, in this 
framework, as 'culturar and as adding weight to the arguments against aspiring to create a multi- 
cultural society. Hence Powell's explicit designation of 'mugging' as 'racial' and Norman (now 
Lord) Tebbits implicit reference to the 1985 riots as an indictment of experiments with pluralism: 
.1 see no point in, for example, simply blan-dng the immigrants (sic) in these inner-city 
areas - although there can be no doubt that, from whatever causes the problems arose, 
they are more difficult to deal with in a multi-cultural, muld-ethnic society than in a mono- 
cultural society of a single racial origin. ' 
(Hansard*9 December 1985) 
The notion of criminality as a cultural trait - and the r6le of this in the arguments of 'The New 
Right'are well documented in Barker (198 1) and in Gordon and Klug (1986). Examples from the 
media include Peregrine Worsthome in the Sunday Telegraph of 29 November 198 1: 
Discussion of 'race' issues, however, may be conducted without explicit reference to ethnic 
minorities. Especially in dlite and political circles a coded language may increasingly be employed 
to make essentially racist arguments without providing verbal proof of racism. (Reeves 1983). 
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'Brixton is the iceberg tip of a crisis of ethnic criminality which is not Britain's fault - 
except in the sense that her rulers unnecessarily imported it... ' 
And similar arguments have been advanced by academics. Tbus Gordon and Klug quote from a 
Cambridge don (John Casey) who wrote in the first edition of the Salisbury Review that 
'West Indians ... especially the Jamaicans, and above all those actually born in this 
country ... [are] structurally likely to be at odds with English civilisation... ' 
(op. cit. Autumn 1982) 
He referred to their 'vastly disproportionate' involvement in violent crime, to 'habits particularly 
characteristic of Jamaica, including .... a general rebelliousness... and, incidentally, that curious 
interest in fire' as well as to 'the West Indian lifestyle (which seems to include drugs and other 
unlawful activities). 
At a more day-to-day level, I personally recorded the following, telling comment by a police 
officer which shades from the cultural into the biological: 
'These are black crimes. I've never nicked a white for bag-snatching yet. It just happens 
to be what they're good at: they're very quick with their hands. ' 
(Personal communication, Walthamstow 1980) 
Liberal interpretations 
Occupying the wide middle-ground of the spectrum are Benyorfs 'liberals' - commentators who 
attribute the involvement of ethnic minorities in crime - or, more generally, in disorder - to a 
combination of factors. Such is the variation in the relative weight they give to these factors and 
the relationship they describe between them that many would not accept that they can be grouped 
together in this way. The argument here is that they are linked inasmuch as all take some account 
of socio-econon-dc factors. However, there are marked differences of emphasis even in respect 
of this apparently common ground. 
Some liberal convnentators stress the need to view the problem in a broader 'race'-neutral context 
which has two particular reference points. One is the well-established link between criminal 
15 
activity and socio-economic status. As one puts it: 
'If black over-offending constitutes at least part of the explanation for their high arrest 
rates, then it puts back squarely on the agenda the question of disadvantage and crime. 
For, if blacks are disproportionately involved in known offending behaviour, they also 
have much higher rates of social disadvantage .... Since known offenders are disproportionately drawn from the ranks of manual workers, the unemployed and the 
socially deprived, the higher black arrest and offender rates should not particularly 
surprise! 
(Jefferson 1991 p. 181) 
The other reference point in this wider context is a historical perspective through which 
commentators variously recall thaL on the one hand, levels of crime and disorder have long been 
the focus of public concern and, on the other, that certain groups within society have been the 
bearers of these concerns. These themes are too widely covered to provide a ful. 1 list of references; 
but specific mention should be made of the classic studies by Cohen ( 'Folk Devils and Moral 
Panics', 1980) and Pearson (Hooligan: A History of Respectable Fears' 1983) on which many 
writers more specifically concerned than Cohen or Pearson with issues of 'race' and crime, have 
subsequently drawn. 
Others, while subscribing to the importance of structural factors, have emphasised the 
particularity of the socio-econon-dc position of ethnic minorities much of which, they argue, is 
attributable to direct and indirect discrin-dnation and to the cumulative effects of these over time. 
IEs approach is most famously identified with Lord Scarman who, in insisting on broadening the 
terms of reference of his inquiry into the Brixton disorders to include social questions (Scan-nan 
198 1), earned a special place in the 'liberal' pantheon. However, critics of the use he made of this 
opportunity - and, in particular, of his treatment of issues of 'race' and crime - have included 
liberals as well as radicals. Lustgarten fires this well-fashioned broadside: 
'Identifying an issue in ethnic terms may get it taken more seriously ... but may also mean 
that fundamental causes or relationships are obscured .... the part 
is taken for the whole. ' 
(Lustgarten 1983 p. 237) 
And he continues: 
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'.. it is important to avoid adopting the narrow view that reduces issues ... to a sub- 
category of race relations. Lord Scarman, unfortunately, set the pattern ... His insistence - 
which won general approval on the Left - upon extending his brief to include a long 
excursis on racial disadvantage gave this element undue pron-dnence. " 
(Emphasis added) 
(op. cit. p. 240) 
That is, conumntators in this middle band agree on the centrality of socio-economic factors, but 
they already differ in the ways in which they interpret the influence of these; and they polarise 
more starkly in terms of the additional factors involved. Some seem to verge on (and even to 
espouse) conservative interpretations. David Smith, for example, who is a key figure in the 
literature documenting racial disadvantage (Smith 1977,198 1), appears to adopt a position which 
differs little from that of the New Right: 
'It is often reported that 40 years ago the police used to behave extremely badly in the 
East End, and yet in general that did not lead to anti police riots in the same sense that we 
have seen them recently. Maybe this is connected with changes in expectations which are 
in turn connected with the introduction of ethnic minorities in the cities... 
In social anthropological research it has been found that individual West Indian boys or 
young men will respond in quite an emotional way to accounts of experiences quite 
remote from their personal lives of some Idnd of bad behaviour by the police or any kind 
of oppression as they see it towards members of their group. ' 
(emphasis added) 
(Smith 1987 p. 7 1) 
Among the most controversial of the 'liberal' interpretations is the work of the 'New Left 
Realists', in particular Lea and Young whose essay on the riots of 1981 begins in the same vein 
as Smith by pointing out that 
LAistgartes main concern. however, was not with Scarman's position in the 'race' and crime debate 
but with his narrow concern with police relations with ethnic minorities (rather than with the wider 
working class). Coupled with this was what Lustgarten viewed as Scarman's idealised notion of 
police discretion and his further tendency to imbue this with the spurious cloak of 'professionalism'. 
In this combination he foresaw (perhaps prophetically) a serious threat to the wider debate about 
police accountability which had begun to rage at around the same time. 
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, ... while the widespread rioting of 1981 seems almost an obvious reflex of economic 
collapse, there were no disturbances of anything like the same proportions during the 
1930s. ' 
(in Cowell, Jones and Young 1982 p. 5) 
Here, and especially in a fuller essay (Lea and Young 1984) which responds to the criticism 
provoked by that in 1982, they develop 'A Subcultural Approach to Race and Crime' (op. cit. 
1984 p. 124). They start from assuming a link between deprivation and crime; but they focus on 
criminal activity among ýsecond generation West Indian youth' as a very particular manifestation 
of that link. 'Conservative' and 'liberal' explanations alike, they argue, have failed to explain the 
connection; but their most detailed (and, often, emotive) criticism is directed at the latter. Their 
own position may be summarised as follows. 
Lea and Young accept as fact that there is a higher crime rate among 'second generation West 
Indian youth' and that it manifests in a distinctive pattern of criminal activity (in particular, 
mugging). They strongly contest any notion that this activity is 'political' (as opposed to purely 
I predatory' and 'anti-sociar); and their premise that this is not due simply to deprivation or to the 
experience of racism rests largely on the twin observations that the first generation of 'West 
Indians'did not exhibit the same pattern and - importantly - nor do 'Asian' youth. They start from 
an assumption that 
'Different ethnic groups react differently to deprivation... ' 
and go on to elaborate the notion that 
I the crime rate is neither wholly a function of ... material conditions ... nor of a particular 
culture, but a complex interaction between the two. Subcultures arise out of material 
conditions, but at the same time the culture a group carries with it into a new situation will 
influence how the new material conditions wiU be experienced, enjoyed or actively fought. 
The existing culture will provide a major part of the raw material out of which a new 
cultural adaptation will be worked. ' 
(op. cit. 1984 p. 133) 
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They explain that 
Me economic alienation of young black people gives rise to a culture with a propensity 
for crime. ' 
(op. cit. 1982 p. 12) 
and go on to argue that this culture 
'.. is not a hand-down from the previous generation of inunigrant parents as the 
conservative thesis of "alien cultures" would suggest. Rather, it is an improvised culture 
based on the import of elements from the West Indies by kids most of whom either have 
never been there or left when they were very young .... (S)uch culture is widely disapproved of by the older generation of West Indian immigrants and is, furthermore, a 
minority and deviant sub-culture within the West Indies itself. ' 
(op. cit. 1984 p. 127) 
As to why young Asians have not fbHowed the same path, Lea and Young advance the 
explanation that Asians have been 'comparatively' insulated from 'the process of relative 
deprivation for two reasons: 
'First, by comparison with West Indian youth, Asians have a more substantive opportunity 
structure within their own community. This is related to the comparatively larger size of 
the professional and business class in the Asian community. Secondly, the distance 
between Asian culture and indigenous British culture is greater than that between the 
latter and West Indian culture. Assimilation to indigenous British standards and aspirations 
has thus probably been a more rapid process for youth of West Indian parentage and 
hence relative deprivation [is] felt more acutely with the consequent fostering of a deviant 
counter culture. ' 
(op. cit. 1982 p. 8) 
Finally, at the opposite (radical) end of the liberal spectrum described in this section, other authors 
acknowledge that structural factors do not offer a full explanation and that what remains 
unexplained has to be accounted for in terms which are specific to the ethnic groups in question. 
However, rather than cast the ethnic component of this account in terms of inherent cultural 
characteristics, they draw on notions of conditioned responses to discriminatory and oppressive 
policing which, over time, have developed as a force in their own right, powering an apparently 
descending spiral. 711us Jefferson refers to 
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'the consequence of the mutual hostility between blacks and police as a self-fulfilling 
prophecy which can produce a deadly dynamic of mutual distrust, tension, hostility and 
eventually hatred'. 
(op. cit. p. 135) 
Radical interpretations 
VVUle Jefferson shares this perception with others who might broadly be thought of as belonging 
to the liberal camp, it is unsurprising to find him providing the bridge to the radicals inasmuch as 
he was one of the authors of 'Policing the Crisis'. This is one of the major works associated with 
the radical position. Indeed, Hall et al. self-consciously warn in their Introduction that: 
'Liberals, people of goodwill, active in the cause of penal reform or improving race 
relations, will like it least of all... ' 
(op. cit. Introduction p. ix) 
The radicals share some key points of reference with the liberals - especially the centrality of 
socio-econon-dc factors (including those which are specific to ethnic minorities) and of 
discrimination (both in its widest sense and by the police in particular). However, the influence 
of these factors is viewed within a wider and more expressly political framework - one in which 
the state and its agents (in this instance the police, with the assistance of the media) traditionally 
serve their own ends by designating certain groups as threats to society at large. Very broadly, 
the radical interpretation holds that, at the present historical juncture, certain ethnic minorities 
who have served the state's purpose of supplying labour when required but who have been kept 
from M participation in British society (including through the denial of equal rights) are variously 
the bearers of, distractions from and scapegoats for the crisis of capitalism and the related crisis 
of state authority. 
What broadly distinguishes the radical from the liberal position is that, in the radical analysis, 
issues of 'race' and crime (and, recently, civil disorder) take on additional political significance. 
On the one hand, ethnic minorities are seen as systematically criminalised - both because the social 
and economic position in which they are kept by the state offers them no alternative and because 
they are picked on unfairly by the police (sometimes with the effect of drawing them into criminal 
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activity). On the other, the minorities themselves are seen as developing strategies of resistance 
to this oppression. Ilese include civil disorder - hence the convention among 'radical' writers of 
referring to the riots of the 1980s as 'uprisings' or 'rebellions' - and the adoption of criminal 
Efestyles in preference to the r8les allotted to them by the state. 
Again, there are variations in the emphases of radical authors. The authors of 'Policing the Crisis' 
rehearse the positions variously taken by black writers (of West Indian origin) associated, on the 
one hand, with 'Race To-day' and, on the other, with 'the Black Liberator'. And the book's final 
chapter struggles with moral questions - for example concerning the victims of criminal activity 
and the longer-term consequences of crin-drialisation in the cause of political expedience. T11e 
authors appear to flirt with different interpretations and variously to hide from or try 
(unsuccessfully) to reconcile some of the contradictions and dilemmas thrown up in the course 
of their collective enterprise, Inasmuch as they reach a conclusion about the articulation of black 
criminal activity and politics, it is 
that there is, as yet, no active politics, no form of organised struggle, and no strategy 
which is able adequately and decisively to intervene in the quasi-rebellion of the black 
wageless such as would be capable of bringing about that break in the current false 
appropriations of oppression through crime - that critical transformation of the 
criminalised consciousness into something more sustained and thorough-going in a 
political sense. ' 
(op. ciL pp. 396n) 
Writing in the 1980s, - and similarly preoccupied with the relevance or otherwise of Marxist 
analysis to their project - Solomos and Gilroy in particular develop these radical interpretations 
with the dubious benefit of hindsight on the riots. Solomos, for example in'Black Youth, Racism 
and the State', describes how (and why) the state constructs a problem category of 'Black Youth' 
and the role played by issues of law and order in this construction. And Gilroy more directly 
challenges liberals and earlier radicals alike - above all for engaging in a debate about the precise 
scale, level and nature of black crininality, a debate which he sees as designed to distract attention 
from the real issues and which simply reinforces a narrow and negatively stereotyping view of 
these activities. Thus he writes of the 'moralism' which appears 
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%. wherever "left" crin-dnologists address the vexed issue of "street crime". Jock Young, 
rather than account for the ideological power of "mugging" or confront its racial 
connotations with precision or honesty, argues that it is "qualitatively different" from other 
forms of "crime ...... 
(Gilroy 1982 p. 150) 
He concedes that'Hall et al. 's view of the progression from proto-political to "organized" forms 
of class struggle' at least 'bypasses' this moralism; yet 
%. they too encounter problems around the conception of "criminality" which is not 
subjected to the rigorous interrogation they accord its specific representation as 
"mugging". They obscure the coniplex relation between behaviour designated criminal and 
political consciousness, by conceding the reality of "false appropriations of oppression 
through crime". This opens the door to conceptions of black culture and political 
traditions generating criminality. ' 
(op. cit. p. 15 1) 
He goes on in later work to develop a much ft&r theory of the significance of 'race' in new (post 
Marxist) social/political movements and the place of crime within this. Consciously focusing on 
the riots - since traditional 'crime' figures are individuated and therefore serve to obscure the 
collective dimension which is central to his thesis - he argues: 
'The riots during the summer of 1981 and the autumn of 1985 were described by the left 
as "barbarous acts of criminality"and symptoms of the "absence of any viable tradition of 
ethnic politics" while the right argued that they were a "cry for loot rather than a cry for 
help". Yet ... evidence ... does support a view of their origins in a social movement. I want to suggest that these forms of protest can be interpreted in a way which does not 
reduce them to either "marginality" or "deviance", term which imply that they are nothing 
more than crude reactions to crisis, lacIdng cognitive, affective and normative dimensions. ' 
'Disorderly protests', he concludes 
'.. reflect the experiences of participants and by conveying antagonism against the world 
as it is, they can be shown to embody a view of how participants would like it to be. ' 
(Gilroy 1987 p. 237) 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Despite the wide range of political perspectives on questions of 'race' and crime, what is striking 
is the consensus which underlies any discussion of these issues. Essentially, it is accepted that 
there is a particular problem of law and order associated with ethnic minorities. More specifically, 
the problem is associated with black youths of West Indian origin (most of whom by now have 
been bom in Britain). The apparently relatively low rate of criminal activity among Asians gives 
succour to those who believe that these are questions of innate 'cultural' tendencies, and this has 
posed obvious difficulties for those who invoke deprivation and discrimination to explain the 
problem. The latter have generally failed to address the issue, and where they have tried to do so 
(Hall et al 1978, Lea and Young 1982,1984, Jefferson 1991) they have themselves sailed near 
the wind of 'culturar explanations or, even, (in the case of the New Left Realists) appear to have 
elaborated new versions of these. 
For present purposes, no further attempt will be made to assess the relative merits of this range 
of interpretations. Rather, we first need to review the empirical evidence currently available on 
the existence of the problem 
its dimensions and 
its causes. 
This is summarised in Chapter Two and supplemented by additional, new material in Chapters 
Three, Four and Five. The conclusions drawn by Chapter Six implicitly evaluate the theories 
outlirý in this chapter in the light of an unapologetically sceptical empiricism. They also attempt 
to build on those elements of the theories which best withstand this test. For the underlying aims 
of the thesis are 
a) to contribute (however modestly) to the development of better grounded understandings 
of the problem and 
b) thereby, to provide a basis for policies and practices which stand a chance of being 
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effective in a real world which is complex and in circumstances which will always be less 
than ideal. 
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Chapter Two 
The story so far 
Only a very small proportion of crimes actually committed are dealt with by the criminal justice 
systerný, so those who show up in criminal justice statistics are not necessarily typical of offenders. 
Moreover, a proportion of those brought into the system as suspects are innocent of any offence; 
and there are a number of key decision making points between initial contact with the system and 
. onnrnt, which is its ultimate sanction. 7bat is, the system itself consists in a series of filters: 
at each stage, a large number of suspects (in some instances, the majority) are diverted from it: 
relatively few complete the full course - or, as some would see it, circuit - from initial contact 
with the police to imprisonment. Before turning to examine the empirical evidence of ethnic 
minority involvement with the system, therefore, it is worth 
a) comparing ethnic minority groups with whites to see if there are differences which 
n-dght trigger these filters differently for different groups and 
b) looking in more detail at the way the filters operate. 
INTER-MNIC COMPARISONS 
The 1991 Census - which was the first to ask directly about the ethnic origin of respondents (in 
addition to place of birth) - provides the most authoritative information to date on ethnic 
minorities in Great Britain. Prior to that, since 1981 the best available source was the Labour 
Force Survey (LFS)2 data. This had also included a question on ethnic origin but, because of the 
sample size, data had to be aggregated over three years to maximise reliability and, even so, 
British Crime Surveys conducted by the Home Office in 1982,1984,1988 and 1992 have 
consistently highlighted the discrepancy between the level of crime experienced by respondents and 
those contained in police statistics. The 1992 report suggests that 70 per cent of all crime went 
uniqxrted or unrecorded (Mayhew and Aye Mating 1992). And, of crimes recorded, the percentage 
actually cleared up stood at about a quarter in 1992 (Home Office 1993) 
The Labour Force Survey has an annual sample size of 150,000 adult respondents and 
includes questions on family composition. 
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numbers were too small satisfactorily to provide ethnic information at sub-regional level. 
Together, the ethnic minorities identified by the Census make up about five and a half per cent of 
the total GB population and six per cent of that of England and Wales. Of these groups, the 
largest consists in people of Indian origin (see Table 2: 1), followed by Pakistanis and Black 
Caribbeans. The Bangladeshis, in fact, are fewer in number than the Black African or Other Asian 
populations and no larger than the Chinese or Black Other groups, but special reference must be 
made to them inasmuch as - because of their origins in the Indian subcontinent, their 
predominantly Muslim religious affiliation (Brown 1984) and their socio-economic position in 
Britain - they are often grouped with the Pakistanis. 
It is worth noting here that the Census categories are different from those used in the LFS up to 
1991. In particular, the US included a 'n-dxed' category which was the fourth largest of the 
minority groups and comprised individuals predominantly of West Indian/White origin (Shaw 
1988). 
Table 2: 1 
Population composition of Great Britain by ethnic group 
Thousands Percentage of Percentage of all 
population ethnic minorities 
Black 
Caribbean 490 0.9 16 
African 220 OA 7 
Other 160 0.3 5 
Indian 820 1.5 27 
Pakistani 490 0.9 16 
Bangladeshi 160 0.3 5 
Chinese 160 0.3 5 
Other- Asian 220 0.4 7 
- Other 270 0.5 9 
All minority ethnic 3020 5.5 100 
groups 
White 1 51970 1 94.5 
Source: 1991 Census 
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The socio-econornic characteristics of the ethnic minority populations are different from those of 
whites at large in ways which may affect the likelihood of their involvement in crime and their 
contact with the criminal justice process. However, it is also important to take into account 
marked variations between the different ethnic minority groups themselves. 
By the beginning of the 1990s, the LFS showed that over half of the Black Caribbean group (and 
over 90 per cent of Black Caribbeans under the age of 30) had been bom in the U. K.; and this was 
also true of fully 85 per cent of the Black Other group. However, it applied to only just over a 
third of Bangladeshis, who were the most likely of all the 'Asian' groups to have been born abroad. 
This reflects the tin-dng of the arrival of the inunigrant generation (referred to in the previous 
chapter), which also explains why the ethnic minorities tend on average to be younger than whites. 
Table 2: 2 is based on the Census and shows that the age profile of the population of West Indian 
origin (the 'Black Caribbean' group) approximates most closely to the white; although it still 
contains a larger proportion at the peak ages for offending (between 14 and 21). The different 
'Asian! groups are younger still: in particular, over 40 per cent of Pakistanis and Bangladeshis are 
still aged under 16. But the youngest group of all - and one which, in terms of its relative size, will 
be of increasing importance for the future - is the 'Black Other' group. A large proportion of this 
category would appear to consist of individuals who would have been classified as 'n-dxed' in the 
LFS (see Chapter 6, Footnote 7). 
Table 2: 2 
Age structure by ethnic group 
Ethnic group Aged 0-4 Aged 5-15 Aged 16-24 Aged 25-44 Aged 45-64 
Black- 
Caribbean 
7.6% 14.3% 14.9% 32.7% 24.6% 5.7% 
Black African 11.8% 17.5% 16.6% 42.2% 10A% 1.5% 
Black Other 20.3% 30.3% 19.00/0 24.2% 5.001o 1.3% 
Indian 8.8% 20.7% 15.2% 34.6% 16.6% 4.1% 
Pakistani 13.1% 29.5% 17.5% 25.8% 12A% 1.7% 
BanRladeshi 15.1% 32.2% 17.6% 20.5% 13.5% 1.2% 
Chinese 7.1% 163% 17.9% 41.2% 14.3% 3.4% 
Other Asians 8.00/0 16.4% 14.7% 43.5% 15.0010 2.4% 
(Other) Other 16A% 25.3% 15.2% 29.6% 10.3% 3.2% 
White 6A% 13.07o 12.6% 29.017o 22.3% 16.7 
All 1 6.6% 1 13.5% 12.7% 1 29.2% 1 21.9% 16.07o 
Source: 1991 Census 
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Given the importance of area differences in the criminal justice system' it is worth highlighting the 
different patterns of distribution of the ethnic minorities. They are far more likely than whites to 
live in cities and, indeed, to be concentrated within certain wards within these. In 1982, Brown 
commented: 
,... a large proportion of the black population lives in a small number of local authority 
areas, and within these areas the black residents tend to be concentrated in a small number 
of electoral wards ... It also means that in most areas of the country there are very few black people indeed. Half the white population in Britain lives in towns and rural areas 
that have less than half of one per of their local residents coming from ethnic 
minorities .... at the level of census enumeration districts the pattern of concentration.. is 
very sharp. Three quarters of the black population lives in a set of EDs in which we find 
only a tenth of the white population. ' 
(Brown. op. cit. p. 20) 
Results from the 1991 Census suggest this picture broadly persists (OPCS 1996). Distribution 
varies at district or county level, for example, from nearly 45 per cent in the London Borough of 
Brent down to 0.4 per cent in Cumbria. Overall, some two thirds of local authority districts in 
Great Britain have ethnic minority populations of less than 2 per cent. Yet, even in areas of 
relatively high concentration, it is again important to note that there are variations between the 
minority groups considered in this research. According to the Census, for example, over half of 
the Black Caribbean, Black African, Bangladeshi and Other Asian groups are to be found in 
Greater London, but their pattern of dispersal beyond that is very different. The West Midlands 
actually has a higher proportion of Pakistanis than London and the number in West Yorkshire is 
not much lower. Although all minorities remain far more concentrated than whites in metropolitan 
areas, some are more dispersed than others, in particular the Black Other and Chinese groups. 
Tlere is no significant ethnic difference in the balance of males to females, particularly among the 
younger age groups which are of greatest interest for present purposes. However, it is worth 
comparing the socio-economic characteristics of both separately, in view of the very different 
level and pattern of representation of males and females in the criminal justice statistics (Newburn 
and Stanko 94). Certainly, there are socio-economic differences between men which might be 
relevant to their involvement with the criminal justice system. Of those in employment, the largest 
minority group (the Indians) are even more likely than whites to occupy non-manual jobs and are 
Area differences are illustrated in the 'Sentencing Profiles'for Crown Court centres included in the 
Tosts of the Criminal Justice System' publication issued under s. 95 of the Criminal Justice Act 
(Home Office 1992). 
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actually over-represented in the 'professional' category. Black Caribbeans, however, are under- 
represented in the professional and managerial group and nearly half occupy manual occupations, 
as do Pakistanis and Bangladeshis. Moreover, as Table 2: 3 shows, the true position of the latter 
two groups may be worse than appears, since 24 and 19 per cent respectively are self-employed 
(compared with 13 per cent of whites and only 7 per cent of Black Caribbeans). While these may 
be classified as holding managerial jobs, a large proportion may in fact be non-skilled workers 
who have become self-employed as an alternative to or consequence of unemployment (OPCS 
1996, op. cit. ). 
However, unemployment rates are higher for economically active men from all ethnic minorities, 
with the exception of the Chinese. As Table 2: 4 shows, 13 per cent of Indian men were 
unemployed in 1991, compared with 9 per cent of whites. This is only partly accounted for by age 
structure since the pattern remains in the 16-24 group. 
Table 2:. 4 
Unemployment by ethnic group (males) 
AU Age 16-24 
Black-Caribbean 25.2% 37.6% 
Black African 23.8% 41.6% 
Black Other 25.5% 35.2% 
Indian 13.4% 23.4% 
Paldstani 28.8% 36.1% 
Bangladeshi 30.9% 20.5% 
Chinese. 10.5% 15.4% 
Asian Other 14.2% 29.4% 
(Other) Other 19.7% 29.4% 
White 10.7% 17.4% 
I 
AU 
1 
9.3% 
1 
18.1% 
Source: 1991 Census 
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For women, a different ethnic pattern emerges from employment-related comparisons. Even when 
age differences are taken into account, women of Caribbean origin are very much more likely to be 
economically active (working or seeking work) than any other group of women. Compared with 
other working women, they are also much more likely to work full-time. (For details see Uglow and 
RtzGerald 1993). Pakistani and Bangladeshi women, on the other hand, are significantly less likely 
than whites or Indians to be economically active. 
There are ethnic differences also in family structure and composition which should be noted here 
inasmuch as they may have a bearing on criminal justice decisions. Chief amongst these is the much 
higher proportion of Black families headed by a single parent (41 per cent, compared with 13 per cent 
of white fan-dlies); but there are differences also in the average size of households which are only in 
part accounted for by the fact that the white population is older. The Census shows that, whereas only 
four per cent of white families and three per cent of Black Caribbean families consisted of two adults 
with three or more dependent children, the figure for Indian families was 11 per cent and for the 
Pakistanis and Bangladeshis it rose to 26 and 28 per cent respectively. 
Clearly it is important to take full account of this range of differences in tying to interpret ethnic 
differences at key filtering points in the criniinal justice process. However, it is important also to 
consider how far socio-economic differences can be conceived of as ethnically or 'racially' neutral. 
That is, we need to be clear whether it is pure coincidence for example that West Indians, Pakistanis 
and Bangladeshis are disproportionately found low status employment. The full reasons for the' 
differences are controversial and the elements of the debate are too complex fully to explore here. It 
is, though, worth bearing in n-dnd the classic definition by a House of Commons Select Committee 
of 'racial disadvantage'. 'Racial disadvantage' is 
I ... a particular case of relative disadvantage within society. With the exception of racial discrimination, the disadvantages suffered by Britain's ethnic minorities are shared in varying 
degrees by the rest of the community. Bad housing, unemployment, educational 
underachievement, a deprived physical environment, social tensions - none of these are the 
exclusive preserve of ethnic minorities... But the ethnic minorities suffer such disadvantages 
more than'the rest of the population, and more than they would if they were white. ' 
(HMSO 1981 para. 12) 
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Although the report does not suggest that discrin-driation is the major cause of this 'relative 
disadvantage', it does go on to assert that 
'if ethnic minorities were not the victims of direct and indirect discrimination in many areas 
of life, their disadvantages ... would be massively reduced... ' 
(emphasis added) 
(op. cit. para. 27) 
The issue of racial discrimination will be taken up more fully in subsequent chapters with particular 
reference to the criminal justice system For the present, it must simply be recalled (see Chapter One) 
that racial discrimination - in both its direct and indirect forms - is an empirically established 
phenomenon which has been addressed by legislation since 1965. Evidence of its persistence to the 
present day comes from a number of sources, including the cases brought annually before 
employment tribunals (the volume of which shows no sign of abating), in non-employment cases tried 
at the County Court and in the findings of formal investigations conducted by the Commission for 
Racial Equality (CRE Annual Reports). Moreover, the range of agencies - both public and private - 
within which discrimination has been found suggests that it is not confined to particular spheres of 
economic or social activity. 
THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESS 
'Mose who come into contact with the criminal jusfice system as suspects of crime and offenders are. 
not a representative cross section of the population at large. They tend to be young and male and to 
come from the poorer sections of society. Most of those who are weeded out at each of the decision- 
making points up to the point of imprisonment fall mainly into one of two categories: those who are 
innocent; and those who, although guilty of an offence, are thought not to warrant incarceration. 
The aim of the system have been surnmarised thus: 
'... to prevent and reduce crime, to dispense justice fairly, to protect the public, to punish the 
guilty and to acquit the innocent. ' 
(Home Office 1992 p. 2) 
Inevitably, it does not always live up to these aims in practice. Recent cases have heightened public 
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concern over serious failures to acquit the innocent. Moreover, the provisions of various statutes 
(from the Bail Act 1976 to the Criminal Justice Act 1991) - not to mention a steady flow of 
I guidelines' from the Lord Chancellor's Department - implicitly acknowledge problems of 
inconsistency in the way the system treats those it processes. For - albeit within certain defined, but 
fairly wide, parameters - it is undoubtedly capable of meting out different treatment to two similarly 
placed individuals who are guilty of the same offence. Even without any question of impropriety 
arising, decision making in the criminal justice process will be inconsistent to some degree for the 
following reasons: 
A very wide range of factors conr, into play in deternining each of the decisions taken at each 
stage in the process. 
Considerable discretion is available to individuals and to agencies in the balance they accord 
these factors in reaching their decision. 
Different patterns establish themselves between - and even within - areas in the way this 
discretion is exercised. 
A decision taken at one point in the system will determine the range within which future 
decisions may be taken', each of these future decisions wW in turn be subject to the same 
exercise of discretion, with the same potential knock-on effect. 
The key decision making points from entry to the system to imprisonment and the filters which, in 
principle, select out the innocent and those undeserving of incarceration are simply represented in 
Figure 2: 1. 
Broadly speaking, there are three routes through which people may be brought in to the system 
(although there may be some overlap between these). 71ey may commit an offence which a member 
of the public (usually the victim) reports to the police and may subsequently be detected on the basis 
of that report. 7bey may be apprehended as a result of proactive policing, including forms of 
surveillance, searches and police stops. And they may be deemed to have committed offences against 
the police themselves. 
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Following this initial contact, many people proceed no further into the system. Suspects of reported 
crime, for example, may not be identified by the victim as the person responsible; few stops result in 
arrests - because they uncover so few offences-, and the police may decide not to arrest in situations 
where technically they have the power to do so. 
If an arrest is made, this does not necessarily lead to a decision to charge - in part because the police 
need to establish whether there are sufficient grounds for charging. Ile charge which is then brought 
rruy sometirnes be chosen from two or more possibilities where the substantive offence falls (as many 
do) in the area where these may overlap. However. the person charged may still not be prosecuted 
but may instead be cautioned. Whether this option is available depends on a number of factors. Key 
among these is whether the person adn-dts guilt; but, even when this is the case, eligibility for 
cautioning is detern-dned by considerations which include the individual's home circumstances, 
previous convictions and whether the victim is prepared to forego prosecution. 
If a caution is ruled out, the Crown Prosecution Service - which was established in 1986 - takes a 
decision whether to ratify both the decision to prosecute and the charge brought by the police. In the 
great majority of cases these are not contested by the CPS (Gelsthorpe and Giller 1990, McConville 
and Sanders 1992). It should also be noted that it is still possible at this stage for the police 
themselves to decide to take no further action. Those who are prosecuted may be entitled to 
assistance with legal representation, depending on their financial circumstances; but there are 
inconsistencies in the extent to which this facility is both taken up by and granted to those who are 
apparently eligible on these grounds. 
Some charges are triable only on indictment: that is, they have to go to Crown Court. However, many 
are triable-either-way: the accused may elect to be tried in a magistrates' court or to appear before 
a judge and jury at the Crown Court; but magistrates also have the right to refuse jurisdiction in such 
cases and to override accuseds'choice by sending the case to the Crown Court. While awaiting trial, 
they may be set at liberty or held in custody at the discretion of the police, depending on the 
seriousness of the charge brought and on other factors such as the police's judgement about their 
likelihood of interfering with witnesses or of turning up for the trial (which may, in turn hinge on an 
assessment of their domestic circumstances). If the trial is adjourned, the court wM then decide 
whether to remand the accused until it resumes. Similar considerations come into play as are 
supposed to govern the police decision and, in practice, it is rare for someone who has already been 
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remanded in police custody to be bailed by the courts. 
Where the accused is already under some form of supervision (whether by the Probation Service or, 
in the case of a juvenile, in the care of a local authority) other agencies will provide reports on them 
which provide background for the court. Where they pleaded not guilty, they were also referred to 
the Probation Service for the preparation of a'social inquiry report'until the 1991 Criminal Justice 
Act which extended this provision to all defendants, irrespective of plea("). Further, the accused's legal 
advisers may commission reports (for example from employers or medical practitioners to provide 
background which may assist their case). And the court itself may caU for reports (for example where 
there is doubt about the accused's fitness to plead) - both in the course of the trial and, if s/he is found 
guilty - before passing sentence. 
Conventionally, acquittal is not synonymous with innocence: the fact that the charge brought has not 
been proven may simply reflect the absence of sufficiently strong evidence to support a presumption 
of Suilt. In Crown Court trials, acquittal rates are higher than for cases heard at magistrates' courts. 
However, where the accused is found guilty, penalties at the Crown Court are likely to be harsher. 
In part this reflects the generally greater seriousness of the cases heard at the Crown Court. In part 
it also reflects the stronger powers available to it. Indeed, magistrates have the power to refer cases 
which they have heard to the Crown Court for sentence if they think this more appropriate. But 
unexpLiined differences remain nonetheless. Hedderman and Moxon (1992) - who matched 758 cases 
on nine key characteristics - found that custody was used almost three times as often where. 
defendants had elected trial in the Crown Court and that sentences were, on average, about two and 
a half times longer. Also there are many factors which influence the type and the severity of the 
sentence meted out in both courts. Chief amongst these are the seriousness of the offence, the 
offenders'previous convictions, whether or not they pleaded guilty (with a discount for a 'guilty' plea) 
and the content of any reports (although the amount of influence which these have may vary 
considerably). Moxon, in fact, identifies no fewer than 19 factors which had a significant mitigating 
effect on sentencing in the Crown Court, sparing the defendant the full rigour of the penalty which 
the judge had the power to fiWose (Moxon 1988). By contrast, only eight factors had an 'aggravating' 
effect. Again, it should be noted that some defendants may be further remanded in custody while 
awaiting sentence and that a certain proportion of these will ultimately receive non-custodial 
disposals. 
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ETHNIC MINORITIES AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
Over the past fifteen years or so a number of empirical studies have been made of ethnic minorities 
and the crhi*W justice system in the United Kingdom. They have, however, often been confined to 
particular localities - so that it may not be safe to generalise from their findings, given what is known 
about local variations in crimM justice practices. They have also tended to focus on particular 
decision-making points in the system rather than on the system as a whole. Some have been 
methodologically flawed. Few have been able to take into account all the variables which influence 
particular decisions (and which might, therefore, explain apparent ethnic differences). And some of 
the findings of early studies may now be out of date. 
It is tempting to turn to the much richer American literature for illumination and some authors have, 
indeed, done so. Certainly this may usefully refirte the research questions on which further empirical 
studies might be based. However, there are several reasons why it would be dangerous to try to read 
across the findings of empirical research for ethnic groups in the U. S. A. One is that the same ethnic 
categories in the two countries do not necessarily refer to the same groups. Also, patterns of social 
relations and the variation in geographic and socio-economic distribution within and between the 
different ethnic groups are different in the two countries in important respects (which, in turn, are 
often related to differences of history and in the size of the groups). Nor are the two countries strictly 
comparable in terms of levels and patterns of crime and the workings of their criminal justice systems. 
And, finally, to make ready assumptions of ethnic sin-dlarities would be to run the risk of 
pathologising - of assuming that, even where there are important differences in their social, cultural 
and criminal justice environments, certain ethnic groups exhibit identical patterns of behaviour - 
patterns which, by extension, are assumed to be determined by their ethnicity. 
In the U. K., the prison statistics are the only national criminal justice data which have an ethnic 
breakdown and are capable of showing trends over time. Initially prisoners were supposed to be 
classified on the basis of their ethnic appearance; but a revised system in 1992 forinalised the practice 
of asking prisoners to classify themselves and used new categories which were consistent with the 
1991 Census. Although the pre-and post-1992 data are not strictly comparable, the two systems 
approximate closely and the trends over time are consistent. 
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Table 2: 5 
Ethnic composition of the prison population 
(England and Wales) 
June 1985 to June 1995 
row percentages 
White Black Asian Chinese/ Other/ 
Not recorded 
Males 
1985 83 8 2 7 
1995 83 11 3 3 
Females 
1985 78 1 12 2 8 
1995 76 
1 
20 1 4 
Source: Prison Statistics 
As rnentioned in Chapter One, the figures have always been interpreted as showing that black people - 
and in particular black women - are massively over-represented in the prison population relative to 
their presence in the population at large. However, only since 1992 has it been possible reliably to 
identify the proportion of prisoners in each ethnic group who are foreign nationals. Once these are 
excluded from the picture, the black over-representation remains. As Table 2: 6 shows, it reduces only 
marginally for men; but the fall for women is dramatic. 
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Table 2: 6 
Prison population at 1995 (British nationals only) 
White Black Asian Chinese and 
other 
Male Female Male Female Male Female Male 
I 
Female 
Prisoners 87.1 86.1 9.7 11.0 1.9 0.9 13 2.0 
General 
population I 
95.4 
I 
953 
I 
1.2 
I 
1.5 
I 
2.7 
I 
2A 
I 
0.7 
I 
0.7 
Figures for the male population aged 15-64 and females aged 15-54 (British nationals only) 
Thus, it is safe to say that there has been an over-representation of black people in the prison 
population at least since figures have been kept; but it is more difficult to be sure of trends until 
several more years data are available on British nationals only. It is, nonetheless, possible tentatively 
to draw some inferences from the ratio of young offenders to adult prisoners in each ethnic group. 
Table 2: 7 gives previously unpublished data for British nationals, broken down for the first time by 
the subgroups within the 'blacle and 'Asian' categories. 
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Table 2: 7 
Male British national prisoners 
by age and disaggregated ethnic group 
(June 1995) 
As % of Young 
Offenders 
As % Adult 
Prisoners 
Young Offenders as 
% of total 
White 87.9 87.8 17.4 
Black 8.4 9.3 19.7 
Black African 1.1 1.1 20.4 
Black Caribbean 5.6 5.9 18.9 
Black Other 1.7 2.2 21.4 
Asian 2.5 1.7 23.7 
Indian 1.0 0.7 21.8 
Pakistani 1.4 0.9 26. 
Bangladeshi 0.2 0.1 
N 7977 36964 
* Ns too small (16 young offenders and 8 adults) 
This suggests that, in the future, the Asian groups may form an increasing proportion of the male 
prison population while the proportion of black prisoners will stabilise or decline slightly. In part, this 
picture reflects the relative demographic profiles of the different groups. This is shown in Table 2: 2 
where it is worth focussing on the 5-15 age band who were 9-19 in the year to which these prison 
statistics relate. That is, if age is controlled for, black people will remain over-represented relative to 
their numbers in the population at large and the 'Asian' group as a whole will not - or the over- 
representation will be so marginal relative to that of the black groups that it will not be seen as 
significant. Table 2: 7, however, highlights the extent to which the 'Asian' total generally is driven by 
the Pakistani rather than the Indian group; and this is likely to become even more the case in the 
future. 
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With regard to patterns of offending, even comparisons which are limited to British nationals, 
continue to show quite marked differences between ethnic groups. (Figures for Asian females are not 
included since they numbered only twelve. ) 
Table 2: 8 
Adult sentenced prisoners 1995 
Offence group by ethnic origin and gender 
(British nationals only) 
column percentages 
White Black Asian 
Males Females Males Females Males 
Violence against 
the person 
23 21 20 13 20 
Rape 5 - 5 - 4 
Other sexual 
offences 
6 - 1 2 
Burglary 17 5 12 - 8 
Robbery 13 8 26 11 15 
lbeft/handling 10 23 6 10 7 
Fraud and forgery 3 7 2 10 7 
Drug offences 8 18 15 44 14 
Other offences 12 10 7 18 
N 30Z 1063 3201 132 1 654 
Figures not included where nunibers fell below 10 
Particularly of note here are: 
the relatively high proportion of white males and females imprisoned for offences of violence 
compared to the Black groups 
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the relatively high proportion of white male prisoners in the burglary category 
the relatively high proportion of Black male prisoners convicted of robbery (twice the rate for 
whites) 
a higher proportion of white female prisoners convicted of theft/handling offences 
and very strildngly higher proportions of the minorities imprisoned for drugs offences - which 
accounted for nearly half of all black female prisoners. 
In sum, even the more refined prison statistics which have become available recently provide clear 
evidence of the cause for concern which had variously been expressed for up to twenty years before 
they began to be kept (see Chapter One). Yet, although they are the best established and most 
comprehensive set of official data on race and crime, a number of limitations and problems of 
interpretation attach to them which it will be necessary to return to in later discussion. Certainly they 
are not sufficient of themselves to provide explanations for the black over-representation they show; 
two sets of outstanding questions remain. The first concerns whether they reflect actual levels and 
patterns of offending among different ethnic groups. Mie second is a set of questions about the 
influence of decisions made at previous points in the crhrdnal justice process on the picture they 
present. 
With respect to the first set of questions, the published evidence is nugatory. At the time of writing - 
none of the main longitudinal U. K. studies of criminal careers". (Farrington and West 1990, Kolvin 
et al 1990, HOSB 1989) nor other surveys of self-reported offending (Kinsey 1992) had asked for 
information on the ethnic origin of the individuals they covered. However, a 1993 Home Office 
survey offers some limited evidence that black young people aged 14-25 had similar rates of offending 
as their white peers and that rates were actually lower in all the Asian groups (Graham and Bowling 
1995). 
See Graham (1988) for an overview. 
Numbers were relatively small: with only 86 black respondents in the male sample and only a minority of any group 
admitting to offending of any kind, little meaning can be attached to apparent variations in types of offending. 
InterpretJmg the results, however, is further complicated by the fact that a much higher proportion of ethnic minority 
respondents than whites either declined to answer the questions on offending at all or answered them only partWly. 
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With respect to decision making at earlier points in the crin-dnal justice process, the evidence is 
inconclusive for the reasons outlined at the beginning of this section. What there is is summarised here 
in two parts. The first covers the early stages of the system where the key decisions are made by the 
police. And the second covers those taken at the court stage. It is iniportant to bear in min d that many 
- although by no means all - of the decisions taken at the second stage are determined to some 
significant extent by those already taken at the first. 
Police decisions 
Albeit fragmentary and incomplete, enough is known to provide a sketch of the situation of ethnic 
minorities at the point of entry to the criminal justice system. Indeed, a relatively large number of 
studies have looked at the rate at which the police stop ethnic minorities relative to whites. One of 
the earliest of these (Tuck and Southgate 1981) suggested that there were no significant differences 
between Afro-Caribbeans and whites within relatively small areas (that is, areas which fell within a 
single police division). Their findings in central Manchester in 1980 tend to be confirmed by those of 
a local study in Leeds in 1987 (Walker et al. 1990). Yet other studies (Jones et al. 1986, Norris et al. 
1992, Young 1994) and, in particular, the national data from the 1988 British Crime Survey (Skogan 
1990) have consistently found that black people are more likely than any other group to be stopped. 
This analysis of the BCS found that significant differences remained even after allowing for all other 
relevant variables. And, although the BCS was unable to control very tightly for area, London studies 
which have done so (Willis 1983, Jones et al. 1986, Norris et al. 1992) have confirmed the BCS 
finding. Where Asians have been considered at all (Walker et al. 1990, Skogan 1990) they appear less 
likely to be stopped than blacks or whites. 
Such encounters may be important in forrning attitudes and, even, in the openings they create for 
conflict with the police which may of themselves lead to arrest. It is important to bear in mind, too, 
that stop powers are used to very differing degrees by different police forces (and, even, divisions) 
as later chapters of this thesis illustrate. However, it should be noted that only a very small proportion 
of stops lead to any further action. Even where arrests are made, these are rarely for serious offences; 
indeed Jones et al. suggest that they may simply result in prosecutions for possession of cannabis. 
nere is, however, very little ethnically-based information on other points of initial contact with the 
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criminal justice system even though these are more likely than stops to result in arrest and charge. It 
has been suggested (Smith 1983; Hewstone, Benn and Wilson 1988) that victims of crime may be 
more likely to report offences if they know the perpetrator to be a member of a different ethnic group-, 
and this is tentatively supported by more recent analysis of the British Crime Survey (FitzGerald and 
Hale 1996)' Similarly, despite frequent allegations by campaigning groups that black encounters with 
the police may disproportionately result in them being charged with offences such as 'obstruction', 
there is no firm statistical evidence on this point. However, a number of studies in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s - many of which referred to the now abolished 'Sus' laws (see Chapter One) - remarked 
on the greater likelihood of black people being arrested as a result of proactive policing (Demuth 
1978, Stevens and Willis 1979, Fludger 1981 and Cain and Sadigh 1982). A Home Office study of 
the operation of the Public Order Act (Brown and Ellis 1994) has now added further weight to this 
suggestion. This found not only that, in more than a quarter of the cases analysed, the police had used 
s. 5 of the Act against individuals who offended them rather than members of the public, but also that 
the individuals who fell foul of them in this way appeared disproportionately to be black. And in 
Hood's Birmingham sample, blacks were significantly more likely to have been arrested on the direct 
initiative of the police (Hood 1992). 
However they enter the system, evidence in London - including, importantly, the large dataset 
generated by the Metropolitan Police (see Chapter One) - has consistently found that arrest rates 
are higher for blacks than for whites (Stevens and Willis 1979, Smith 1983, HOSB 5/89) and Walker 
et al came to the same conclusion in Leeds. Also, there is a suggestion that overall differences - far 
from being explicable in terms of dfferences in age structure - actually mask still higher rates of arrest 
of young black people relative to whites (Smith 1983, HOSB 5/89). Both Smith and Walker raise the 
possibility that their risk of arrest is higher in areas where ethnic minorities are fewer in number; - 
indeed, Walker claim that in localities with larger ethnic minority populations, it is the arrest rate for 
This found that whites were more likely to report crimes they believe were committed by ethnic minorities (44 per 
cent) than those corrunitted by whites (40 per cent). However, the numbers involved are too small to control for 
different types of offence which might alter the general picture since some crimes are more likely to be reported 
than others. 
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whites which is higher. And Walker and her colleagues go on to speculate that the black people 
arrested in areas where they were fewer in number might also differ noticeably from local whites. For 
example, they might be council tenants living in a pocket of relative deprivation in an otherwise 
middle-class neighbourbood (Jefferson and Walker 1992). 
The prison statistics (see earlier, Tables 2: 7 and 2: 8) confirm that there are significant differences in 
the charges brought against different ethnic groups. And reference has also been made to the 
possibility that black people are more likely to be charged with victimless crimes, as a result of more 
proactive policing. Walker (1988,1989), in her analysis of the Met data, remarks on the fact that 
black defendants are more likely to be charged with indictable-only offences; and, although she 
repudiates the inference that this is because that they commit more serious crimes (since many 
comparable offences are triable-either-way) the consequences may nonetheless be more serious. 
Moreover, other commentators have certainly implied that the charges brought against blacks are 
more serious than for whites conunitting the sarne substantive criminal act. Blom-Cooper and Drabble 
(1982) strongly suggest that this is a result of differences in charging practices between police 
divisions, while Hudson (1989) goes further and encourages an inference of more direct 
discrimination. 
The question of whether those arrested have no further action taken against them has received 
remarkably little attention, although it is interesting to note that the Leeds study by Walker et al. 
found that this was much more likely in the case of Asians. Until recently, the only detailed study of. 
the rate at which juveniles are diverted from the system by cautioning had only been addressed in a 
study-in London in 1978 (Landau 1981, Landau and Nathan 1983). This found that black youths were 
less likely than whites either to be referred to the Juvenile Bureau at all or to be cautioned if they were 
referred. Landau does not provide information on the proportion who were defacto ineligible for 
referral (and, therefore, for cautioning) because they refused to admit guilt, although other studies 
(see below) show that blacks are more likely to plead 'not guilty' to the charges against them. But he 
and Nathan point out that, of those referred to the bureaux, Afro-Caribbeans may have lost out on 
This finding shotdd be treated with some caution because of problems with the benchmark data used and the small 
sample size in areas of low ethnic minority population. It may, however, be worth noting that the white population 
in question appeared to be a more transient population than their black neighbours. 
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the social criteria for recommending a caution - criteria which include fan-dly circumstances (as well 
as whether the victim was willing for the offender not to be prosecuted). Because of higher rates of 
single-parenthood in Afro-Caribbean households he found that these young people - many of whom 
may have been first-time offenders appeared to be being penalised because they were 'latch-key kids'. 
Landau does not, however, explore the possible further implications of his finding that cautioning 
rates vary considerably between different police districts - both in absolute terms and in relation to 
particular offences. 
Some twelve years after Landau's study, seven police forces began on an experimental basis ethnically 
to monitor the proportion of juveniles referred for prosecution, compared with those diverted from 
the courts through cautioning or by having no further action taken against them. Reporting on the 
results of these pilot studies in 1992, the Commission for Racial Equality expressed concern again 
at the higher rates of prosecution of black juveniles and claimed (though the numbers in each force 
were often very small) that these could not be explained in terms either of the seriousness of the 
offences they committed, nor their number of previous offences. Only one of the forces, however, 
took explicit account of admissions. 77his found that nearly twice as many young whites (62 per cent) 
were prepared to adrnit to the offence. And, in another force which grouped its cases into those which 
were 'divertable and those which were not, a very much higher proportion of blacks fell into the latter 
category. Moreover no ethnic differences were found in referral rates for those whose cases were 
'divertable'. Overall, the CRE report also suggests (though the report plays this down) that cautioning 
rates were often much higher for Asians than for other groups, including whites. It is worth adding. 
here that, in passing, the Leeds study by Walker et al. (1990) confirms this general picture. 
Although it is possible for the police to remand suspects in custody at this stage, only one study has 
looked carefully at ethnic differences at this point (MacLeod 1990). It found that, in Leicester, black 
suspects were significantly more likely than whites not to be given bail. The opposite, however, was 
true for Asians - even when account was taken of a range of relevant variables including age, offence 
type and previous convictions. 
To summarise, by the court stage, a pattern of ethnic differences is already well established, although 
our ability to explain them is very limited. Some of the studies cover only males and the relatively 
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small numbers of females who feature in the criminal statistics suggest that inferences can only safely 
be drawn for men even from data which include both. Few of the available studies provide precise 
definitions or sufficient further breakdown; but it seems likely that the 'Afro-Caribbeans' they refer 
to are predominantly of West Indian origin, resident in Britain and likely to have been born here. We 
also know that this group is disproportionately likely to come into contact with the police and to do 
so more as a result of proactive policing, including being arrested for what has classically been termed 
Tontempt of Cop' (Sherman 1983). They are also more likely than whites to be arrested and to be 
charged with offences which may be more serious - or may carry the risk of more serious 
consequences. Moreover, a smaller proportion appear to be diverted from the system altogether at 
the pre-court stage. 
Asians, on the other hand, have tended to receive far less research attention. What is available treats 
them indiscriminately as if they were a homogenous group in both cultural and (more pertinently in 
this context) socio-economic terms. Inasmuch as such findings tell us anything meaningful, what is 
striking is the contrast with the black group; and this is heightened further by their position relative 
to whites as well. 'Asians'. it seems, have lower rates of contact with the police than any other group 
and, where they do, they are more likely to be diverted from the system at a very early stage. 
Court-centred decisions 
Ethnic differences in the rates at which those picked up by the system have been filtered out by the 
court stage can be illustrated by combining data from the Metropolitan police for the years 1984 and 
1985 which are split between two Home Office Statistical Bulletins (5/89 and 6/89). From the first 
of these it is possible to work out the numbers arrested in each of the three main ethnic groups in 
1984 and 1985.7be second provides figures for those proceeded against for indictable offences at 
magistrates' courts in the same years. While it may be objected that individuals in the latter group 
were not necessarily in the former, it seems likely that a comparison of the two sets of figures may 
broadly indicate the rate at which those arrested in London end up being prosecuted. 7liere are 
marked ethnic differences: 82 per cent of whites arrested were proceeded against by the police, 
compared with 92 per cent of 'blacks' and 77 per cent of Asians. 
Once brought to court, there is no research-based information on a number of issues which may 
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strongly influence court outcomes. Nothing is as yet known, for example, about the respective use 
of legal aid by different groups or the quality and general thrust of the legal advice available to them. 
Nor has the role of the Crown Prosecution Service in cases involving ethnic minorities received 
attention. What is known, however, is that blacks are more likely to be tried at the Crown Court, that 
they are more likely to plead not guilty and that they are more likely to be tried from custody - all of 
which factors increase their likelihood of a receiving a custodial sentence. 
One reason for the higher proportion tied at Crown Court is their greater likelihood of being charged 
with summary offences (see above). Additionally, cases which are triable-either-way are also more 
likely to be heard at Crown Court if the defendant is black. However, the studies which show this do 
not agree on whether it is defendants or magistrates who are primarily responsible. Brown and Hullin 
(1992) confirm the earlier finding of Walker et al. (1990) in Leeds showing that magistrates were 
more likely to decline jurisdiction in cases involving Blacks. Yet according to Shallice and Gordon 
(1990), this was not true in London. All three studies, nonetheless, found that black defendants 
themselves were more likely than whites to elect to be tried at Crown Court. 
It is possible that election for Crown Court trial may be also be related to plea. There are doubts 
about the reliability of plea information in the Metropolitan Police statistics, which constitute the 
largest available dataset (Vennard 1982, HOSB 6/89); but this strongly suggests both that blacks are 
much more likely than whites to plead 'not guilty (Walker 1988,1989) and that the difference is more 
marked at the Crown Court than in cases heard by magistrates (Walker 1989). A number of other 
studies (Moxon 1988, Shallice and Gordon 1990, Walker et al. 1990, Hood 1992) - corroborate this 
and additionally suggest that it is true of Asian defendants. 
There are further ethnic differences in the circumstances in which those subject to court proceedings 
await trial. The Prison Statistics consistently show even greater over-representation of black males 
in the remand than in the sentenced population (see Table 2: 9) as do Met data (HOSB 6/89, Walker 
1989). However, this is not true for black females; and the apparent disparity for Asian females 
should be treated with caution since the number of unsentenced female prisoners from this group was 
only eighteen. 
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Table 2: 9 
Prison population 1995 
Remand and sentenced (by gender and ethnic origin) 
column percentages 
White Black Asian 
Male Female Male Female Male Female 
Remanded 
un e 
80.0 
I 
71.2 14.1 
I 
22.2 
I 
2.7 
I 
5.3 
I 
Sentenced 
1 
84.4 
1 
76.3 10.6 
1 
21.1 
1 
3.0 
1 
1.9 
1 
Excludes prisoners convicted but awaiting sentence 
Source: Prison Statistics 1995 
There are, of course, a number of possible explanations for these differences, including the greater 
likelihood of Crown Court trial which may take longer and, therefore, result in a higher number of 
rernands per case. But questions also arise about possible differences in the application of bail criteria. 
Walker (1989) appears to hint at the first of these explanations. Analysing Met data, she found that 
a higher proportion of blacks were remanded by magistrates at each point where a bail/remand 
decision was taken. However, differences were less marked at the Crown Court where rates were the 
same for 17-20 year olds (although blacks aged 21-25 were more likely to have been remanded at 
some time). 
It is, however, equally possible to suggest that Walker's findings point to differences in the way the 
courts apply the bail criteria (see opening section, this chapter). Reference has already been made to 
limited evidence that the police are more likely to remand black suspects in custody (MacLeod 1990). 
Not only do the Met data confirm that this pattern is repeated at magistrates courts and, to a lesser 
extent at the Crown Court (see previous para. ), HOSB 6/89, cordinns that this is true for all offence 
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groups. Yet for Asians the pattern is reversed: the same statistical bulletin shows that they have lower 
remand rates in all offence groups than blacks (with the exception of drugs offences). These 
categories are too broad to indicate the degree of seriousness within them; but HOSB 21/94 examines 
the ren-and rates of those subsequently given custodial sentences, controlling for offence and sentence 
length. Looked at in this way, apparent ethnic differences reduce markedly; yet significant differences 
remain within some sentence-lengtb/offence groups. And the findings tell us nothing about those who, 
although previously remanded in custody, were ultimately either given non-custodial sentences or 
acquitted (see below). 
Hood (1992) breaks new ground in constructing a'Custody Remand Score'modelled on the seven 
variables known to be legally relevant to the bail/custody decision. This is then used to predict the 
likelihood of custodial remand for each of the ethnic groups in his large Crown Court sample and 
confirms that blacks are indeed more likely to be remanded in custody than whites, all other things 
being equal (op. cit. p. 149), with the further inevitable consequence of heightening differences in the 
rate at which they received custodial sentences. 
In considering the outcome of court cases, it is important to look both at acquittals and at the 
sentences passed on those convicted. 
7be available evidence from London suggests that both black and Asian males are more likely than 
whites to be acquitted at both magistratescourts and the Crown Court (Walker 88, HOSB 6/89); and 
it is worth noting additionally that Walker found a higher proportion of cases involving blacks had 
already been withdrawn at magistrates' courts because of insufficient evidence. In a smaller study in 
Leeds (which only covered outcomes at the Crown Court) a significantly higher proportion of Afro- 
Caribbeans were also acquitted - although Asians were more likely than whites to be found guilty 
(Walker et al. 1990). 
Despite higher acquittal rates, disproportionate numbers of blacks still remain among those found 
guilty by the courts; and further ethnic differences appear in the sentences they receive. This is true 
of non-custodial disposals, although - with the exception of probation, where all the main sources find 
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a lower representation of blacks relative than in the prison population" (HOSB 6/89, Brown and 
Hullin 1992, Moxon 1988, Mair 1986, Voakes and Fowler 1989, Walker 1989, Hood 1992) - no 
clear pattern emerges; and it seems possible that the differences between studies may simply reflect 
wider differences in the courts' use of alternatives to custody (which are often area-specific). All the 
evidence shows clearly, however, that blacks are more likely to receive custodial sentences which, 
in turn, are significantly longer than those given to whites (HOSBs 17/86,6/89, Hudson 1988, Walker 
1988,1989, HMSO 1991). 'Again there is a contrast with Asians who appear to have lower custody 
rates than whites - although those who are sentenced to imprisonment tend, like Afro-Caribbeans, 
to receive longer sentences. 
Any attempt to explain higher custody rates and longer sentences needs to take account of a number 
of factors and of the interaction between them. Key amongst these are: 
age 
court of trial and sentence 
charge(s) (and seriousness within offence category) 
plea 
number and type of previous convictions 
whether any recommendations are made in pre-sentence reports and the extent to which these 
are followed by the courts. ". 
It will, however, be noted that these objective, measurable criteria are relatively few in number 
compared to the range of influential factors identified by Moxon (see above) - the majority of which 
are 'softee. 
Until the Hood report there had been only three empirical studies which tried to take a sufficient 
number of even this limited number of factors into account in explaining ethnic differences in 
It should be noted that the probation statistics cited later are of limited help on this point, since they only relate to 
cases dealt with by the Probation Service and not to the totality of disposals. 
Until 1991 when pre-sentence reports became mandatory in most cases, a further factor was whether or 
not a social inquiry report had been prepared on the defendant at all. 
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sentencing. Each suffers from serious limitations. McConville and Baldwin (1982) lumped all Asians 
and Afro-Caribbeans together as'blacks'. Hudson (1989) draws on a large data set but consistently 
fails to provide numbers for individual ethnic groups, let alone the subsamples to which she refers. 
And Mair's study - which is by far the most rigorous - was only ever intended as a pilot and the 
numbers are too small to yield definitive answers. It is, however, possible to summarise the evidence 
available for the impact of each factor separately and for a limited range of interactions between them 
(where studies have considered them). 
The difference in their age distribution suggests on the one hand (as has already been noted) that 
ethnic rrinorities are likely to be over-represented in the criminal statistics but, on the other, that more 
may be first-time offenders and, therefore, less likely to receive custodial sentences. In fact the Met 
data for 1984-5 which has already been cited shows that 9% of whites proceeded against were under 
16, compared with 12.6% blacks and 8.2% Asians. A surprisingly large number of studies, however, 
fail to control for age, including Crow and Cove (1984) which is one of those most frequently cited. 
Where this is taken into account, an overall pattern persists of higher custody rates for blacks but a 
lower rate for Asians (HOSB 6/89). 
Although Hedderman and Moxon clearly demonstrate the link between Crown Court trial and heavier 
sentences, the precise relationship with different sentencing outcomes for different ethnic groups does 
not appear to be straightforward. That is, the differences are not primarily explained by the higher 
proportion of blacks tried at the Crown Court. HOSB 6/89 found no significant overall difference in 
the disposals used by magistrates courts or the length of custodial sentences (although there was a 
higher use of fines for Asians). At the Crown Court, however, there was a much higher use of 
immediate custody for blacks; and the bulletin remarks that this was due 'to the higher proportion of 
the black group given youth custody (19 per cent), compared with the white group (I I per cent) 
(and) Asian (7 per cent). Walker (1988,1989) confirm the higher use of custody - and of longer 
sentences - for blacks at Crown Court; but she found that, for adults, the magistrates courts were also 
more likely to impose custodial sentences on this group. 
Walker also suggests that London courts were more likely to use custody for black offenders - both 
juveniles and adults - in all offence groups. Yet Moxon's study of Crown Court sentencing, which 
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aggregated data from different courts across the country" and standardised on the most common 
offence (theft and handling), found no significant differences in the use of custody. Brown and liullin, 
on the other hand, found Leeds magistrates more likely to impose custodial sentences on Afro- 
Caribbeans. And HOSB 6/89 which tries to take into account age and offence group (albeit without 
controlling for court) presents a picture which is not clear cut. In the three largest offence groups 
(violence against the person, burglary and robbery), Afro-Caribbeans consistently received immediate 
custody more often than whites in the 14 to 17 age group; but this was not true for robbery amongst 
the over 21s. 
More recently, new light has been shed on the question of differences in sentence length by the 1994 
analysis of the prison statistics (HOSB 21/94) which provides details of the excess sentence length 
for white, black and Asian males received into prisons in 1990 but which then 'normalises' these to 
take account of age, type of offence and whether sentencing took place at magistrates' courts or at 
the Crown Court. As Table 2: 10 shows, the excess remains when these factors are taken into account, 
even though it reduces significantly. 
10 For a discussim of the impact of area differences which may be masked by aggregation, see Chapter Six. 
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Table 2: 10 
Males received into prisons in 1990 
(Average sentence length in days) 
I 
Actual length Excess Normalised length* Excess 
Under 21 
White 372 -11 380 -3 
Black 501 +118 419 +36 
Asian 491 +108 427 +44 
AII 571 
21 and over 
White 544 -27 553 -18 
Black 776 +206 669 +98 
Asian 642 +71 618 +47 
FAH 
417 
For explanation see previous paragraph 
Source: HOSB 21/94 
Ilese differences might be accounted for to some degree by seriousness within offence category and 
also by plea. Evidence of a greater propensity amongst Afro-Caribbeans to plead not guilty has 
already been referred to; but no studies appear to control for this in looldng at court of trial in 
conjunction with rates of custodial disposals (which are themselves related). Rather, it tends to be 
referred to only inasffmch as it rmy explain the lesser availability of social inquiry reports prior to the 
Crin-dnal Justice Act ý 1991 (see above) and the consequent lower use of probation for this group 
(Moxon 1988, Voakes and Fowler 1989). 
Data produced by the Met until the mid 1980s on court outcome were severely limited in their 
usefulness by the absence of information on the previous convictions of those proceeded against, 
although Fludger's early study of Borstal trainees (which does not distinguish between blacks and 
Asians) is frequently cited as evidence that young people from ethnic minorities are more likely to be 
sentenced to custody with fewer convictions than whites. And Mair (1986) - in one of the most 
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potentially useful of all the studies available - found that although Asians were more likely to be first 
offenders, Blacks had no more previous convictions than whites. However, he points up how 
misleading such comparisons can be if age is not taken into account, for his black sample was much 
younger, suggesting: 
'.. that black people are being apprehended by the police and prosecuted more often than 
whites, and that this process may start at an earlier age for blacks...: in the 17-20 age group, 
28 per cent of blacks as compared to 36 per cent of whites were first time offenders' 
(op. cit. p. 153) 
The 1986 and 1984 analyses of the prison population (HOSBs 17/86 21/94) both provide information 
on previous convictions in connection with explaining ethnic differences in sentence length. Taking 
six or more previous convictions as their benchmark, white male prisoners - both adults and young 
offenders - had, on average, more previous convictions than either blacks or Asians". However, when 
previous convictions were taken into account along with geographical area in addition to age, type 
of offence and court of sentence the variation in length of custody shown at 2: 10 above were largely 
but not entirely accounted for. Differences remained in particular for wounding, theft and handling 
and drugs offences for some court, age and area categories: in the first case the average sentence 
length was longer for blacks than for whites and in the other two cases this was true for both 
minorities. 
Regarding social inquiry reports (now Pre-Sentence Reports), the available evidence has been 
confused on several counts. Contrary to the authors referred to previously, the studies by Shaffice and 
Gordon (1990) and Mair (1986) both claim that blacks are more likely to have reports prepared on 
them (although they disagree on the reasons for this). There has been further disagreement on 
whether the reports themselves show bias in their recommendations and yet more over whether the 
reconivendations made influence the decision of the court, with Voakes and Fowler contending that 
'the reports.. bear some responsibility for influencing the Court towards the more punitive or 
restrictive sentences' (op. cit. p. 30), while Mair concludes: 
Of male sentenced prisoners aged under 21, the proportion with six or more previous convictions was 39 per cent 
for whites, 27 per cent for blacks and 18 per cent for Asians. In the caw of adults. the figures were respectively 
60 per cent, 48 per cent and 29 per cent. 
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'The recommendations made in social inquiry reports-were similar for the three groups, 
which may point away from unequal treatment by the probation service to unequal treatment 
by the courts. ' 
(op. ciL p. 154). 
Hood (1992) has recently lent authoritative weight to Mair's interpretation in his major study which, 
on this point, came to the 'inevitable conclusion 'that the differences in the sentences imposed cannot 
be attributed to recommendations made by the probation officers' (op. cit. p. 159). 
The ethnic monitoring system established by the Probation Service in 1993 is by no means adequate 
in many respects" and the first returns were not as complete as n-dght have been hoped. Ethnic group 
was not recorded for 12,14 and 9 per cent respectively of those commencing probation, community 
service and combination orders and for 9 per cent of offenders on whom the Probation Service had 
prepared Pre-Sentence Reports (PSRs). Moreover, there is a geographical bias to the missing data, 
with the highest non-response rates in Inner London (37 per cent), the West Midlands (24 per cent) 
and North East London (23 per cent) - areas which, together, account for a high proportion of the 
ethnic minority population, and, the black population in particular (see earlier, this chapter). By 1994, 
this situation was beginning to improve, with the total non-recorded figure for probation 
comn-encements at 8 per cent. Those for Inner London, the West Midlands and North East London 
were still high but were down respectively to 19,12 and 14 per cent. 
These lirritations of the probation statistics imply a need for caution in respect of some otherwise 
interesting findings (HMSO 1996). Although black people were, indeed, over represented on all 
orders in relation to their proportion in the population at large, the percentage was only 5 per cent. 
12 The form of ethnic categorisation adopted by the Probation Service after long negotiations is complex and is not 
fully consistent either with benclunark data from the Census or with other criminal justice statistics. The main 
problem derives from the fact that individuals are not immediately asked which of a prescribed list of categories 
they belong to. 7bey are first asked , 
'Would you wish to describe yourself as black? 
'Would you wish to describe yourself as white? 
*Would you wish to describe yourself in another way7 
Although the subsequent question is based on a prescribed list which can be re-aggregated to other sources, it is 
much more elaborate and it allows respondents to choose more than one category. 
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The fact that the scale of over-representation is only about half that seen in the prison population is 
consistent - albeit very crudely - with the notion that, in terms of court disposals, black offenders are 
more likely than whites to receive immediate custody than probation. South Asians, on the other 
hand, are under-reprepresented, making up only 1.6 per cent of offenders who were recorded as 
receiving probation, community service or combination orders. It is more difficult to make inferences 
from the probation statistics about the extent to which this is attributable to recommendations made 
by the Probation Service, since the Service made no recommendation on a much higher proportion 
of black offenders on whom PSRs were written. However, Table 2: 11 shows that the black offenders 
for whom proposals were made were slightly more likely than whites to be recommended for a 
custodial sentence. The proportion receiving custodial sentences in all groups was over 10 times as 
high as the proportion for whom the Service had recommended custody-, yet the figures do not 
suggest that the courts treated black defendants any more punitively (relative to the probation 
proposal) than whites. (Although numbers are relatively small, it is interesting to note the apparently 
greater lenience exercised by the courts in the case of Asians. ) 
Table 2: 11 
Pre-sentence reports by proposal and disposal 1994 
VvUte Black South Asian 
No proposal 88.9 7.9 1.4 
Proposal for immediate custody/ 
suspended sentence 
86.9 8.5 2.9 
Disposal: immediate custody/ 
suspended sentence 
89.5 6.9 2.1 
N 169826 11035 3554 
Source: Probation Statistics England and Wales 1994 
In conclusion, fiirther reference should be made to Hood's study which has not only clarified a number 
of key questions about the treatment of ethnic minorities at various points prior to sentencing but is 
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the only study to have taken rigorous account of all the sentence-related factors listed above and used 
them in multi-variate analysis on a large data set. Hood matches the cases in his sample by creating 
a'probability of custody score' based on 15 variables which described '50 legally relevant attributes 
of the offence and the offender's criminal record' (op. cit. p. 197). Basing the score on the average for 
the whole sample, he found a five per cent greater probability of black males being sentenced to 
custody than white males. (When the score was based on the rate for blacks, the difference increased 
to 7.6 per cent). There were no significant differences among women, however; and the rate for 
Asians was rather lower than the score predicted. Considerable variations were found by the study, 
however, which are masked by these overall figures, three of which are of particular interest. These 
are that the disparities are greatest for offences of medium seriousness (where there is greater scope 
for the exercise of discretion) and that there are important differences between both courts and 
individual judges. That is, some courts and judges deal relatively equitably with defendants from 
Merent ethnic groups, while the differential treatment meted out by others is much greater than the 
aggregated results for the sample as a whole suggest. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
At a very crude level of analysis, the age structure and socio-economic position of ethnic minorities 
suggest that one might expect to find them disproportionately represented in the criminal statistics. 
Yet there are important distinctions to be made both between and within groups which the available 
evidence - and many commentators - have hitherto failed to recognise. 
Moreover, until recently the available evidence in the UX has been frustratingly limited despite being 
apparently extensive. One gap in our current knowledge is the essential question of whether and to 
what extent there are differences in actual rates and patterns of criminal activity between ethnic 
groups. The major data sets and research studies cover the entry of a small minority of offenders into 
the criminal justice system and outcomes at different stages of the process; but they only offer limited 
insights. On some questions they remain completely silent; on most they fail to take account of all the 
relevant factors; and on several they disagree. Nonetheless, a picture has emerged which begs more 
questions than it answers but which has confirmed the cause for concern described in Chapter One. 
Patchy as it is (and relatively weak in its coverage of the Asian groups), the evidence to date has been 
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clear on eight key points: 
1. Black youth are especially likely to be stopped by the police and to be arrested. Asians are 
less likely than whites to be stopped. 
2. Once arrested, blacks are less likely to be cautioned than whites. Asians are more likely to be 
cautioned. 
I The overall pattern of charges brought against blacks differs from that of whites; and there 
appear to be some further differences for Asians. 
4. Black defendants are more likely to be remanded in custody. 
5. Black defendants are more likely to plead not guilty to the charges against them. 
They are also more likely to be tried at the Crown Court. 
7. They are more likely to be acquitted. 
8. But where they are found guilty of crirnes they are likely to receive more and longer custodial 
sentences and a different range of non-custodial sentences. 
These differences emerge from evidence which - far from ruling out the possibility of discrimination - 
has also suggested that many of them cannot be explained simply in terms of factors which are 'race'- 
neutral. 
The list was published in the first of the publications on 'race' under s95 of the 1991 Criminal Justice 
Act (Home Office 1992); and the next chapter begins by describing research into a major new policy 
initiative which was launched in 1996 on the peg of s. 95 which was implicitly designed to explore the 
reasons for sorne of these findings. 'Me initiative has raised expectations that criminal justice statistics 
on 'race' and crime are about to enter a new era in which data wW more definitively answer the 
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questions raised by the sources referred to here - including questions about the possibility of both 
dirr-ct and indirect discrirnination. The chapter provides relevant background on the context in which 
the initiative has been taken and describes the approach taken in the thesis to exploring how far these 
expectations are likely to be realised in practice. 
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Chapter Three 
Police Ethnic Monitoring 
The Research Project and its Context 
In March 1995 a Honr, Office letter to Chief Constables announced that all police forces in England 
and Wales would be required to record the ethnic origin of everyone they stopped and searched using 
their powers under sl of the 1984 Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE). The requirement 
applied also to arrests and cautions; and they were to record the ethnic origin of victims and suspects 
in homicide cases. A follow-up letter specified that statistical returns to the Home Office were to use 
a four-point classification which was compatible with 1991 Census data (White, Black, Asian and 
Other) and should show the proportion of cases where ethnic origin had not been recorded. The 
system would be mandatory from April 1996; but forces were invited to pilot the new system on a 
voluntary basis from 1995. The results of the pilot would not be made public but the Home Office 
would evaluate it. 
This chapter briefly describes the research research project spawned by this initiative, the results of 
which form the substance of Chapters Four and Five, before outlining the historical background and 
the context in which those results need to be seen. 
THE RFSEARCH 
The Home Office had not anticipated the number of volunteers for the pilot: by mid- 1995 nearly all 
of the 43 of the forces i n* England and Wales were monitoring one or more of the items specified in 
the letter. Some were starting from scratch but others were building on their own local systems, most 
of which had been established in recent years, although some went back very much longer. To meet 
the commitment to evaluate the pilot trials an ad hoc team was assembled of social researchers, 
7he requirement to monitor deaths in police custody was added later. 
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statisticians and administrators. As Principal Research Officer responsible for race relations research' 
in the Office's Research and Statistics Directorate, I was centrally involved in this initiative. Between 
us, we undertook one day visits to over thirty of these pilot sites based on a specification which I 
drew up. There were three aspects to this. Forces were given a list of detailed background 
information which they were asked to provide in advance; they were given an indication of the 
schedule of core issues which the Home Office team would cover in each force; and they were told 
the range of experience the team was looking for in the personnel they met on the day. Within this 
common framework, however, a considerable margin was allowed for exploring locally-specific 
issues. 
I co-ordinated feedback from the teards regular de-briefing meetings, along with material provided 
by forces themselves and reports written by the team according to my original schedule for the visits- 
These provided the basis for the guidance which I then wrote and which was issued to forces under 
Home Office circular 3/96 in February of the following year. 7be guidance covers, stage-by-stage, 
the collection and analysis of the basic ethnic statistics required by the Home Office as well as how 
the data can be used both internally within forces and with the public at large. Throughout the 
evaluation and in drafting the guidance, I liaised closely with the Community and Race Relations 
subcommittee of the Association of Chief Officers of Police. They were represented on the working 
group which was otherwise largely composed of team members; and I regularly gave oral progress 
reports to their meetings'. 
My immediate priority was to provide this practical guidance to help forces as they faced the 
t introduction of mandatory ethnic monitoring. The insights gained from the pilots, however, 
con&=d that the high expectations of politicians, pressure groups, policy makers and some police 
officers were likely to be disappointed. For the background to the initiative and the organisational 
context into which it was being introduced already suggested: 
21 approached the first meeting with some trepidation but was successftd in weaning them from the 
misapprehension dim the main focus of the research was to provide an explanation for ethnic differences 
in the PACE data. 
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a) that it would be some time before the system produced reliable data and longer still 
before the patterns shown by these data could be adequately interpreted; and 
that, even when that point was reached, the data would not, of themselves, 
definitively answer the central question they were implicitly expected to address, vizz. 
whether or not the police discrin-dnated against ethnic minorities. 
It was in part to document these two caveats that I set up a further, more detailed research project. 
By publishing the results before the first year's monitoring data appeared in autumn 1997 1 hoped to 
damp down expectations and avoid the danger that they would be over-interpreted. The new project 
had three inter-related aims: 
to set police ethnic monitoring in context; 
to describe the range of experience of ethnic monitoring across different police forces; and 
to identify and anticipate any problems which would need to be addressed if the new 
monitoring system was to be both reliable and of practical benefit. 
In late autumn of 1995, my Research Officer (Dr Rae Sibbitt) and I began fieldwork in four very 
different force areas. I covered two contrasting divisions of the Met: an inner city division which was 
highly cosmopolitan and where black residents predominated among the minorities; and a sen-ii- 
suburban area where a long established Jewish community had now been joined by a sizeable Asian 
population. Rae Sibbitt, meanwhile, worked in two provincial forces. One was a very large force, 
including several major urban areas, with a significant (but predominantly Asian) population. The 
other was a small force which was predominantly rural, with the exception of a few large towns, and 
in which the minority population was weU below the national average. 
The main focus of our fieldwork was the ethnic monitoring of PACE stop/searches, arrests and 
cautions. We interviewed police officers at all levels as well as civilian staff concerned with ethnic 
monitoring and a limited number of members of local organisations with an interest in the issue. We 
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attended both internal and external meetings which were pertinent and amassed a wide range of 
documr, ntation, including management information, policy documents, minutes of relevant meetings 
and statistical information on local populations in the areas. Both of us directly observed the police 
in action on the streets and in custody suites. Our observations were considerably enriched by Andy 
Zurawan who was recruited specially for the project and who spent nearly four weeks overall 
patrolling with officers in three of the four areas. In the fourth area (the suburban area in the Met), 
he worked with the Management Information Unit looking in detail at the ethnic differences shown 
by the PACE records. All three of us wrote up our fieldwork notes and exchanged them. 
Over the whole period (that is, the evaluation of the pilot trials and the fieldwork in the case study 
areas), I was also involved in a range of other activities which yielded additional relevant material, 
both quantitative and qualitative. 
In addition to the existing literature and the material from the fieldwork areas, the Management 
Information Unit in the second of our London divisions did special analyses of their own PACE data 
for us. I was a member of the working party set up by the Metroplitan Police with the CRE in 
sumnr, r 1995 to look in depth at police stops in London. It commissioned analyses of other London 
data which have been made available to rrr-. Additionally, with Professor Chris Hale at the University 
of Kent, I produced a report for the Working Party analysing data on stops from the British Crime 
Survey (FitzGerald and Hale forthcoming). This compares stops of different ethnic groups by the 
police in London with those in the rest of the country and sets the findings on stop/searches in this 
wider context. At the annual week-long Home Office Holly Royde community and race relations 
seminars in 1995 and 1996,1 led workshops on police ethnic monitoring and worked closely with 
officers there who were developing local projects on this topic. Late in 1996,1 brought together the 
key findings emerging from all of these different strands in a presentation at two national conferences 
on police ethnic monitoring convened jointly by ACPO and the Home Office. These brought together 
ACPO rank officers, officers with senior operational responsibilities and specialist staff including 
(civilian) force statisticians from the majority of forces in England and Wales. The discussion 
generated by my presentation and the workshops I subsequently led provided further insights and 
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material of direct relevance to this thesis. 
The thesis, then, draws on material from all of the three main sources described (that is, the evaluation 
of the pilot trials, work in the case study areas, and from the other related activities described in the 
previous paragraph) to meet the broad aims set out at the end of Chapter One specifically by: 
shedding further light on some of the outstanding questions in the debate on 'race' and crime 
described in the previous two chapters; and 
exploring the potential (and the limitations) of current police ethnic monitoring and its likely 
future extension for resolving these questions. 
It is worth noting here that the material related to stop/searches proved much richer than for arrests 
and cautions and this balance is reflected in the chapters which folloW3 . However, many of the issues 
raised by it clearly had implications for understanding ethnic differences in these other areas of police 
activity also. This chapter continues by describing two important features of police ethnic monitoring 
which have already been referred to above - that is, the background to its introduction and key 
aspects of the organisational context in which it will be implemented. 
THE HISTORY OF POLICE ETHNIC MONITORING 
It is nearly 30 years since the authors of one of the earliest, major studies on British race relations - 
urged: 
'.. that the methods of collecting and presenting data be fi-nproved to allow accurate assessment 
of the rates of crime and delinquency among ethnic and other minority groups. ' 
(Rose et al 1969 p. 726) 
Where the material was generated by Rae Sibbitt or Andy Zurawan this is explicitly acknowledged. With 
these exceptions, the material used was generated by myself or held in common within the research 
project or is based on my own analysis of secondary sources. 
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The principle of ethnic monitoring remained controversial for many years, however. The practice 
became widespread only in the 1980s and it has come relatively late to the criminal justice system. 
Following the sen-drial work by Rose and his colleagues cited above, other studies began 
systematically to document both racial disadvantage and discrimination and to show that these were 
persisting beyond the immigrant generation (Smith 1977). Their evidence added increasing weight 
to the argument that public bodies should routinely collect information which would help them both 
to monitor disadvantage and to ensure that their own policies and practices were free of 
discrimination. Census population data were available on place of birth and Us type of information 
was often included in records of individual users of services. (In the 1960s, for example, schools were 
required to make annual returns to the Department of Education and Science of the number of 
irnmigrant pupils. ) 
However, by the 1970s increasing numbers of children of the West Indian immigrants had been born 
in this country and this was beginning to happen with the groups who followed them. The size, 
location and circumstances of these populations could be estimated for a while - albeit fairly crudely - 
on the basis of the numbers living in households where the head had been born in a particular 
country4; but it was clear that this could only be a stop-gap measure. Once the children began to set 
up homes in their own right - as was already happening with the 'West Indian' group - such 
monitoring would be possible only by asking them about their ancestry or ethnic origin. 
Three inter-related arguments were advanced against introducing ethnic monitoring. One was that 
it was wrong in principle to distinguish people on the basis of colour. The second was that identifying 
individuals in this way would actually increase their chances of being discriminated against. And the 
third was that the information, if it fell into 'the wrong hands', could be used systematically to 
discriminate against whole groups. Gradually, though, the counter-arguments prevailed, chief 
4 lbough, under this system, retired Anglo-Indians artificially inflated theethnic minority' populations of 
the shire counties 
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amongst which was that discrimination was already occurring and those responsible were unlikely to 
be inhibited by the lack of statistics. On the other hand it would be impossible to track down 
discrimination and disadvantage - or to assess the effectiveness of policies to deal with them - unless 
the circumstances of the populations at risk could be measured with accuracy and consistency over 
time. 
The main impetus towards ethnic monitoring of the delivery of public services came from local 
authorities and began in the late 1970s. In part it was politically driven and gathered momentum in 
the wake of the Greater London Council of the early 1980s which blazed a trail in terms of the profile 
it gave to issues concerning ethnic minorities and race equality issues, burning many fingers (and 
arguably some bridges) in the process but leaving an indelible mark on future policy in these areas. 
Behind the rhetoric, though, two important pragmatic considerations were also influential. One was 
the authorities' need, in times of increasing financial constraint, to make the case for additional 
resources - for example, under the Department of the Enviroment's Urban Programme and in 
applications to the Home Office for grant under sII of the 1966 Local Government Acts. The other 
irnpetus can-c from the race relations legislation and especially the new Race Relations Act of 1976. 
Several local authorities were investigated by the Race Relations Board (prior to 1976) and by its 
successor, the Commission for Racial Equality, especially with regard to their housing policies. The 
lesson was not lost on others who realised that they needed some ethnic yardstick against which to 
measure their performance - if only to cover themselves against allegations of discrimination. Adding 
impetus to this were two new provisions of the 1976 Act: the extension of the law to cover indirect 
as well as direct discrimination; and a specific duty laid on local authorities by the Act. 
s7l of the 1976 Race Relations Act requires all local authorities 
'to make appropriate arrangements with a view to securing that their various functions are 
carried out with due regard to the need 
5 The original terms of sII allowed local authorities to apply to for 75 per cent of funding for posts to meet 
the'additional'cost of meeting the needs of residents from the New Commonwealth or Pakistan. 
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a) to eliminate unlawful discrin-dnation 
b) to promote equality of opportunity, and good relations, between persons of different 
racial groups. ' 
The import of s7l is largely symbolic; for its legal force (as measured by case law) has effectively 
been nil. Yet it has proved a powerful lever on the development of race equality policies (including 
ethnic monitoring) and has been co-opted to that end both by community groups and, importantly, 
by 'policy entrepreneurs' within local government (Young 198 1). 
Notwithstanding the relative length of local authority experience, the picture is still patchy. A variety 
of factors - some of them very locally specific - impelled certain authorities to develop ethnic 
monitoring systems while others continued to hold out against the tide until relatively recently 
(FitzGerald 1986). Ilie pattern does not correspond directly with the size of local ethnic minority 
populations; and there have frequently been variations from one department to another within the 
same authority. Moreover, even those who were pioneers in this field did not necessarily 'get it right' 
first time. There was a long period while the bandwagon was rolling at its fastest when authorities 
were gathering large amounts of ethnic data but did not - and often could not - analyse it to any 
obvious effect for developing poky and/or practice. Thus. many of the most experienced authorities 
have by now been through one or more major reviews of their monitoring systems while others are 
only just getting started. Yet a 1996 report comments thus on the experience of departments in 
several authorities who had been thought of as leaders in the field: 
'In some cases data collection seemed to have become an end in itself - although front-line 
staff could not understand why they had to spend so much tinr, and energy collecting the data 
in the first place only for no use to be made of it. ' 
(Jones 1996 p70) 
Meanwhile, as the fears about ethnic monitoring proved to be unfounded and data based on place of 
birth becanr, increasingly obsolete, the practice spread more widely throughout public agencies and 
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increasingly into the voluntary and even the private sector. 
Locally, therefore, police forces have increasingly been operating in a context where ethnic 
monitoring has becorm the norm for other key agencies (in particular, local authorities). They often 
need to work closely with these agencies and to exchange information, for example in inter-agency 
fora, local partnerships and statutory and other consultation arrangements and this exerts a certain 
pressure to be able to 'match' ethnicity data held by others. Added to this, there is often pressure from 
local campaigning groups, ethnic minority organisations and Race Equality Councils for the police 
to account for their perceived treatment of minorities locally. In several forces local monitoring 
inititiatives had already begun - either on a pilot basis or more permanently - well before notice was 
received of the Home Office requirement. Several such initiatives began in close co-operation with 
local RECs or with the CRE nationally. The best known examples are: Leicestershire Constabulary 
which began routine monitoring which, in some respects, went beyond the current Home Office 
requirement'; and the pilot scheme to monitor juvenile cautioning which was undertaken by seven 
forces in collaboration with the CRE (CRE 1992, see previous chapter). 
Nationally the build-up of pressure towards ethnic monitoring has taken place in the context of the 
long-standing concerns aboutrace' and crime described in the previous chapter and of important 
organisational changes within the police - in particular the move to a 'performance culture' (with all 
that connotes in terms of measurement) which is described in more detail in the following section. 
Together these created a climate which was conducive to the introduction of s95 of the 1991 Criminal 
Justice Act and to a number of separate initiatives in its wake, which generated a cumulative 
momentum leading to the Home Office announcement of compulsory monitoring from 1996. Chief 
in practice there was surprisingly little public resistance to providing tWs information from the outset and 
voluntary response rates to questions about individuals'cthnic origins now suggest that these are viewed 
at least as routinely as, for example, questions about marital status. Non-response rates to the ethnic 
question in the Labour Force Survey were already only 1.1 per cent in 1981 
In 1992 Leicestershire began by trying to monitor. arrests; complaints against the police; arrests from stop/search; 
negative breath tests; discontinuances by CPS; premises searched; PACE and voluntary stop/searches; drug related 
offen=; and HORTIs (see next footnote). Ilml is, the list does not include cautions or homicides-, and the negative 
breath test item has had to be dropped because the infonnation was too unreliable. 
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among these initiatives were the foHowing. 
In July 1992, the Home Office sent a circular to all Chief Constables (HO 70/1992) entitled 
'Implementing Section 95 of the Criminal Justice Act 1991 and Ethnic Classifications'. On a strict 
reading of this section (see Chapter One), the Home Secretary has complete discretion over both the 
type of information he considers 'expedient' for the purposes specified and the choice whether to 
publish financial information or information related to race, sex or any other type of potential 
discrirnination. Yet the Circular referred to 'the Act! s requirements in relation to the police service'. 
The first s95 publications, it said, would be based on existing material but 
'... in the longer term, more comprehensive information will be required to falful the 
provisions of the Act' so 
'In future, additional monitoring will be required to measure both equal opportunities within 
forces, and fairness in service delivery. 71e specific areas of police work to be monitored have 
yet to be finally agreed. More information on this will be provided to forces as soon as 
possible, once agreement has been reached within the Home Office and with ACPO. ' 
(emphasis added) 
The circular concluded 
'Section 95 will be an important tool for the police service, and for other agencies in the 
criminal justice system, to ensure that they deliver a fair and non-discriminatory service to all 
members of the public and to employees. ' 
It was followed in 1993 by three further, important catalysts to the introduction of compulsory 
monitoring. 
The first - and probably the most important - of these catalysts was the report of the Royal 
Commission on Criminal Justice (HMSO 1993). At the behest of the Commission I had written a 
report on 'Ethnic Minorities and the Criminal Justice System' which highlighted the current, patchy 
state of knowledge at the key decision making points prior to imprisonment (FitzGerald 1993); and 
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the Commission amply took this up. Of its 352 recommendations, the second and third were the 
foUowing: 
'2. There should be further research to establish the extent to which members of the 
ethnic minority communities suffer discrimination within the criminal justice system. 
'3. A system of ethnic monitoring should be introduced to establish how ethnic 
minorities are treated and thus to identify measures which are needed to ensure that 
as far as possible the rules, procedures and practices of the crin-drial justice system are 
applied in the same way to all. ' 
(emphasis added) 
(op. cit. p. 188) 
The second catalyst was the introduction by the police Inspectorate (HMIQ of a 'Performance 
indicator' (see below), requiring all forces to provide basic ethnic statistics (broken down simply by 
white/ethnic minority) on their use of stop/search powers under PACE. Meanwhile, a joint working 
party had been set up by the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) and the Comn-dssion for 
Racial Equality (CRE) which in the same year published 'Policing and Racial Equality: a practical 
guide to the ACPO strategic policy document Setting the Standards for Policing: Meeting 
community expectation.. 
This third catalyst (the ACPO-CRE document) had a powerful impact; and its influence was very 
apparent throughout the research at all levels within the police - even if this was not explicitly or 
consciously acknowledged. Two aspects of the report, in particular, seem to have been taken to heart. 
One is that, although the report covers a range of race equality issues (including dealing with victims 
of crime, public satisfaction, consultation, complaints and Neighbourhood Watch schemes), primacy 
has been attached to its coverage of ethnic monitoring which, following the Circular of the previous 
year, was already being referred to as afait accompli thus: 
There are two essential objectives which may be achieved by the collection and analysis of 
ethnic data in relation to people alleged to have committed offences. First, it will enable the 
police to evaluate the exercise of the powers over which they retain exclusive control. For 
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example, the analysis of all process decisions, including cautions, vvill indicate whether there 
are any significant differences between ethnic groups.. ' 
(emphasis added) 
(CRE 1993 p. 21) 
The data which it recommended collecting would have covered: stop and search; searching of 
premises; arrests for criminal offences; reports for summons (and process decisions); issues of 
HO/RT/l and VDRS notices". 
The other aspect of the ACPO-CRE report which calls for comment is its invocation of s95 of the 
1991 Criminal Justice Act which it interprets even more creatively than did the eponymous Home 
Office circular of the previous year. In its Introduction, the ACPO-CRE guidance described the 
significance of s95, as follows: 
"Ibe issue of ensuring that policing is provided in a non-discriminatory manner has become 
more urgent as a consequence of the Chminal Justice Act 1991 .... The police must be in a 
position to respond satisfactorily to section 95 and one of the most important features of a 
non-discriminatory programar is the compilation and evaluation of ethnic data. Without this 
information the Home Secretary is unlikely tofuYll his duty under the Act. ' 
(emphasis added) 
(op. cit. pp. 8-9) 
Meanwhile, the promised consultations within the Home Office and with ACPO took place and 
resulted in the 1995 letter to Chief Constables. This scaled down the list of items proposed in the 
ACPO-CRE document. The four areas to be monitored initially were among those on which forces 
already submitted statistical returns to the Horne Offim. 711ey were chosen in order to try to keep the 
exercise more manageable and to ensure data quality. 
S95 is now invoked in ways which echo s7l. of the Race Relations Act 1976. If s71 had been a spur 
5 HO/RT/I s are notices issued to drivers by the police asking them to produce their documents subsequently at a 
police station and VDRSs require motorists to rectify vehicle defects the police have identified. 
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to action by local authorities for which, strictly speaking, there was no legal requirement, one is 
tempted to see s95 as its equivalent for the police. In police circles at every level, the collection of 
the ethnic statistics with which* this report is concerned is routinely referred to as 'Section 95 
Monitoring. ' 
Less attention, however, seems to have been given to the other 'essential objective' of ethnic 
monitoring specified in the ACPO-CRE guidance: 
because the police are part of a criminal justice process, the decisions made by the Crown 
Prosecution Service and the courts must be considered in relation to the process brought by 
the police. Indeed, without such information, the purpose of monitoring will largely be 
defeated. ' 
(op. cit. p. 21) 
At the time of writing, the CPS and the courts have, in principle, accepted the need for ethnic 
monitoring of what happens in the process between the police stage and imprisonment. However, it 
has also been agreed that it would be a waste of effort for them to establish a new ethnic record for 
each case they deal with (as well as leading to possible confusion). Rather, they will rely on the 
ethnicity data initially recorded by the police. In the context of this thesis, therefore, questions about 
the reliability and completeness of the police statistics as well as the interpretation of the ethnic 
differences they show have a wider significance. For ethnic monitoring by the police will not only 
provide the basis of future information on decisions taken at the stages of the criminal justice process 
between the point of entry and imprisonment (see Figure 2: 1); it will also (for better or worse) 
provide models for interpreting that information. 
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THE ORGANISATIONAL CONTEXT 
The experience of ethnic monitoring in service delivery generally suggests that the results it produces 
and their implications strongly reflect - and may be affected by - the particular service being delivered. 
Ilie characteristics of the organisation delivering it come strongly into play, including the extent of 
diversity within the organisation. For no large national organisation is a monolith: the problems it 
faces will, vary - between different parts of the organisation; at different levels of responsibility within 
it; and according to local circumstances. In the case of the delivery of policing (and, specifically, the 
treatment by the police of suspects and offenders) the factors which will most critically affect the 
hTlementation of the Home Office requirement are closely inter-related but can broadly be grouped 
under three separate heads: 
local variations in the policing environment 
service priorities and arrangements for meeting them and 
policing 'cultures'. 
Local variations 
It is irnportant to recognise very different local circun-Lstances in which all 43 forces in England and 
Wales are collecting ethnic data. Not only do forces differ in the problems of crime they face and their 
response to these (points taken up in more detail later), they vary widely in size, in the types of 
population they serve and, in particular, in their ethnic make-up, as Table 3: 1" shows. 
The sources used for tlýs table were various: population data are taken from the Chartered Institute of 
Public Finance and Accountancy's'Police Statistics' (1993-4); Notifiable Offences from the Home Office 
Cifininal Statistics for England and Wales; and ethnic minority population data from internal Home Office 
sources. 
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Table 3: 1 
Key characteristics of police forces in England and Wales 
(1993-1994) 
Population 
(OOOS) 
Of which ethnic 
minority 
Population per 
officer 
Notifiable offences 
per 100,000 
population 
Avon & Somerset 1445.6 2.0 474 11605 
Bedfordshire 545.8 9.9 471 9734 
Cambridgeshire 681.2 3.5 539 9043 
Cheshire 977.9 1.0 513 7709 
Cleveland 548.9 1.0 377 14609 
Cumbria 495.0 0.4 418 8669 
Derbyshire 944.0 3.0 517 9035 
Devon & Cornwall 1528.1 1.8 525 7168 
Dorset 669.5 1.0 516 8302 
Durham 593.3 1.5 529 10704 
Dvfed Powys 474.7 0.7 493 4583 
Essex 1495.0 1.9 509 7121 
Gloucestershire 528.4 1.8 457 11152 
Greater Manchester 2561.6 5.9 365 13111 
Gwent 450.5 1.5 451 8535 
Hampshire 1719.1 1.8 525 8221 
Hertfordshire 854.1 4.2 505 6465 
Humberside 874.4 1.0 430 15357 
Kent 1547.0 2.3 491 10089 
Lancashire 1410.7 4.4 442 8960 
Leicestershire 900.7 11.1 496 10892 
Lincolnshire 601.8 0.8 500 7943 
Merseyside 1414.6 1.8 302 9496 
Norfolk 770.1 0.9 533 7329 
Northamptonshire 603.1 3.5 509 9733 
Northumbria 1432.6 1.5 400 14120 
North Wales 662.3 0.7 490 6623 
North Yorkshire 723.9 0.7 534 9611 
Nottinphamshire 1015.5 4.0 436 14837 
South Wales 1320.9 2.1 419 11872 
South Yorkshire 1293.2 2.9 427 12026 
Staffordshire 1055.7 1.8 481 8899 
Suffolk 646.3 2.2 528 6096 
Surrey 770.3 2.5 459 6079 
Sussex 1447.2 1.9 481 7439 
Thames Valley 1999.7 5.6 516 9308 
Warwickshire 485.4 3.4 471 8629 
West Mercia 1105.2 1.4 538 7571 
West Midlands 2600.0 14.6 372 11989 
West Yorkshire 2065.9 &2 410 13786 
Wiltshire 580.6 1.7 459 6543 
City of London 300.0 7.3 349 
Metropolitan Police 7284.6 19.0 262 11633 
Average (England and 
Wales) * 5.9 406 10222 
Not applicable 
Metropolitan forces in bold 
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The Metropolitan police is in a league of its own in term of population size and police, strength, with 
each of its five areas larger than many provincial forces. The provincial forces themselves vary in size 
such that the population of the largest (the West Midlands) is nearly seven times that of the smallest 
(Dy&d Powys). Not captured in the table is the very different mixture within forces of conurbations, 
cities, large towns and rural areas. It is also worth remembering that force boundaries do not coincide 
exactly with local authority boundaries and that some forces cover more than one authority. 
The previous chapter drew attention to the very uneven and highly skewed distribution of the 
minority population; and this is already reflected in Table 3: 1. However, it also pointed out that there 
were important variations within this by ethnic group. Of the Asian group, for example, only 18.6 per 
cent of Pakistanis lived in London in 1991 compared to 44.4 per cent of Indians and 54.2 per cent 
of Bangladeshis. London, though, was home for over 60 per cent of the black population who, until 
recently, have been the main focus of concern in the 'race' and crime debate; yet this figure, in turn, 
masks distinctions between the subgroups within this generic category'O. That is, four very broad 
ethnic categories are being used as a basic minimum for monitoring purposes" but they subsume 
groups who differ from each other considerably, including in their age-profiles and their socio- 
economic characteristics, in ways which will affect their likelihood of coming to the attention of the 
criminal justice system. Moreover, the four categories mask the very different distribution of these 
subgroups between different forces. 
All the minority groups, though, are concentrated in largely urban areas and this has a number of 
implications for ethnic monitoring. One is that the ethnic minority population only reaches or exceeds 
the average for England and Wales in eight of the 43 police force areas but the ethnic n-dx within these 
areas varies considerably. 7be eight are dominated by the Metropolitan Police and the West Midlands 
10 77 per cent of Black Africans lived in the capital in 1991, compared to 58 per cent of Black Caribbeans and 45 
per cent of thc'Black Othee group. 
The system was adopted for two main reasons. It allows comparisons direct comparisons with Census population 
data while providing for visual classification of suspects in policing situations where it might be invidious to ask 
them to classify themselves. However, the Home Office guidance of February 1996 makes clear that forces may 
require more refined information within the framework of this basis system and they are encouraged to use self- 
classification where this is possible. 
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and the black group fonns a very much smaller proportion of the total population than the Asians 
everywhere except for the Metropolitanpolice area, where it just exceeds the Asian total" but where 
the 'Other' group is also relatively large. Another is that even forces which have relatively small ethnic 
minority populations overall may contain pockets of fairly high concentration. These may account for 
nearly all of the force's ethnic minority residents while most areas served by the force will be almost 
exclusively white. Tbus in Lancashire, for example, where ethnic minorities form little more than four 
per cent of the total population, the figure rises to over 20 per cent in Blackburn and Burnley. 
Table 3: 2 
Population of police force areas with average or higher ethnic minority populations 
(as % of total population) 
(Largest group shown in bold) 
Black Asian Other 
Metropolitan police 8.0 7.8 4.3 
West Midlands 3.6 9.7 1.3 
Leicestershire 1.0 8.9 1.2 
Bedfordsh e 2.5 6.1 1.2 
West Yorkshire 1.2 6.0 0.9 
City of London 0.9 2.4 4.0 
Greater Manchester 1.3 3.6 1.0 
'Ibarnes Valley 1.4 3.0 1.3 
Source: 1991 Census 
Levels of recorded crime vary considerably between forces: they tend to be higher in metropolitan 
areas and forces which include cities and large towns (that is, the types of area where ethnic 
minorities are most likely to live. ). The number of police officers per head of population also ranges 
12 Projecting frorn the 1991 Census, however, it is apparent that by mid 1995 Asians predominated among those aged 
20 and under. 
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quite widely from I per 262 to 1 per 539 and tends to be highest in urban areas. London is apparently 
the most intensively policed (although additional national responsibilities and the issues particular to 
policing a capital city inflate the numbers), followed by Merseyside, Greater Manchester, the West 
Midlands and Cleveland. 
Policing priorities 
As Lustgarten points out 
me purposes of policing are much less obvious than may first appear' 
(Lustgarten 1986 p. 22) 
and the tensions between their role in preventing (and detecting) crime, protecting life and property 
and the preservation of public tranquility has been much rehearsed - most notably, in recent times, 
by Lord Scarman (op. cit. ). Yet police forces have increasingly approached their work on the basis 
of formalised objectives backed up by practical arrangements (including information systems) geared 
to these objectives and designed to measure the extent to which they are being realised. Implicitly 
these developments favour their role in detecting crime over their other roles if only because this lends 
itself most readily to measurement. 
These developments have been driven by a range of both internal and external pressures - both . 
political and financial; and it is no coincidence that they have taken place as many forces have coped 
with structural change, the introduction of new management systems, changes in working practices 
and major IT developments. At the same time there have been new approaches to relations outside 
the force including revised arrangements for working with other local agencies and an enhanced 
emphasis on consultation with the public. 
Forces routinely provide a wide range of information to the Home Office and other bodies. From the 
early 1990s, the information which forces had to submit annually to the police inspectorate (HMIQ 
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increasingly became streamlined into a suite of national'performance indicators' (Pls) which were first 
introduced in 1993 and which 
t .... reflect the combined requirements of the 
Home Office, the Audit Commission, the ACPO 
and the Inspectorate and are classified according to the ACPO's five key service areas, with 
a section on resources and costs. The indicators cover information which, jointly, it is believed 
managers need to know in order to assess the performance of the force. ' 
(1994/5 report of Her Majesty's Chief Inspector of Constabulary p. 23) 
(HMCIC 1995) 
Additionally, the Home Secretary acquired a statutory power under the Police and Magistrates Court 
Act of 1994 annually to set key objectives for policing. I'lle Home Secretary's Objectives are related 
to certain of the Performance Indicators and they are intended to 'cover those areas of policing about 
which the public appear most concerned'- albeit these may, obviously change from one year to the 
next depending on changes whether in public concerns or of Home Secretaries. In 1995/6, for 
example, while the fieldwork for this research was being undertaken, forces had been set the 
following five objectives by the Home Secretary 
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Figure 3: 1 
Home Secretary's Key Objectives (and related Performance Indicators) 1995-6 
Key Objective Key Performance Indicator 
To maintain and if possible increase the number of The number of violent crimes detected per 100 officers 
detections for violent crimes 
To increase the number of detections of burglaries of The number of burglaries of dwellings detected per 100 
people's homes off icers 
To target and prevent crimes which are a particular local Work carried out this year on the development of a high 
problem in partnership with the public and other local level indicator suggests that tackling repeat victimisation 
agencies looks to be the most fruitful area, since reduction in 
repeat victimisation can lead to significant reduction in 
crime generally. Work will continue on developing a PI 
for repeat victimisation aimed at reducing its incidence. 
To provide high visibility policing so as to reassure the Public satisfaction with levels of foot and mobile patrols. 
public. 
To respond promptly to emergency calls from the public. (1) 7be percentage of 999 calls answered within the 
local target time. 
(2) The percentage of responses within the local target 
time to incidents requiring immediate response. 
The Home Secretary's Objectives were set alongside 25 PIs under six headings: 
call management 
crime management 
traffic management 
public order management/ public reassurance 
community policing management 
resources/costs. 
Police authorities have also been required since 1994 to publish information on the forces' 
performance in answering the telephone, answering letters, access to and use of buildings, and equal 
opportunities. Worth noting here are the four 'race' related items in this battery of information which 
is now required nationally. The first three are Pls set for forces by HMCIC and the fourth is part of 
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the infonnation to be published by the Police Authority. Only the first and the third, however, are 
directly relevant to the areas of service delivery monitoring which are the subject of this research 
report. The four are: 
1. a) Number of PACE stop/searches of white persons per 1000 white population. 
b) Number of PACE stop/searches of ethnic minority persons per 1000 ethnic minority 
population. 
2. Percentage of reported racial incidents where further investigative action is taken. 
3. Number of ethnic minority police officers per 1000 ethnic minority population. 
4. a) Does the Authority have a published policy to provide services fairly to all sections 
of the community? 
b) How does the Authority monitor its performance in implementing this policy? 
c) Does the Authority follow the Commission for Racial Equality ... code of practice on 
employment? 
Chief constables are expected to refer to the Home Secretary's objectives in their annual reports, 
along with any additional indicators set locally. The HMCIC report acknowledges that reservations 
have been expressed about the move to standardised national measures of performance; and the 
figures it includes for performance on meeting the Home Secretary's objectives differ quite widely 
from one force to another. HMCIC accepts that these differences are in part a reflection of local 
circumstances, including differences in both levels and patterns of crime. However, a detailed review 
after the first year's returns in 1993/4 revealed: 
a significant lack of consistency in the data supplied due to a widely different 
interpretation of requirements; 
considerable variation in the systems available for data capture and analysis, with 
widespread reliance on n-anual systems and at tinýes inaccuracies in the systems used; 
and 
a degree of mismatch between some performance indicators and the practice in certain 
forces. ' 
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...... The review team' it continues 'concluded that, in the circumstances, the comparison of 
performance between forces could for some indicators prove to be misleading. ' 
(op cit p. 69) 
The indicators, nonetheless, are also central to the annual plan which forces are required to publish 
under the 1994 Act after consultation with the local community. According to HMCIC this plan, in 
tum, 
'-should be linked to a force strategic plan setting out the longer term direction of the force 
over a period of 3-5 years. The annual plan may need to be supported by more detailed plans 
for local units. An important element of the plan is that it must be costed, with an expectation 
that costings will eventually be based on outputs and outcomes rather than inputs. ' 
(op. cit. p. 60) 
Thus ethnic monitoring is being introduced into a service where priorities are increasingly being 
formalised and standardised on a national basis according to measurable criteria and with a new 
emphasis not only on cost effectiveness but also on internal and external communication about these 
priorities. In reality, however, it is evident that the service will take some time before it is fully 
capable of meeting these objectives on the basis of information which is strictly comparable across 
all forces; and even when it does, important local differences will remain. Our case study areas 
revealed considerable variation in management information systems, the deployment of staff and in 
approaches to tackling crime (FitzGerald and Sibbitt forthcoming). Of particular significance in the 
context of this thesis was the variation in the use of the powers available to them -a central theme 
which emerges from the scrutiny of stop/searches, arrests and cautions in the following chapters. 
'Cultural'factors 
For all that has been written about police culture, especially with regard to 'race' issues (Holdaway 
1983, Smith 1983, Reiner 1985, Graef 1990, Fielding 1991), our research uncovered a diversity of 
attitudes towards ethnic monitoring. At the collective level, these tended to reflect a combination of 
past history and present circumstances, all of which vary considerably between forces. It is, however, 
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important to stress also that the range of views held by individuals within forces was probably more 
diverse still than the range of collective opinion between them. 
As we have seen, London has by far the longest experience of dealing with the issues now being 
raised by ethnic monitoring and of the sensitivities attached to these. It has unprecedented experience 
of collecting and analysing ethnic data and was the site of major disturbances in 1981 and 1985 (as 
well as much of the political fallout from these) and is the home of the majority of the black 
population. London too has been the area where that debate has had its highest political profile over 
the years in terms of specific carr4)aigns" and constant pressure from local authorities (most notably 
the Greater London Council in the early 1980s) and well-established local groups including Racial 
Equality Councils and their predecessors"'. 
A number of other forces share circumstances which are in some ways similar to those of the Met. 
Even though their experience may not be as long-standing or as extensive or intense, it has also 
inculcated an awareness of the issues associated with ethnic monitoring before it was formally 
required of them. Such forces include the following: 
forces which have experienced (or been threatened with) disturbances largely involving young 
people from ethnic minorities; 
forces where organisations representing ethnic minorities have exerted pressure regarding. 
police treatment of suspects and offenders from their communities; 
forces where the wider political environment has been alive to issues of racial equality and 
where, for exaniple, other local agencies have developed their own ethnic monitoring systems. 
13 These include the'Scrap Sus'campaign and campaigns on specific cases such as the campaign over the death in 
police custody of Wayne Douglas which sparked new disturbances in Brixton in December 1995. 
14 In 1988 for example. the umbrella organisation for all London Race Equality Councils (GLARE) produced a report 
entitled 'A Fair Cop' which made detailed recommendations for organisational reform within the Metropolitan 
police in order to ensure equality of treatment for ethnic minority suspects and offenders. 
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The forces with these characteristics have not always been those with the largest ethnic minority 
populations and, although they are often found in combination, the three sets of circumstances 
described above have not always combined in the same way in different forces. Two areas which were 
badly hit by the disturbances of the 1980s for example, Avon and Somerset and Merseyside do not 
(at force level) have large ethnic minority populations. In 1991 minorities represented only two per 
cent of the total population. However, the politics of 'race' has played out very differently in each 
area. Broadly speaking, the local authorities in Avon and Somerset - especially in the Bristol area - 
have espoused a classic programme of 'progressive' policies (including ethnic monitoring) and have 
been urged on by a very active but well-established REC with one of the most stable leaderships of 
any in the country. Merseyside, on the other hand, was suffering from high profile political instability 
during the formative period of the riots and their aftermath, with a 'radical' left group in charge of the 
city council which for ideological reasons held to some of the traditional arguments against ethnic 
monitoring and an REC which was the arena for much of the factional in-fighting connected with 
wider political battles (Ben-Tovirn and Gabriel 1986, Liverpool Black Caucus 1986). 
Also, this type of experience has not universally encouraged a favourable predisposition to ethnic 
monitoring. The criticisms post-Scarman in some areas brought a defensive closing of ranks among 
officers bruised and battered by the undoubtedly traumatic effect of the riots; and this was further 
reinforced by the events of 1985 in which PC Blakelock was killed. Officers we interviewed said that 
this legacy was still apparent in some areas which failed to attract and retain mature recruits and 
which persisted in a 'them and us' mentality, with supervisors more likely than elsewhere. 
unquestioningly to take the part of junior officers against outside criticism. Certainly memories of 
these events still powerfully influenced the personal attitudes of officers who had lived through them 
in their early days as constables; and many of these had now moved into more senior positions 
elsewhere within the same force or to forces elsewhere in the country. Conversely, officers who were 
not part of that legacy but came to these areas with no experience of the issues had been forcibly and 
pairMy struck by attitudes of suspicion and, even, hostility which they encountered in their dealings 
with minorities. 
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The majority of police forces, however, had never been faced with such traumas; and their longest 
experience of any kind of ethnic monitoring in service delivery has been the recording of racial 
incidents from the late 1980s. They had not been sensitised - favourably or otherwise - to the issues 
of ethnic monitoring of suspects and offenders until the ethnic breakdown of PACE stop/searches 
required by HNUC from 1993 was published in answer to Parliamentary Question in December 1994. 
National publicity focussed on London but remarked also on the disproportionate stopping of 
minorities elsewhere and this seems to have alerted some groups to press forces to account for the 
local figures 15. 
ne evaluation and the case study research as well as other discussions with police officers around 
the country indicated broadly that the ethnic monitoring requirement appeared mainly to be accepted 
without question. It was largely regarded as yet another demand for statistics the purpose of which 
was unclear (or irrelevant); but officers saw compliance as a matter of professional responsibility. 
Beyond this, four sets of attitudes towards ethnic monitoring became apparent. The second and third 
were the most conunon and were not particular to any rank or type of force. These attitudes can be 
summed up as follows: 
1. Theproblems monitoring is concerned with are problems onlyfor a minority offorces and 
London in particular. Thisforce has been free of them until now: collecting and publishing 
these data is an unnecessary imposition andlor may stir up trouble where none previously 
existed. 
This attitude was prevalent in two types of area. 
15 The headline in the Independent of 3 December 1994 read Racist" searches by police prompt calls for inquiry 
and the Guardian reported: 
'Police "stop-and-search" figures published yesterday, showing that over two-fifths of Londoners 
questioned by the police on the street are black or Asian, prompted calls for an urgent inquiry into the 
"racist" use of these powers. 
j3ernie Grant, the black Labour MP for Haringey, said the figures showed the Metropolitan police used 
their stop-and-search powers to intimidate ethnic communities. ' 
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One was areas where the local ethnic minority communities were predominantly Asian and 
where, until recently, community criticisms of the police had centred almost exclusively on 
their response to racial incidents. At least one, however, had been surprised when it 
undertook more detailed analysis of its stop/search data. 7be figures showed no disparity 
between whites and ethnic minorities; but this aggregated picture was found to mask 
considerable over-representation of the small black population. Moreover, certain forces were 
increasingly becoming concerned about the growth in criminal activity among sections of their 
Asian youth and recognised that ethnic data on suspects and offenders might become 
increasingly relevant for the future. 
The other set of forces were those with very small ethnic minority populations. Staff 
responsible for providing data in a smaU force with only one per cent ethnic minority 
population recognised the need for national statistics and the value of local comparisons but 
thought that the setting up of systems was a burden which could not be justified for local 
purposes. 
2. Thefigures will simply be used - nationally and locally by politicians, the Home Office, the 
Inspectorate, ACPO, by the media, our ownforce management and by community groups - 
as a stick to beat us with. 
There was deep resentment among many officers about the accusations of racism levelled . 
against the police generally and those which they personally faced on the streets. Quite 
independently of each other, they recounted situations which they believed they had 
approached with scrupulous professionalism to be greeted with the wearily farnifiar taunt 
'You're only picking on me because I'm blacIC; and my two co-researchers observed this 
themselves on at least one occasion during the fieldwork in the case study areas". 'Me 
publicity surrounding the first PACE returns (see footnote 14) had added considerably to 
16 One such incident involved a yotmg Asian. 
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these sensitivities. Certainly my suggestion in a dicussion group with a group of detectives 
that, if they were behaving fairly the figures might help them to prove this, was greeted with 
scorn. One surntned up the generally cynical view of the group, saying that the police could 
use the figures to justify what they were doing but others would use the same figures to justify 
allegations of police discrimination. An Inspector in another area told me that the figures 
would simply be manipulated by certain groups to make the police 'look bad. ' 
3. The figures could be used to prove that we are behaving fairly - especially if senior 
management were prepared to use them to demonstrate that black people are, indeed, more 
likely to show up in police statistics because they are more involved in crime (and street 
crime in particular). 
Those who held this view tended also to hold the most overtly negative attitudes towards 
black people (and often towards their own senior management). They had, however, been 
much encouraged by the launch of Operation Eagle Eye in July 1995 which was intended to 
check the rise in street robbery (or'mugging') in London. Unpublished figures collected from 
data held on divisions had shown that well over half of all victims - and in some places as 
many as 80 per cent - described their assailants as black. Recognising that the operation 
would disproportionately target this minority, the Comn-dssioner sent a letter"' inviting key 
17 The letter read: 
Txly in August I shall be launching an important police operation to combat street robbery and I think 
it is important to tell you about it. 7bis is to invite you to a briefing.. 
VVhen I talk about crime figuresý I always add a health warning to the effect that we should really simply 
use them to identify trends. In London over the last two years, the trend has shown a reduction in reported 
crime. However, within dim trend there is another which gives me cause for concern. 7bat is that crimes 
of violence against people showed a marked an unacceptable increase. 
Most crimes of violence are committed by people who are well known to their victims, but there is a 
worrying upward trend in the number of street robberies - the kind of offence we generally call 'mugging' 
and which nearly always involves some form of violence. 
It is a fact that very many of the perpetrators of muggings are very young black people who have been 
excluded from school and/or are unemplo)ed. I am sure I do not need to spell out the sensitivity of dealing 
with this crime problem which is, of course, much more than just a police problem. ' 
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black people in the capital to discuss the implications with him. ffis initiative generated 
considerable controversy and was covered under newspaper headlines such as 'Met chief 
breaks taboo to reveal most muggers are blacle (Daily Telegraph), 'Condon tackles black 
muggers! (The Times) and'Most muggers are black says top cop'(The Sun). 
Officers who took this third position on ethnic monitoring tended to interpret the 
Commissioner's initiative as a vindication of their point of view and were probably more 
willing to air their opinions about black involvement. in crime as a consequence. Typical are 
the comments made to me by a constable and two Inspectors from different areas of London: 
'If 99 per cent of people committing robberies are black - and in an area like this they 
are - then you would expect to find 99 per cent of the stop/searches to be of black 
people. ' 
'I don't know if I see any point in doing it really - unless they can put that towards 
crime or persons conunitting crime because it has been proved that more street 
robberies are corruriitted by 10-type people", but "they" are loathe to say that 60 per 
cent of a certain type of crime is committed by a particular group -just that 'Y' per 
cent of arrests involved members of that group and that it is "disproportionate". ' 
Ve knew for a fact it was all IC3s that were getting stopped because it was them that 
was doing it. ' 
This last comment was a reference to street robbery, although the same inspector had also 
made a similar argument about drug dealing, concluding that, in a certain area, 90 per cent 
of the drugs-related stops were'bound'to be of black people. He also bemoaned the fact that 
the police were 'brilliant! at collecting information but failed then to use it in a 'positive way' 
(Le. to support the argument that the disproportionate numbers of black people in the police 
statistics simply reflected their disproportionate involvement in crime). 
18 i. e. black people, using the Police National Computer classification which is based on six categories 
(vAjite European, Dark European, Afro-Caribbean, Asian, Oriental, Arab). 
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4. Ethnic monitoring may be able to help us defend ourselves against unfounded accusations 
of racism - whether routine and knee-jerk or politically motivated - but where we do have 
a problem it will help us identify where it is happening, who is responsible and how to stop 
it. 
This view encapsulates the classic arguments in favour of ethnic monitoring. It was broadly 
held by senior management, although a surprising number of officers at this level explicitly 
held to one of the two previous arguments, while others took a very guarded line in 
interviews which did not betoken enthusiasm. Inevitably, though, many senior managers who 
supported this case for monitoring were driven by priorities which, for them, were far more 
pressing; and some may, however unconsciously, shy from pursuing the possible implications 
of ethnic differences in the data. " With one or two notable exceptions, therefore, the officers 
who had espoused this argument with the greatest enthusiasm were often not best placed to 
fill the role of 'policy entrepreneurs' in their forces. 17hey tended to be: a) officers with a 
community relations brief and (depending on the management structure within the force) little 
influence on dayý-to-day operational policing; and b) force statistical officers, some of whom 
were civilians. 
SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 
The impetus towards introducing a national system of ethnic monitoring by the police gathered 
unprecedented momentum from about 1991. Some (though by no means all) of the pressure was 
generated by Horne Office officials and senior police officers who co-opted s95 of the 1991 Criminal 
Justice Act to this end, imbuing its very non-specific terms with such very specific meaning that to 
describe their enterprise as creative seems hardly adequate. The arguments advanced more generally 
19 1 was reliably told of one force in which the overall stop and search figures had shown parity between 
whites and minorities but, once unpackedý revealed a marked over-representation of black people. The 
largest minocity was Asian and, with the support of the Chief Constable, the force had actively promoted 
what hitherto had appeared to be good relations with the various groups. The CWef Constable personally 
intervened to block an initiative to publish the disaggregated figures on the grounds that, since there was 
no apparent demand for them. it was unnecessary to risk damaging those relations. 
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by these and by other Muential actors in this process clearly imply an expectation that such statistics 
will'measure' whether or not the police treat minorities fairly and equally. It is also intended that the 
police figures will open onto a bridge spanning the whole of the crin-Linal justice system through to 
the far side of imprisonment and 'measuring' fairness at each stage. For the present, though, only a 
very limited range of police decisions are being monitored under a system which became mandatory 
on all forces in Aptil 1996. 
However, longer experience of ethnic monitoring of other public services should sound several notes 
of caution. Ilis suggests: that it may take a considerable time before the data are reliable; that data 
quality, coverage, analysis and use may vary within the same organisation; and that monitoring can 
easily lapse into an exercise in data collection for its own sake. Whether or not police ethnic 
njonitoring will avoid these pitfalls is too early to say; but the likelihood of its success may strongly 
be influenced by three important sets of factors in the organisational context into which it has been 
introduced. 
There are major differences between (and within) forces in: a) their policies and practices, 
including their use of different powers available to them; b) the quality, coverage and 
comparability of the statistics they collect generally; and c) the ethnic make-up of their local 
populations. In particular, only a handful have ethnic minority populations at or above the 
national average (which is itself under 6 per cent); and nearly two thirds of the black 
population -who have been the major focus of concern in the debate about 'race' and crime - 
lives in the Metropolitan Police area. 
policing priorities increasingly reflect the need to meet objectives set nationally and 
supplemented, where necessary, by further objectives set in response to the main concerns 
local populations. Ile imperative to meet these objectives is experienced at all levels within 
forces and it coincides with a drive towards more 'inteHigence'-Ied policing. It is uncertain 
where, whether and to what extent ethnic monitoring wiH mesh with these over-riding 
concems. 
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For the most part ethnic monitoring is seen as irrelevant at best; at worst, it is resented and/or 
feared as a stick deliberately designed to beat the police with. Also, those who actually 
support it do so for three main reasons: because they believe it will vindicate their claims to 
treat all groups fairly-, because they expect the figures to prove that there are ethnic 
differences in levels and patterns (and, specifically, that this will vindicate their higher rates 
of stop and arrests of black people); and because they see it as a way of pinpointing and 
rooting out discrimination. Those in senior management positions who take the third view, 
however, are likely to have other demands on them which are more pressing than to ensure 
the effective introduction of ethnic monitoring; and some may - however unconsciously - be 
wary of the hornet' s nest it may stir up, not only in the local political context but, more 
immediately, within the force itself. Below this level, the other main enthusiasts within the 
police tend to occupy posts which give them little leverage on the operational mainstream. 
It is against this historical, political and, organisational background that the thesis now turns 
specifically to consider the ethnic monitoring of PACE stop/searches, arrests and cautions. It does 
so using a range of empirical data I have generated or been given access to over the last three years 
in the course of my work in the Home Office on the introduction of police ethnic monitoring. 
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Chapter Four 
Stop and Search 
TlIE SIGNIFICANCE OF POLICE STOPS 
Of the three main aspects of policing covered by the ethnic monitoring requirement of 1996, the 
question of stops and searches has attracted by far the greatest interest - from the police, politicians, 
the media and community groups alle. The stopping of ethnic minorities (with or without a search) 
has also been covered more extensively than any other by previous research on ethnic minorities and 
the criminal justice system (for an overview see FitzGerald 1993). And it has attracted this degree of 
interest because the rate at which black people are stopped by the police, along with the quality and 
content of these encounters has been seen as a major factor in shaping black-police relations'. Similar 
concerns have rarely been expressed in relation to the stopping of whites or Asians and it is evident 
that many have come- to regard stops as a form of police harassment of black people which has taken 
on a symbolic significance almost akin to the'Sus'law's. 
Most discussion of this subject, however, has failed to take account of the marked differences in the 
extent to which different forces use their powers of stop and search. Ile Metropolitan police has 
always relied much more heavily on these powers than any other force' and in 1995 was responsible 
for nearly half (46 per cent) of the national total of recorded searches under sl of PACE (White 
1996). Together with the City of London, it was one of fourteen forces with a rate of 100 1 or more 
stop/searches per 100,000 population. Only two other forces in this group - Leicestershire and 
min ity populations. Few other forces reached even half creater Manchester - had significant ethnic or 
the Met rate. In particular, seventeen forces had rates of 301 to 600 stop/searches per 100,00o 
population and these included all of the other forces with higher than average ethnic minority 
populations (that is, the West Midlands, West Yorkshire, Tha=s Valley and Bedfordshire. ) A further 
Tlm, 'SwMW 81'9 the operation which triggered the Brixton riots of that year was based on the police's use of their 
stop and search Powers. 
See, for example. Carol Willis's 1983 The Use, Effectiveness and Impact of Police Stop and Search Powers' 
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four forces - none of them with significant ethnic minority populations - had rates which were lower 
stin 
Further, inasmuch as police ethnic monitoring is intended ultimately to illuminate the treatment of 
minorities within the criminal justice process, it is important to bear in mind that only a small 
proportion of stop/searches results in an arrest; and, whatever their overall use of the PACE power, 
this pattern varies little between forces. Yet it is also noticeable that the number of recorded 
stop/searches has increased sixfold from 1986 (when the national total was 109,800) to 690,300 in 
1995 but the 'yield' in terms of arrests has fallen steadily from 17 per cent overall to 12 per cent. 
Nonetheless, inasmuch as some forces have much higher rates than others of stop/searches per 1000 
population (see Table 4: 1), the arrests which result from these encounters may contribute more to 
their total arrest figures than they do in forces where the power is used only sparingly. 
It is in this context that the HMIC requirement to monitor PACE stop/searches was first introduced 
in 1993. Even though the pubhshed figures shown in Table 4: 1 do not distinguish between different 
ethnic minorities they consistently show that, overall, ethnic minorities are stopped and searched more 
frequently than whites - although the pattern varies considerably between forces. 
Questions about interpreting the picture shown by Table 4: 1 are discussed in the final section of this 
chapter; but the figures have been seen as the first 'official' proof that concems about the 
disproportionate stopping of black people were justified (see Chapter Two). This has in tum fuelled 
interest in the 1996-97 figures which, by providing a breakdown which distinguishes stops of black 
people from those for other minorities, are expected to paint an even starker picture. Forces who have 
already provided this type of information have tended to confirm this expectation. In the capital, for 
example, the ratio of 2.5 ethnic minority stops to one of a white person 'unpacks' to a figure of 4.4 
for stops of black people and 1.2 for stops of Asians; and in Leicestershire the semblance of parity 
in the HMIC returns breaks down again in the case of black people where stops are more than five 
times the rate for whites. 
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The starting point of this chapter is to clarify what in principle is covered by the PACE figures. It 
then looks at what the figures cover in practice, including a) the factors which make it inevitable that 
the profile of the 'population' stopped and searched under PACE will be very different from the 
population at large and b) factors which influence the recording of stop/searches. In the light of this, 
it looks at the question of interpreting ethnic differences shown by the figures by reference to the 
material generated in the course of the research. 
WHAT ARE THE PACE FIGURES INTENDED TO COVER? 
Prior to the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 the police nationally had powers to stop and 
search for drugs and firearms'. sI of PACE added to these the power for a police constable to 
'detain in order to search any person, vehicle or anything which is in or on a vehicle, in any 
place to which the public has access, if he or she has reasonable grounds for suspecting that 
stolen or prohibited articles will be found. Any such article found during a search may be 
seized. ' 
'Me term 'stolen articles' is self-explanatory but 'prohibited articles' are usually defined in terms of 
'articles made or adapted for use in the course of or in connection with a burglary, theft, 
taking a motor vehicle without authority or obtaining property by deception or intended by 
the person having it to be used by him (sic) or some other person' 
and 
offensive weapons made or adapted for causing injury to persons'. 
The latter include sharp bladed knives and items which are, of themselves, innocent but are intended 
by the suspect or another person to cause injury. 
Ibe PACE figures cover both stop searches under the original powers (i. e. for drugs and fireanns) 
and those provided by sl. All are regulated by Sections 2 and 3 of PACE, which require a record to 
7bc relevant legislation is contained in s23 of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 and s47 of the Fireams Act 1968. 
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be made of such searches and which specify how they should be exercised. The codes of practice 
governing the Act, commentaries on these and related training materials attempt to clarify the term 
'reasonable grounds' without actually defining it, emphasising that what constitutes 'reasonable 
grounds! may depend on the circumstances in each case; but the bottom line is that there must be an 
, objective basis'for the suspicion. The usual examples of the type of grounds which will provide this 
objective basis are 
'-where information has been received such as a description of an article being carried or of 
a suspected offender, (where) a person is seen acting covertly or warily or attempting to hide 
something; or (where) a person is carrying a certain type of article at an unusual time or in 
a place where a number of burglaries or thefts are known to have taken place recently'. 
(Code of Practice 1995) 
At the same time, strong emphasis is placed on what does not constitute such grounds, thus 
'Reasonable suspicion can never be supported on the basis of personal factors alone. For 
example, a person's colour, age, hairstyle or manner of dress, or the fact that he is known to 
have a previous conviction for possession of an unlawful article cannot be used alone or in 
combination with each other as the sole basis on which to search that person. Nor may it be 
founded on the basis of stereotyped images of certain persons or groups as more likely to be 
committing offences' 
(ibid. ) 
Neither the stop nor the search is legal without 'reasonable grounds'; but a written record must be 
completed only if a search takes place and it is this written record ( in London, Form 50904) which 
is the basis of the PACE figures. Before moving from a stop to a PACE search, the officer involved 
must give the person concerned (i. e. the individual who will be searched or the person in charge of 
the vehicle to be searched) the following information: 
the officees name and the name of the police station to which he is atmched; 
A separate form (5091) is used for searches of unattended vehicles. 
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the object of the search ; 
the grounds on which the search is being conducted; and 
notice of the persoWs right to a copy of the search record on the spot or at the police station 
named within a year. 
This last requirement, however, is qualified: it may be omitted in cases where 'it appears to the 
officer that it will not be practicable to make a record of the search'. The guidance offered on this 
is 
'An officer who has carried out a search must make a written record unless it is not 
practicable to do so, on account of the numbers to be searched or for some other operational 
reason, eg in situations involving public disorder' [and, by implication, situations in which the 
officer perceives the threat of public disorder] 
'The records must be completed as soon as practicable, on the spot unless circumstances (eg 
other immediate duties or very bad weather) make this impracticable. ' 
The forms themselves vary in design from force to force and ft-om, time to time. All, though, are 
carried on a small tear-off pad about a quarter the size of a normal (M) sheet of paper. At this size 
there is space only for the bare minimum of information required under PACE, viz: 
the name of the person searched or (if withheld) a description 
a note of the person's ethnic origin 
when a vehicle is searched, a description, including the registration number 
the object of and the grounds for the search and its outcome 
the date, time and place 
a note of any resultant injury or damage to property 
the identities of the officers involved. 
The reverse side of the form is available for entering additional notes. 
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PACE returns, then, record searches but not necessarily stops except insofar as these precede the 
search (though see the discussion below about recording practices). Other searches, may take place 
which do not come under the firearms and drugs legislation as extended by s1 of PACE, although it 
is unlikely that members of the public caught up in these encounters will be aware of the distinction. 
These non-PACE searches are of two types - searches which take place under other legislation and 
'voluntary' searches. 
The other two main other pieces of legislation which permit searches of this type are s60 of the 
Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1995; and sl3a of the Prevention of Terrorism Act. The 
. 
conduct of searches under these powers is governed by sections 2 and 3 of PACE, including the 
requirement to make a written record; but neither requires 'reasonable grounds'. The Criminal Justice 
and public Order Act allows for random searches for offensive weapons etc in order to prevent 
serious incidents of violence in a defined locality. It may be used only for a specific, finite period and 
only when authorised by a senior officer5. The PTA power applies similarly to searches for articles 
used in terrorisrrL The ethnic monitoring requirement of April 1996 relates only to stops and searches 
under the Firearms and Nfisuse of Drugs Acts and sl of PACE. For practical purposes, though, the 
search power under other legislation adds little to the total figure: the Criminal Justice and Public 
Order Act and the Prevention of Terrorism Act have been used in this way by only a minority of 
forces (see White 1996). 
71be question of 'voluntary' searches is a much greyer area which is discussed in more detail in the 
next section. For the present it should be noted that it is permissible for any officer to speak to any 
person. without needing 'reasonable grounds' for suspicion. On a strict interpretation, the reference 
in pACE to Idetaining'imphes, in sorm sense, that the person might not have stopped if the constable 
had not exercised the PACE power. By extension, the safeguard that the officer should be able to 
justify the use of the power on specific, objective, 'reasonable grounds' is required precisely because 
of this implication of coercion. The guidelines make clear that, for a search to be conducted using the 
-1he power was invoked in only 17 of the 43 forces in 1995, with the Metropolitan Police accounting for 1.397 of 
the total 2,439 searches recorded and Greater Manchester the next highest user with 484 (Home Office 1996). 
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PACE power, these grounds must have been present from the outset. Where they are absent, 
however, some form of search may nonetheless take place on a voluntary basis. For example, if the 
officer asks what is in sonrone's bag or in the boot of their car, they may open it to show them. The 
initial mining of constables in London covers the point thus: 
The general power to stop and search requires that an officer has reasonable grounds for 
suspicion in order to be lawful. These grounds, which are necessary for the exercise of the 
initial power to detain, may be confirmed or eliminated by questioning a person detained for 
the purposes of a search. However, the reasonable grounds cannot be retrospectively 
provided by such questioning during detention or by the person's refusal to answer any 
question put to him (sic). In other words, you must have reasonable grounds from the outset, 
although the grounds may change or be eliminated as a result of questioning. If, however, a 
person voluntarily stops and answers your questions and as a result of this you reach a 
decision to search, this is pennissible. ' (emphasis added) 
(Metropolitan Police 
The Code of Practice also emphasises that 
'In these circumstances an officer should always make clear that he is seeking the consent of 
the person concerned to the search being carried out by telling the person that he need not 
consent and that without his consent he will not be searched. ' 
WH[AT SHApF-s niF- PACE FiGUREs iN PRAcricE? 
While the previous section has described what PACE stops and searches cover in principle, there is 
an extensive literature describing the extent to which they depart from this in practice, the 
circumstances in which this tends to occur and the reasons for this. Tlis has recently been well 
summarised by my colleague, David Brown, in ? ACE Ten Years on: a Review of the Research' 
(Brown 1997); but the main factors which appear particularly relevant to the concerns of this thesis 
are as follows. 
A recent study of stop and search in one area of London (Young 1995) strongly makes the case that, 
in meeting their obligation to prevent and detect crime, the police will inevitably target certain 
sections of the population and not others. The notion of 'democratic suspicion' whereby all citizens 
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should be assumed equally likely to offend is, the author argues, a nonsense. In short, to expect the 
police to operate on this basis would put large sections of the population unnecessarily (and unfairly) 
under suspicion as well as being grossly inefficient. One would not, therefore, expect the profile of 
those stopped and searched by the police to match that of the population at large. Not only is it 
unsurprising that young men are disproportionately stopped relative to old ladies - it would be a 
matter of concern if the reverse were the case. However, it is far more difficult to define who is likely 
to be caught under the power if it is exercised properly; and this, of course, makes it especially 
difficult to be sure of how far pettems of ethnic difference are predictable (and legitimate) or to what 
extent they are a cause for concern. 
Two sets of factors were identified in the course of the research which appear to have an important 
influence on the PACE statistics and which may, to some extent, affect the ethnic profile of those 
searched. Both have been covered in the general research literature (see especially Brown 1996b for 
an overview); but they have rarely informed the discussion of ethnic statistics. The first can broadly 
be termed 'operational' and the second 'administrative'. 
Linked in part with the notion of 'democratic suspicion' - and contrary to the image often conjured 
up in discussion - PACE stop/searches (henceforth 'searches') are not random. In practice, they are 
shaped in three main ways which partially reflect their legal basis. Many searches are conducted in 
the context of specific, targeted operations; many others are 'intelligence' led; and they vary by time 
and place. In our present state of knowledge, it is not possible to estimate what proportion of the 
total are accounted for in either of the first two ways; but it seems likely that the majority could be 
attributed to 'intelligence'. This term may be used very loosely but it increasingly provides a -guiding 
principle for day-to-day policing and is often referred to in policing objectives. 
, intelligence' 
The most obvious fonn of intelligence which provides officers with the 'reasonable grounds' for a 
pAcF, search comes from crime reports which focus attention on areas where incidents have occurred 
and, sometimes, descriptions of suspects connected with these incidents. Much police patrolling 
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activity is reactive and - in particular - tends to be driven by the crime reports which are relayed by 
radio from central control rooms to officers on patrol. This pattern has recently corne. under critical 
scrutiny by the Audit Commission in a report entitled 'Streetwise' which observes: 
'Currently.. patrol effort in many forces can be characterised as "fire-brigade policing". It is 
highly reactive and patrol officers spend a significant proportion of their time - up to 60 per 
cent in some areas - dealing with incidents and their aftermath. ' 
(Audit Conunission 1996 p. 5) 
However, the research provided examples of a number of additional, ways in which forms of 
intelligence other than crime reports could influence patrolling, both formally and informally. All 
forces keep central lists of 'prominent nominals' - individuals who are the focus of particular 
observation at any time because of their suspected involvement in crime locally; the names on the list 
change regularly but there will be a second, longer list of individuals who have either just come off 
the core list of Prominent Nominals; or who are shaping up to enter it. In addition, Local Intelligence 
Offices at divisional and/or subdivisional level within forces build up information on a wider range 
of individuals who may be involved in offending locally and of people known to associate with them. 
The sources of this information are diverse but much comes from officers on patrol. It includes details 
which may be provided on the reverse side of the 5090 PACE forms 
6. More important sources, 
though, are notes recorded by officers in their pocket books, including notes on other stops and on 
checks made on the Police National Computer to see whether individuals who have attracted their, 
attention have criminal records. Before going out on patrol, teams are briefed on a range oi items, 
including recent incidents in the area and individuals to watch out for. More informally, it is common 
for teams to swap intelligence while out on patrol almost as a form of professional gossip - who has 
been seen with whom, which offenders have recently been released from custody etc. 
In fact, the sharing of 'intelligence' is patchy and the quality of the information available to officers 
5090S (of which susPects are entitled to request a copy for up to a year) are usually held by the LIO once the basic 
details on the front of the fonn have been collated in central records. 
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on patrol leaves a lot to interpretation and discretion'. One of the reasons for this is the briefing 
process itself. This can vary from one relief to another within the same station and may be affected 
as much by differences in approach between those responsible for the briefings as by the information 
available to them. The following descriptions from reports by HMIC in two different areas in 1995 
are typical: 
HMI attended a number of operational briefings for uniform patrol staff, and in the main 
found these to be traditional and poor, with little emphasis on intelligence, priorities and 
performance; little more than postings and refreshment times. ' 
and 
TIMI attended a number of routine operational briefings during the Inspection at which 
individual officers were tasked. Generally speaking the briefings allocated individual officers 
to a core posting with little or no guidance on what was expected of them or current local 
priorities. These briefings were accompanied by an unstructured run through the local 
intelligence log and recent messages and circulations. ý 
(emphasis added) 
However, another factor militating against intelligence-sharing may actually be an exacerbation of 
competitiveness between officers as the I performance culture' takes hold. If 'intelligence' has always 
been used as a type of currency, its value is immeasurably increased where officers' 'scores' are 
measured one against another in league tables which are posted openly on notice boards for all to 
sees. 
These factors are reflected in criticisms by the Audit Commission which describes both the briefing 
debriefing process as leading to: 
'.... reduced commitment to gathering and sharing intelligence . .... Although quantity. does 
not matter above quality, some Local Intelligence Officers are being starved of the raw data 
needed to construct quality indices on local crindnals and their habits; there is evidence that 
For a full discussion see Fielding 1995, especially Chapter 9. 
in one force outside our fieldwork areas where this and odw similar incentives were routinely used one officer said 
openly in front of his team mates that, if he received a piece of Prime intelligence just before going on leave for 
several days, he would not pass it on but hope to capitalise on it personally when he returned. 
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patrol officers also believe that not enough intelligence is being collected and disseminated. ' 
(emphasis added) 
(op. cit. p. 40) 
one consequence of this, it concludes, is that 
' Unless they have been assiduous in briefmg themselves, or the force has succeeded in 
cascading strategic objectives to the level of individual officers, many officers will default to 
doing what interests them or what they consider to be important. ' 
Yet the very emphasis given to these criticisms and increasing references in, for example, local 
policing plans reinforce the irnpression that this inteMgence-led approach to patrolling is likely for the 
future to increase rather than decrease, with possible consequences for the policing of minorities 
which are picked up later in this chapter. 
Observations in the course of the fieldwork for this research illustrated this problem of unfocussed 
patrolling when the police are not in reactive mode. In these circumstances, according to the Audit 
Comrr-ission, police attention is likely to be 'orientated towards traffic offences (for example defective 
vehicles or disqualified drivers) or alternatively the officer will drive around in response mode, waiting 
for the call to the next job. 'Relatively speaking - and certainly in the view of the Commission - these 
activities are non-strategic and inefficient. However, it would be wrong to assume that they run 
counter to local policing priorities and represent a waste of patrol time; and they are still 'intelligence- 
led' to a considerable degree. This is most obviously true of the pursuit of disqualified drivers; and 
officers do not drive around completely airnlessly'waiting for the next call', they may also use the time 
proactively and win usually draw on 'intelligence' (in its broadest sense) to do so. In practice, unless 
they chance on an incident on the street which claims their interest, their attentions are most likely 
to focus on that section of the population defined by 'intelligence' as being of particular interest to 
the police9. 
A simple example would be that, finding themselves in response mode in a Particular neighbourhood, a patrolling 
crew will have a completely arbitrary choice of which direction to take at a junction. If one direction will take them 
past the home of a known Villain'they will decide they may as well take a look - even, possibly, as one ofricer put 
it, let him know we're keeping an eye on him'. 
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Being a likely object of police attention should not of itself make anyone a legitimate target to be 
searched. However, it seems almost inevitable that a much higher proportion of the people who fall 
into this category are likely to be searched than of the population at large. Thus analysis on one 
division for the Met Working Group suggests there may be very high levels of stopping of 'prominent 
nominals'. Of 46, six were recorded as having been stop/searched 25 times or more; and the average 
was eight. 
Time andplace 
The third operational factor which appears to bear heavily on the pattern of searches is their timing 
and location. A special survey of four London divisions undertaken for the Stop and Search Working 
Party showed that PACE searches in the period of one month occurred as follows: 
a. m. to 2 p. m. 
2 p. m. to 10 P. M. 41.5% 
10 p. m. to 6 a. m. 46% 
Very much smaller numbers of the population are likely to be on the street between 10 p. m. and 6 
a. M than at any other time. So the chances of individuals who are out at that time being searched is 
very much higher (relative to other times) than the figure of 46 per cent suggests'o; and this is 
probably driven by two factors. For officers on patrol it will be a relatively quiet time with fewer 
crime reports to respond to and more opportunity to be proactive. 71iis'mismatch with demand'is 
referred to thus in the Audit Commission report: 
16 per cent of operational patrol officers are on duty at 7 p. m., when workload is peaking, 
while II per cent are on duty during the quietest period, in the early hours of the morning. 
Almost one in ten BCUs [Basic Command Units]" had the most officers available for patrol 
10 in discussion with officers from a wide range of forces one plausibly suggested that rural forces like his own had 
a much lower rate of searches because they had hardly any night patrol cover. 
II The Basic Cornamnd Unit (as the name irnplies) is the main sub-valit of organisation within a police force and may 
sometimes (as in the Met) be referred to as a 'division'. 
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at 5 arrL. The mismatch between incidents and resources is explained in part by the practice 
of double-crewing patrol cars at night (for reasons of officer safety).. ' 
(op. cit. p. 29) 
In the fieldwork areas, patrols were double-crewed at night unless insufficient staff were available. 
one particularly striking finding from a late turn in one of the areas covered by Rae Sibbitt was that 
nearly every one of the people seen on the street in the early hours of that morning was 'known' to 
the police. A point of debate in the interpretation of PACE, though, was what sort of activity would 
justify using the PACE power at night which might not during the day, bearing in mind that the 
guidance specifically refers to 'an unusual time' in the context of 'reasonable grounds'. The following 
exchange between a PC and a probationer was illuminating on this point: 
PC: You'd want to stop someone with no socks on. 
Probationer: No socks on? 
PC: Yes - especially if they've got them in their pockets. 
Probationer: In their pockets.... why's that grounds for suspicion? 
PC: Well, it's burglary: they wear socks on their hands to prevent fingerprints. 
Same with gloves. You should always search someone with gloves on. 
Probationer: Gloves? Thaf sa bit dodgy isn't it? 
PC: Not at three o'clock in the morning. 12 
With regard to the question of location, a point frequently made was that searches would be far more 
common in certain areas than others. The guidance specifically refers to areas in which there have 
recently been burglaries or thefts, although we found some uncertainty about whether the 
combination of being in such an area at an unusual hour itself constituted 'reasonable grounds' for a 
PACE search. At least as important, though, are particular shopping centres and places of 
entertainment which may often attract people in large numbers from outside the division (and even 
the force) and where searches may involve groups rather than lone individuals. The implications of 
this are further unpacked in the next section; but for the present it should simply be noted that the 
numbers of stops may vary quite markedly from one police beat to another for entirely legitimate 
12 (See also, for example, Rubinstein 1973). 
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reasons. In one of our areas, the PACE figure for twenty regular uniformed patrol teams over one 
month ranged between none and 25. In another area, the yearly total for eighteen beats had a low of 
212 and a high of 1,784. 
Recording practices 
In addition to these broadly 'operational' influences, three inter-related administrative factors come 
into play which may further shape the picture which emerges from the PACE records (Brown 1997) 
and we observed all of them in the course of the research. 
The first is that a proportion of PACE searches goes unrecorded for a variety of reasons. Despite the 
guidance, many 5090 forms appear not to be filled in at the tfive of the search. One incident fi-om our 
fieldwork is worth citing in this context. It iRustrates the difficult circumstances in which officers are 
required to make this record - circumstances in which fears for personal safety and the demands of 
negotiating a tense situation in order to prevent it fi-om escalating must inevitably take precedence 
over the formal requirement to fill in a PACE slip. Andy Zurawan's notes read: 
'A call was received regarding a domestic incident where there was a possibility of violence... 
As we approached, a young male IC1/3 (sic) was seen leaving the property with two large 
bags over his shoulders in a hurry, with a woman shouting obscenities at him from the 
window above. X [Officer One] called out to him but he ignored his calls. At that point X and 
Y [Officer Two] (closely followed by me) got out of the car to question him about the 
incident. As X began talking to him he started making movements towards his front pockets. 
I jumped back thinking he had a weapon and because I was standing right in front of him. Y 
held back his hand to stop him from going to his pocket and they informed him that they were 
going to conduct a search. Y told him that by going for his pockets he was making all of us 
nervous. Y conducted the search. By this time the guy was getting pretty angry. and was 
mouthing off about not wanting any police brutality. He allowed the search and a PNC check 
was carried out on him He was offered a copy of the search record. During this time the 
woman above was still shouting at him, telling him in no uncertain terms that he was not 
welcome there. X and Y suggested that maybe he shouldn't go back to the house for a while 
as this might aggravate the situation between himself and his girlfriend further. No further 
action was taken. ' 
-Ibe guidance also recognises that officers may not complete a record because of calls to other dudes. 
But, in addition to these pennissible exemptions, it was very apparent that officers have no strong 
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personal incentive to make a record. This is especially so where the search was unproductive but the 
encounter passed off smoothly so no further police action is required and no repercussions are 
anticipated. On the other hand, where the search 'yields' an arrest, the paperwork completed for the 
arrest is the basis for any subsequent processing and there is little incentive to duplicate effort by 
completing the 5090 also. The second of our London fieldwork areas did a spot check and discovered 
that the 5090 had not been completed for 30 per cent of the arrests which resulted from a PACE 
search. A PC in another area - more forthright than many I spoke to but by no means atypical - put 
it thus 
UI can get away without filling in a piece of paper I Will. 113 
Senior management emphasise that, despite these temptations, officers are instructed to complete 
5090s for all relevant searches and gave the impression that completion rates have improved 
considerably. This is tentatively confirmed by David Brown (op. cit) who compares the marked rise 
in the police figures between 1988 and 1992 with the rate indicated by the British Crime Survey. It 
is also possible that the HMIC performance indicator and the 1996 monitoring requirement are 
beginning to generate a greater incentive for officers to 'cover themselves' by recording. In some 
places, increased vigilance by supervisors and line managers is having an impact. This is usually 
exercised in the name of Quality Control; and the research yielded numerous instances where the 
practice had been adopted of sending incomplete forms back to the officer responsible (often via their 
line manager). This was usually initiated by personnel responsible for entering the details onto the 
database. Until relatively recently, they would usually have left fields blank or (especially in the case 
of ethnic appearance) simply imputed for themselves. However, such checks largely apply in instances 
where records have been made; and this, arguably, could add to the incentive not to record, thereby 
avoiding such scrutiny. 
A further powerful incentive to record - and one which has ramifications for other forms of recording, 
13 For further discussion of police aversion to such paperwork, see also Manning (1977) and Fielding (1988). 
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including arrests - was undoubtedly the impact of Performance Indicators and Local Policing 
Objectives whose growing influence was referred to in the previous chapter. On the ground these are 
often a cause of resentment for two main and inter-related reasons. Officers feel that no recognition 
is given to activities in which they are routinely involved which are very time-consun-dng and some 
of which may represent an important investment in community relations terms"'. 'I'lle second was 
described in one area as causing a lowering of morale. As officers saw it, their performance was under 
increasing scrutiny- they got no positive feedback from senior management but were singled out for 
criticism where local objectives were not being met. A further and rather more positive incentive in 
this context was the widespread perception that the activities officers recorded directly influenced the 
allocation of funding and resources. 
Further complicating the question of whether all PACE searches are recorded is that many forces (or 
divisions within them) seem to include some PACE stops on 5090s in addition to the searches, even 
though the Act only requires the search to be recorded. In some instances, officers would mark 'stop 
only' on the form; but the extent of this practice remains unclear. It may vary between officers and/or 
between areas; and where it happens there is no way of knowing whether stops-without-searches are 
being recorded with the same degree of consistency (or lack of consistency) as stops-with-searches. 
'Voluntary' searches 
The second administrative problem concerns the question of 'voluntary' searches. The Codes of 
Guidance originally issued in conjunction with PACE have been reissued in part to clarify the point; 
but discussions and direct observation throughout this research suggests that the dividing line 
between a PACE search and one which is 'voluntary' is still a point of debate not only between 
individual officers but even between forces. In one of my Holly Royde workshops with a group of 
officers from a wide range of forces in 1995, some said that their forces did not recognise the 
14 One evening I was with two officers who spent over an hour dealing with a domestic dispute, arranging to get the 
fernale party to hospital and bringing the male party in for questioning. We then spent a further three hours trying 
to find someone to take care of the matfs nine-year old son. It was a frustrating and distressing incident which they 
handled admirabl3r, but they deeplyresented the idea that those tb= hours 'counted'for nothing in the measurement 
of police effectiveness or their own professional rating. 
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possibility of a 'voluntary' search: all searches had to be conducted under PACE. Many simply 
accepted that an unknown proportion of searches would never be recorded because they were 
voluntary. But other forces were trying to develop systems for recording 'voluntary' searches as well 
as PACE searches in order to capture the totality of these encounters with the public in their statistics. 
An experiment along these lines was taking place in one of the fieldwork areas but the addition of 
stops recorded as 'non-PACE' accounted for only about five per cent of the total. Rae Sibbitt and 
Andy Zurawan observed more than one such 'voluntary' search. Typically, the police would stop a 
car and - especially where the driver was already known to them and the encounter was free of 
tension - the interchange would go something like: 
Officer: Is it OK if I have a look in your car mate? 
Driver: Yeah. 
Ibc search would be treated as 'voluntary' because of the assumed consent of the individual. 
Such incidents may occur more frequently with traffic stops since officers have the power under the 
Road Traffic Act to stop any vehicle without needing 'reasonable grounds'; but the RTA does not 
provide a power of search. Once having stopped the vehicle using the RTA power, therefore, it would 
seem that any search must of necessity be 'voluntary' since the exercise of the PACE search power 
requires 'reasonable grounds' from the point of stop. However, most of the examples officers gave 
us of searches they treated asvoluntary- inasmuch as they felt it unnecessary to record them - were 
footStops. Here it must be acknowledged that, in real-world terms, there is a conflict for officers. To 
meet the procedural requirement for treating the search as voluntary, the person searched must be 
aware that they have a right to refuse. Yet informing them of that right may defacto formalise an 
encounter which both parties would probably prefer to keep low key. 
Lack of clarity about the PACE power 
Finally, the question of recording and of the distinction between 'voluntary' and PACE searches are 
in themselves related to some extent to the third administrative problerri. Officers who undertake 
searches are often simply very hazy about the PACE provision. In a discussion group I held with four 
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beat officers in one of the pilot study forces, a sergeant asked each to explain the search powers 
provided by PACE and the conditions for using them. Only one made no mistake in his reply - and 
he had just revised the Act in preparation for a forthcoming exam. 
In sum, the view of officers on the ground and direct observations in the course of the fieldwork 
confirm that the problem of under-recording persists and that what is recorded is not recorded 
consistently. Despite efforts which have been made since 1984 to clarify the PACE requirement and 
the increasing incentives to comply with the recording aspect of it, confusion remains, especially with 
regard to 'reasonable grounds' and the question of 'voluntary' searches. The situation still resembles 
that described by Bottomley et al in 1989 and summarised by Brown as follows: 
'.. whether searches are fornally recorded may be attributable more to a variety of contingent 
factors than to legal requirements: for example, failure to negotiate consent to a search, the 
need for officers to safeguard themselves where a search leads to an arrest, or the recording 
of searches for intelligence purposes. They conclude that there is a large grey area between 
exercise of the PACE stop/search powers and true consensual searches, in which searches are 
done outside of PACE procedures with the cooperation of the suspect but without informed 
consent. There is a threat to the safeguards for the suspect in such cases: since the principles 
under which the PACE rules are applied are unclear and uncertain (despite the aims of the 
legislation), it is unlikely that a set of "correct" rules will be internalised and implemented 
by off I-cers. ' (emphasis added) 
(op. cit. ) 
ETUNIC DUMENCES 
The cfiapter so far suggests that interpreting PACE statistics depends on three 'nested' questions: 
1. Which individuals are most likely 
a) to be the objects of police suspicion and 
b) to be available for stopping and searching in the places and at the times when PACE 
searches are most likely to occur? 
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2. How do the police exercise the power? 
How are PACE searches recorded? 
It is also apparent that we do not have clear answers to any of these questions. Interpreting ethnic 
differences in PACE data, therefore, can only be speculative; but, for that reason, exploring these 
questions with regard to minorities may shed light on the searching of all ethnic groups. 
Ethnicity and 'suspiciousness' 
Leaving aside the question of searches connected with specific, targetted operations, it seems that 
young males are more likely to attract police attention than any other group. This is especially true 
where they match descriptions received from the public of suspected offenders or where they are 
'known' through various forms of intelligence to be actively involved in offending locally (or 
associated with those who are). Descriptions of suspects will strongly influence the pattern of reactive 
policing; but other forms of intelligence may come into play at times when there is more scope to be 
proactive. 
While there is no significant difference in the gender distribution of young people from different ethnic 
groups, the younger age profile of the minorities has already been noted as well as the variations 
between the different minorities (see Chapter Two). Analysis for the Met-CRE working party by one 
Met division found that the largest number of searches were of men in the 16 to 20 age group. These 
accounted for 45 per cent of searches of males, followed by 18 per cent and 17 per cent respectively 
for under-15s and those aged 21 to 25. Andy Zurawan's analysis in the second of our London 
divisions gave an average age of 20 for whites and Asians and 21 for black people searched. 
Recognising the implications of the skewed age-profile of the search population, from the outset the 
Met has, wisely, given figures per thousand population based on the population aged 15 to 29. These 
have still persistently shown over-representation of black people; but the ratio of white to black is 1 
: 3.5, by comparison with I: 4.5 if the calculation is based on the full age range. 
with regard to the descriptions of suspects, a random check run for me on the Crime Information 
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System in the first of our London divisions in mid 1996 showed that, over the previous seven weeks, 
the ethnic appearance of suspects reported was: 250 ICI (white), 372 IC3 (black) and 19 IC4 
(Asian). The Eagle Eye data for the three month period from December 1995 to March 1996 were 
much starker again. Ilese cover reports of snatch thefts, robbery of personal property and assaults 
with intent to rob. They related in this period to 361 offences for which 561 suspect descriptions were 
recorded (reflecting the fact that such offences are often carried out by two or more offenders). Some 
14 per cent of descriptions were of white suspects and 80 per cent of black. 
Three main concerns have been raised about the ethnic patterns set up by this type of 'hard' 
intelligence. They concern: the accuracy of victim or witness recall; whether incidents involving 
. rities are more likely to be reported to the police than those involving whites; and whether the 
ethnic profile would be the same for the full range of crimes since, in the majority of cases (about two 
thirds), the victim will not have seen the person responsible. Any ethnic bias at this reporting stage 
might indeed, unfairly skew the profile of those who are brought in to the criminal justice process. 
However, the police cannot be held responsible for this: in reactive mode, they will properly and 
necessarily respond to the information they are given. 
police activity in proactive mode, though, is (as we have seen) shaped by a wider range of types of 
intelligence, some of which are much softer than others. Informed gossip, anecdote and casual 
observations are essential to the intelligence on which much policework depends and which was 
described earlier in the quote from the Audit Cominission as 'the raw data to construct quality indices 
of local criminals and their habits"5. To some extent this intelligence is shaped - consciously or 
otherwise - by perceptions built up over time, which are reinforced by being shared with colleagues 
and confkmed, in turn, by experience. As has already been illustrated in the previous chapter, the 
research repeatedly yielded examples of common sense understandings of ethnic differences in 
15 A striking example was a local drug dealer observed on patrol one evening. My police companions deliberately 
drove past slowly several times mid looks of mutual challenge were exchanged. I was given details of where he kept 
his drugs and, even, his unsavoury sexual habits - all of which seemed plausible to me from his thoroughly 
menacing appearance. On probing, though, I discovered that no drugs had ever been found on him and he had no 
Convictions of any sort against him. The information I was given was all based on 'intelligence. 
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patterns of criminality. Some of these clearly derive from victim and witness descriptions;. they are 
reinforced by the everyday experience of apprehending offenders; and they are reflected ultimately 
in the prison statistics - see Chapter Two. 17hus burglary was commonly seen as a'white'crime and 
street robbery as a 'black' crime. 
This type of generalisation, though, can lead to a collective view of whole groups which borders on 
stereotyping. These views may be positive as well as negative; but a positive view of one group can, 
in turn, be used to reinforce a negative view of another.. The white majority may be collectively 
viewed as dividing into a few, very broad subgroups, with the main split between those who are 
'respectable' and those who are not - or even between likeable villains and offenders who were the 
object of intense moral opprobrium". NEnorities, on the other hand, seem less likely to benefit from 
even these crude subdivisions. Rather, they may be thought of en bloc as representing one or the 
other. 
Ve have a lot of Jewish groups although they don't give us much ... well, we don't come 
across them much in terms of crime. I don't know why. Maybe they're more law abiding.... ' 
(Inspector, case study area) 
me Japanese and the Chinese, culturally speaking, are very respectful. With black people we 
often prepare ourselves for the abuse in advance, or the knives (which is again a cultural 
thing). ' 
(Chief Inspector, different case study area) 
The day-to-day business of responding to crime reports, collective memories of the riots and the 
experience of hostility - both as individuals and as a group - combined to produce a collective view 
of black people which was negative rather than positive. One Chief Inspector spoke with concern 
about the views of many colleagues. As he saw it, in Ihe organisational culture', the evidence of over- 
representation of black people 
in street robbery was generalised to the whole of crime; and 'the 
16 One custody suite sergeant complained: 
'Why can't we have someone really nasty in here? Then we could all go home feeling much better: 
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experience of Brixton, Broadwater Farm etc'generated anxieties which were reflected on the street 
in officers'dealings with black people. A spiral had set in he felt, 'of mutual suspicion, aggression and 
hostility which it will be difficult to break. ' 
Collective views of Asians were less clear-cut; but they were no longer seen a's relatively 
lunproblematic' groups whom the police encountered - if at all - almost exclusively as victims of 
crime. 77he Rushdie affair and other, local political developments, particular problems in investigating 
intra-community crime, the events in Bradford of summer 1995, the growth of vigilantism, the 
accumulating experience of aggressive behaviour and hostility towards the police among younger 
Asians and perceptions of their increasing involvement in crime pointed to the development of new, 
and more negative views of Asians especially in areas where they were the predominant minority. This 
was reflected in the second of our Met divisions. Although Asians were perceived to be wary of 
reporting crimes conmitted by their own members to the police, older'community leaders' had begun 
to raise concerns with senior officers whom they trusted about the behaviour of some of their young 
people. Meanwhile, officers on the ground were becoming more aware of groups of young Asians 
'hanging around', apparently 'up to no good'. None of these parties, however, (the 'community 
leaders', the senior officers or their more cynical colleagues on the ground) was apparently aware of 
the age profile of the area shown by the 1991 Census in Figure 4: 1. 
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nus, by the time of the fieldwork, the relatively large black group who in 1991 had been aged 16 to 
29 were by now 21 to 34 and the group now aged 10 to 20 was only about half the size. Yet there 
was a 'bulge'in the Asian population aged 5 to 15 at the time, of the Census which, imperceptibly, had 
moved into the 10 to 20 age range by 1996, potentially doubling the numbers already on to the streets 
from the age cohort above. Once this bulge' has passed through to adulthood, the proportion of 
teenagers will again be similar in the black and Asian groups; but it scems possible that by then the 
collective police view of its Asian population may have changed irrevocably. 
Although the fieldwork provided plenty of evidence of these collective views of rriinority groups - it 
would be an unwarranted generalisation to imply that they were universal. Nor does the fact that they 
are widely held imply that officers behave in any way unprofessionally because of them. However, 
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it seems possible that officers will be more receptive to 'intelligence' which goes with the grain of 
these perceptions and will, in turn, generate more of the same. Conversely, they may look more 
sceptically at 'intelligence' which is counter-intuitive. Thus they may identify behaviour as suspicious 
when they observe it in people they are already inclined to suspect. The same behaviour on the part 
of anyone else might pass unnoticed or be interpreted as innocent. 
Availability'for stopping 
Turning to the question of the times and locations of searches, there is evidence to suggest that young 
black people, at least, are more likely than whites to be 'available' for search than whites for at least 
three reasons. Many police officers we spoke to were aware of these reasons at a commonsense level 
even if they lacked the hard evidence with which to justify their perceptions. One is that black young 
people - as well as some of the Asian groups - have much higher levels of unemployment than whites 
(see Chapter Two). They may, therefore, be on the streets during the daytime because they have 
nowhere else in particular to go and they may be out later at night because there is nothing to get up 
for in the mornings. The numbers of these young unemployed who are 'available' to be searched may 
also be swelled by the disproportionate numbers of black pupils excluded from school. In 1993-4 
official statistics show that black children were more frequently excluded from English secondary 
schools than any other group, with the rate for black Caribbeans six times that for whites (OFSTED 
1996). Importantly also, compared to the Asian groups, black people (of all ages) are far more likely 
to go out on two'or more evenings pet week. The 1994 British Crime Survey shows that, of males 
aged 16 to 25,54 per cent of whites in London went out three or more evenings per week but the 
figure s for Asians were lower (46 per cent for Indians, 32 per cent for Bangladeshis and 28 per cent 
for pakistanis). The figure for young black men was 64 per cent. 
It is more difficult to comment on whether black people are any more likely to be found in areas 
where searches are most likely since we know so little about where searches are most likely to take 
place - except that there are wide variations between and within forces. At the broadest level of 
analysis, black people disproportionately live in London where the PACE power is most extensively 
used and this will, of course, significantly influence the national picture. On the other hand, the West 
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Midlands (which has the second largest proportion of the black population) uses the power only 
sparingly-, but the important point is that black people appear disproportionately to be searched in all 
areas - irrespective of the extent to which the police use their PACE power. 
Implicationsfor estimating 'proportionality' 
'Me research, though, confirmed that it is difficult to estimate this 'disproportionality' by comparing 
the ethnicity of those stopped with their presence in the local population. Andy Zurawan's analyses 
of arrests following searches suggest that in the division in question around 45 per cent of whites 
came from addresses outside the division, with a figure for blacks of nearly 60 per cent. Similar 
figures were produced in the context of the Met Working Party in another London division, where 
50 per cent of all searches of whites were of people from outside the area, with a figure of 58 per cent 
for searches of blacks. Taking this analysis down to beat level, it emerged that only a tiny proportion 
(16 per cent of whites and 10 per cent of blacks) were actually stopped on the beat where they lived. 
Therefore, it is technically safer to calculate 'over-representation' for figures at force level than at 
divisional and beat level; for the majority of searches may be assumed to be of people who are 
resident in the force area - even if the searches take place outside the divisions where they live and 
almost never in their own neighbourhoods". But, in real terms, (even if age is controlled for) the 
research suggests that force-level comparisons of PACE figures with local populations are relatively 
meaningless for two reasons: 
1) PACE searches are very unevenly distributed across force areas (and this may be even more 
true of forces with a mixture of rural and urban areas). This uneven distribution continues 
down to beat level where this difference may be even more pronounced than the difference 
between forces. However, the fact that these variations seem to affect all groups almost 
17 Fielding asserts that 'Crime is a close-to-home activity, a high percentage of all types of crime occur within four 
miles of the criminal's residence, and much within one to two miles'(Relding 1995 p. 1 2). Ibis is not inconsistent, 
however, with the idea that it does not occur in the Crimina& immediate neighbourhood - nor with the rule of thumb 
which appears to underlie the pattern of police stops, sumnied up by one officer as 'They don't shit on their own 
doorsteps. 
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equally, suggests that there are good operational reasons for them and that they contribute 
little, if anything, to 'explaining'ethnic differences. Ibus, in one Met division, the 1995 figures 
for the beat with the highest number of searches was 1,463 whites to 111 blacks; for the beat 
with the lowest, they were 146 and 26 respectively. 
2) The beat, therefore, is the most meaningful level for analysis; yet the proportion of those 
searched (of any ethnic origin) where the search takes place in the neighbourhoods where they 
live is so small that comparisons with the local population are irrelevant, not to say invalid. 
Ethnic patterns in recorded PACE searches and resulting arrests 
The second - and critical - question about whether the police exercise their powers equitably between 
the groups who come, to their attention remains difficult to answer, especially since we do not know 
whether the figures are complete and whether there is any ethnic bias in recording. One fairly crude 
measure of equity would be equity of outcome in terms of arrests; but this is by no means 
straightforward for several reasons. Only a minority of searches of any group results in an arrest but 
the 'yield'may vary considerably according to the original reason given for the stop; and a further 
problem of interpretation arises if the reason for the arrest is different from that for the stop. (For 
example someone stopped may turn out to be in breach of bail, a warrant may be out for their arrest, 
or they may be arrested on public order grounds rather than because the search turned up evidence 
of the original grounds for suspicion. ) By far the most common reasons for searches are 'stolen 
propertyý and 'drugs'- though the order in which they appear may vary by area, reflecting local crime, 
problems and policing priorities. Least common are searches for firearms. Andy Zurawan's divisional 
analyses in Table 4: 2 illustrate the very different extent to which these produce arrests. 
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Table 4: 2 
Arrests by grounds for search 
(Fieldwork Area 1995) 
N searches N arrests Arrests as % of searches 
Going equipped 872 70 8.0 
Drugs 1731 139 8.0 
Firearms 32 4 12.5 
Other 34 5 14.7 
Stolen property 1274 TZA 18.4 
297 48 16.2 
in any area, therefore, it may be important to know not only whether there are differences in the 
original grounds on which different groups are searched but also to know about the proportion of 
arrests of different groups by the original grounds for the search and also by reason for arrest. With 
the limited data available, it was only possible to explore this for the largest categories of search. 
Table 4: 3 suggests that there are some ethnic differences in the pattern of searches. Asians, for 
example are more likely to be suspected of drugs offences. However, this does not seem to be 
unwarranted inasmuch as Asians stopped on these grounds have a higher arrest rate than whites. 
Indeed, any question of unwarranted suspicion in the context of drugs searches arises with regard to . 
the black group whose arrest rate looks much lower. It is, though, tempting to infer too much from 
such tables. The numbers of arrests of those searched for drugs were 76 white, 43 Asian and only 15 
black; but we do not know how many of these arrests were actually for drugs offences. Certainly it 
would be unwise to try drawing any inferences from the ethnic breakdowns for the remaining search 
categories. 
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Table 4: 3 
Ethnic composition of searches and % arrested as a result 
(Fieldwork Area 1995) 
% of searches by group % ofthosesearched 
arrested 
White Black 
I 
Asian White Black Asian 
Going equipped 62.5 15.7 17.9 8.2 7A 
_ 
8A 
Drugs 53.2 15.3 26.8 8A 5.8 9.5 
Stolen property 62.1 20.1 14.0 19.7 15.9 15A 
All 58.2 17.6 
1 
20.3 12.5 
1 
10.6 
1 
11.5 
1 
Arrests, then offer only a very crude and uncertain measure of equity, even in areas where numbers 
are large enough for analysis. It is, though, worth bearing in mind that officers know that recorded 
searches are increasingly open to scrutiny. There is no obvious reason why - if they were consciously 
discfiminating - they would provide evidence which could be used against them. Nor is there reason 
to assume that conscious discrimination occurs on anY significant scale - even were it possible to 
conceal it. One of the most important findings of the Hood report (see Chapter Two) was that the 
large differences in sentencing outcomes for the black offenders in his sample compared with whites 
were explained by factors other than ethnicity. Moreover, inasmuch as some discrimination was 
apparent at the aggregate, statistical level, fin practice this meant that only a minority of individual 
cases were affected. For the majority of cases Hood analysed were treated equitably and the decisions 
of the majority of sentencers were not open to question. By analogy, police officers, whatever their 
personal views, have no incentive to behave unprofessionally out of simple malice. As one of the most 
cynical inspectors I interviewed put it: 
'There's no doubt we still have a small minority who are racist; but I've never seen people 
stopped just because they're black. Why do it if you're only going to get the wrong peopleT 
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Clearly, if there is discrimination, it is important to be able to track it down; and the monitoring data 
should, in principle, facilitate this. However, it is worth reporting the results of an initiative which 
ran in parallel with our fieldwork. This has - albeit unintentionally - provided corroboration for the 
thesis that the black-white disparity in the PACE data is too large to be explained by direct 
discrimination and is, therefore, unlikely significantly to diminish. Bernie Grant, the MP whose 
parliamentary question first put concerns about the official figures on the political agenda, publicly 
joined his local police commander in launching a local initiative to address the problem of the 
disproportionate stopping and searching of black people in the force area. All officers who conducted 
a PACE search were required to give the person concerned a leaflet informing them about the nature 
of the police power and their individual rights. The total figure for the year of the experiment (from 
July 1995 to June 1996) was 3,533.17his was a drop on the 4,966 recorded in the previous year (to 
June 1995), although it is by no means certain that this can be attributed to the experiment since the 
drop from the June 1994 figure of 7,539 was much larger. What is striking, however, is that the 
proportion of black people searched in each year was similar - 45 per cent in the year of the 
experiment, compared with 44 per cent in the twelve months previously. 
Overhanging the data, though, is the question of how fully they capture all searches. If we assume 
that an unknown proportion of all the searches which take place is not recorded (for whatever reason) 
it would be important to know whether the ethnic balance is the same for those which are recorded 
and those which are not. There is no way of knowing this; but I and my colleagues were told 
repeatedly (throughout the pilot study, in our case study interviews and in other discussions with 
police officers) that stops of black people were more likely to be recorded than those involving 
whites. Seniof managers were less likely to acknowledge this; but none went so far as to contradict 
it. The reasons invariably given were to cover one's back for fear of a complaint and (in part related) 
because the stopping of black people was often more confrontational so any search, therefore, was 
less likely to be 'voluntary'. 
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'If you stop someone you get no problem from you just say "cheerio" and it's not recorded; 
but ethnic minorities are more likely to complain. they'll say "if s only because I'm coloured" 
and you get very defensive under those circumstances. ' 
With regard to IC3s, for cultural or whatever reasons, stops tend to be a little less friendly. 
So there's more chance of triggering the "you've only stopped me because I'm black" 
syndrome. In that situation officers will look after Number One by recording the stop. ' 
Very much less frequently we heard that black searches might increasingly be less likely to be 
recorded since officers had become aware of the sensitivity of the PACE figures and were wary of 
having the finger of discrimination pointed at them. However, it is uncertain that - in the absence of 
feedback on their performance - that officers are aware of the overall pattern of their use of the 
power. This is hardly surprising when, in a large town in one of the areas covered by Rae Sibbitt 
(admittedly a force which used the power very sparingly), beat officers averaged one recorded PACE 
searches every three months. "' in one pilot force there had been some political fall-out when the first 
years figures were published. I was told that, as a result, officers seem to have become even more 
anxious to cover their backs by recording even more of the individual incidents in which they searched 
black people'9. They were apparently unaware of the likely impact of this on the aggregated records: 
the following year's figures showed an inexplicable rise for ethnic minorities of nearly ten per cent. 
Interpreting the PACE data 
In trying, nonetheless, to interpret the ethnic patterns in stops which are recorded, the figures are. 
often wrongly treated as though they represented individuals and as though each represented a 
discrete event. With the exception of the analysis for prominent nominals referred to earlier, the 
reseaerch revealed no examples of forces trying to analyse their data by checking: 
Is Dixon et, al in 1990 suggested the national figures then available showed an average of less than one recorded 
search per officer in a year. 
19 Ironically, Brown's summary of Bottomley usefully reminds us that - if it is the case a record is more often made 
where a black person is stopped, this, in principle, means that black People's rights are being better safeguarded 
than those of whites. 
121 
the number of individuals searched over a given period; 
the average number of searches per individual (by ethnic group); and 
the extent to which the searches arose from stops or two or more people. 
Analysis of the BCS data for London, however, confmns that black people are disproportionately 
stopped overall relative to whites - that is, irrespective of whether this was followed by a search 
(FitzGerald and Hale, forthcoming). However, that disproportionality is not as marked as figures 
based on searches alone would suggest for two reasons: 
black people in London are also much more likely than whites to have been stopped more 
than once in the previous year, and 
black people who are stopped are also much more likely than whites to have been searched. 
our analysis treats footstops and vehicle stops separately and gives results for men only. Over the 
previous year (from January 1993) 2.3 per cent of white respondents had been stopped, compared 
to 5.3 per cent of black men. For vehicle stops, the figures rose to 15.7 per cent and 25 per cent 
respectively. Combining both types of stop gives a ratio for individuals of about I white stopped 
to every 1.7 black men. However, the average number of footstops per 100 respondents was 3.4 for 
whites and 12 for blacks, while the corresponding figures for vehicle stops were 25.8 and 62.1. So 
the disparity is much greater in the ratio based on numbers of stops. For one stop involving a white 
man there were about 2.5 stops involving black men. 
Turning to those stops which were Mowed by searches, these appear to be much higher among 
those stopped on foot than in vehicles; but the base numbers for whites are too low in both instances 
to allow inter-ethnic comparisons. 
20 By combining both types of stop, though, and adding in the 
20 only eight white men were actually stopped on foot and three of these were searched, but it is worth noting that 
46 per cent of the 23 black men stopped were also searched. In the case of vehicle stops, only four of the 61 white 
men stopped in a vehicle were searched; but the fact that 16 black men were searched out of 85 (18.5 per cent) 
at least suggests that they may be searched at more than twice the rate of whites. 
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results for female respondents, it was possible to estimate the ratio of stop/searches for the capital 
in 1993. This suggested that six black people are searched for every one white -a starker disparity 
than shown by the police figure of four to one. The BCS numbers for London are relatively small 
(785 white and 664 black respondents in all) so the estimate cannot be viewed as definitive. Nor is 
it certain that BCS respondents' understanding of a'search'wfll accord with the police's. The further 
question arises, moreover, of whether black respondents may have been more likely to interpret police 
scrutiny as a search whereas white respondents - whose experience of these encounters was, in any 
case, less conflictual (see below) - were less likely to put this interpretation on it. 
The BCS estimate, however, clearly runs counter to the thesis that black searches are over-recorded. 
In part, this may be because black people are more likely to have been stopped with others" - 
especially if, as was suggested during fieldwork interviews, when a group search takes place, a record 
is sometimes made only for one individual. At best, though, controlling for this would bring the 
figures nearer to parity. If, indeed, the accounts officers gave of their own (technically irregular) 
recording habits and those of their colleagues is true, some further explanation is needed. One 
possibility, in addition to the unanswerable question about different interpretations of the term 
, searcW, lies in the uncharted territory of 'voluntary' searches. 7be discussion earlier of the power of 
stop under the Road Traffic Act implies that a much higher proportion of vehicle than foot searches 
may be voluntary' since drivers may not, initially, have been stopped under PACE, so a PACE search 
is not an option. The BCS suggests that about twice as many people have been searched in a vehicle 
as on foot; but our divisional analysis of 47 arrests following searches suggested that, in the PACE 
records, footstops may predominate slightly over vehicle stops. If it is true generally that a large 
proportion of searches take place following an RTA stop but if, at the same time it is also true that 
the PACE figures over-state the extent to which black people are searched - then the 1 to 6 estimate 
from the BCS (which covers both PACE and non-PACE searches) would suggest that the rate at 
which black people are 'voluntarily' searched 
is even higher than the rate at which they are searched 
under PACE. 
21 52 per cent of white men stopped in a vehicle had been with others at the time, whereas the figure for blacks was 
66 per ccnt. 
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SummARY AND DiscussioN 
The PACE figures tell us little about overall ethnic differences in the majority of cases dealt with by 
the criminal justice system, since they yield only a very small proportion of these cases. They might, 
in principle, tell us something about policing activities vis d vis different ethnic groups at the critical 
point of entry to the system; and from this it may be possible to draw more general inferences about 
other policing activities (such as arrests) whose 'yield' is more significant. The reason for the intense 
attention they have received, however, is that they are taken as a surrogate measure for police stops 
of minorities. It is stops as such which are symbolically important for two reasons - most dramatically, 
because they have been the trigger for several major disturbances and, at a more everyday level, 
because of claim that repeated stopping by the police is a regular experience for black people which 
is tantamount to harassment. 
Yet the PACE figures as such are seriously deficient in their ability to throw light on any of these 
concerns - and rmy possibly even be misleading - if they are taken in isolation and interpreted at face 
value. Their main limitations are as follows. 
Police stop/searches in total account for only a tiny proportion of the encounters which help shape 
public perceptions. Nearly 20 per cent of respondents to the British Crime Survey in 1994 had been 
stopped by the police; but only 2 per cent had been searched. Also, inasmuch as searches do 
contribute to perceptions of the police, it is very uncertain what proportion of all searches are picked 
up in the PACE figures. This research suggests that a large minority may follow stops under the Road 
Traffic Act and will necessarily be treated as 'voluntary'; but a further, unknowable, proportion may 
also go unrecorded for a variety of reasons. These include: the fact that other policing tasks take 
higher priority-, a preference to avoid formalising situations which have been successfully negotiated 
by virtue of keeping them as informal as possible; and the quagmire of the PACE regulations which 
makes it tempting, where possible, to avoid making a record rather than risk getting caught out for 
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some technical breach. ' 
Moreover, the PACE figures tell us almost nothing about the quality of these encounters. Yet this 
influences community relations far more than the actual number of these encounters or whether they 
meet formal requirements of which the public are, for the most part, unaware. My own BCS analysis 
FitzGerald and Hale, op. cit. ) shows that the majority of people stopped in vehicles (of all ethnic 
origins) were very or fairly satisfied with the way the police had handled the incident - irrespective 
of whether they had been stopped on previous occasions. Satisfaction was lower for footstops; black 
people were more dissatisfied than whites; and those who were searched following the stop were 
more likely to be dissatisfied. But the main factors which explained levels of satisfaction were 
whether the police gave a reason for their action, whether they were polite and whether those stopped 
felt they listened to what they had to say (see also Bucke 1995). 
It seems very unlikely that the pattern of ethnic differences shown by the figures will change radically. 
Fully comprehensive recording might reduce the proportion of searches on black people by bringing 
more whites into the frame2'. However, unless the power itself was used less, the actual number of 
searches on black people would probably stay about the same; and even if it was used less, the 
relative proportions of each ethnic group would probably stay fairly constant. If individual officers 
were consciously abusing their search powers, it seems unlikely that they would record this. From 
the PACE records, it should be possible to pick up the over-zealous use of the power against 
particular groups; but that would not in itself mean that the power was being used improperly. 
L40cation, tirne of day, the availability of different groups to be searched in these places at these time, 
compounded by police notions of 'suspiciousness' are the main factors which shape the ethnic pattern 
22 An inspector responsible for Quality Assurance said that he had often challenged officers on the legality of their 
searches as recorded on the 5090. VA= they talked the incident through, however, they could often give perfectly 
good grounds for their actions - even though the minimum of detail on the form did not appear to justify them. 
23 Too much cannot be read into the data from one year to another, but it is worth noting that the figures for 1994 in 
Table 4: 1, overall, represent an increase on 1993 for both whites and minorities. However, the rise was 19 per cent 
for stops of eduiic minorities compared to 39 per cent for stops of whites. The pattern. moreover, was replicated 
in the majority of forces (For details, see FitzGerald and Sibbitt, forthcoming). 
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of the PACE statistics. But 'suspiciousness' is not directly driven by prejudice of any sort. It derives 
most immediately from 'intelligence' (in all its forms) and from the accumulation of individual and 
collective police experience over time. This is not to say that prejudice may not come into play. It 
may influence officers' interpretation of those experiences; and it may determine which items of 
intelligence are taken most seriously and acted on. 
For, in all of this, it is essential to bear in mind the role of police discretion. The police enjoy a very 
large degree of individual discretion in decision making; but the power this gives them is, perhaps 
above all, the power not to act. Fielding usefully summarises the situation as follows (albeit with 
specific reference to arrests): 
'Goldstein's classic article-established that the police are nearly alone among bureaucracies 
in that the degree of discretion is greatest at the lowest level, and that decisions by officers 
in contact with the public are marked by "low visibility", thus being invisible to supervisors 
and effectively "unreviewable'. This is especially true when they have decided not to arrest. 
Lustgarten asserts that Goldstein's point reflects the more fundamental fact that "in taking the 
sort of decision that is the quntessence of their work, the police are guided by virtually no 
legal standards at alr'... Subject to the broad restraint of civil and criminal liability ...... they act 
within an almost infinite range of lawful possibilities"' 
(Fielding 1991 p. 128) 
The implications of this and - in particular - the possible differential use of this power vis-d-vis 
different groups are explored more fully in the final chapter. However, it does mean that when 
officers decide to take action against particular individuals this may raise questions about why they 
decided to act rather than take the option of doing nothing; but it would not necessarily imply that 
the action taken was unprofessional or in technical breach of their powers. Further, the case of stop 
and search implies that those powers may be actively used disproportionately against certain sections 
of the population in large part because the focus of police attention is so narrow. The expectations 
bom of experience and intelligence (possibly reinforced further by prejudice) may, in effect, blind the 
police to suspiciousness more generally. 
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Democratic suspicion is clearly a nonsense; yet the implication here is that the police might find it 
fi7uitfill to broaden their expectations of who may and who may not be worthy of supicion. The civil 
liberties implications of this may appear to make the proposition hardly worth exploring - except that 
the real question which it raises is this. Even if the police were suspicious of a broader range of 
people - would they choose to act on those suspicions equally towards everyone within that range? 
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Chapter Five 
Arrests and Cautions 
Arrests play a far more important role than stop/searches in determining who is and who is not 
brought in to the criminal justice system. Almost as important, though, is the police's choice between 
the three options available to them for disposing of the selection of individuals brought into their net 
through arrests. One is to take no further action (NFA), such that the arrest effectively amounts to 
a more serious form of police stop. Another is to caution them, which (in principle at least) is a 
formalised way of diverting them from the criminal justice system but which may adversely affect 
them if they come to the attention of the system again. 71lie third is to charge them with an offence 
for which (subject to the approval of the Crown Prosection Service) they may subsequently be 
prosecuted through the courts. 
Arrests are the subject of mandatory ethnic monitoring by the police. Information on whether there 
are ethnic differences in the disposal of those arrested is limited, though, since the monitoring 
requirement applies only to formal cautions: that is, for the present, the figures will give no indication 
of what proportion of arrestees who are not cautioned are released without any action being taken 
against them and what proportion are charged (still less successfully prosecuted). 
The research yielded less material on arrests and cautions than on stop/searches - whether from 
original or from secondary sources; and this itself further reflects the symbolic importance stops have 
assumed in the hce'and crime debate. Arrests, though, like stop/searches, may result from reactive 
I 
or proactive policing. They too seem increasingly likely to be intelligence-led, just as their patterns 
will also tend to be shaped by formalised policing objectives. In that sense, many of the factors 
referred to in the previous chapter are likely to be relevant also to ethnic differences in arrests - 
including police notions of 'suspiciousness'. 
Again, however, it is important not to leap in to trying to interpret ethnic differences in the data 
available without some appreciation of the issues surrounding the interpretation of figures for arrests 
and cautions generally. 
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ARRESTS 
Interpreting arrest data 
Although arrest figures are routinely collected by the Home Office from all forces, in practice, 
relatively little use is made of arrest data alone, either nationally or locally. Arrest data do not, for 
example, routinely appear in the annual compendium of 'Criminal Statistics for England and Wales' 
(HMSO); and local force objectives concerned with tackling crime usually focus on detection rates 
while local management information tends to be concerned with clear-ups. Clear-ups comprise only 
those arrests where the suspect was subsequently charged or cautioned; and they are boosted 
significantly by offences for which no arrest has been made but which are cleared up by other means, 
including crhms admitted during visits to offenders after they have been sentenced for something else. 
Potentially, one of the most important sources of infonnation on arrests is the HMIC, whose 
Performance Indicators for 1995/6 include 
Number of persons arrested/reported for notifiable offences per 100 police officers 
Percentage of persons arrested/reported for notifiable'offences prosecuted 
percentage of persons arrested/reported for notifiable offences dealt with by other means 
Percentage of persons arrested/reported for notifiable offences subject of no further action. 
Chapter Ibree, though, has already rehearsed the problems IMIC has identified with some of the 
data they receive in force's PI returns; and arrest dam appear to be a prime example of the concerns 
currently under scrutiny in the Inspectorate's review of Pjs. Certainly, HMIC have never yet published 
the arrest figures they have collected from forces either in total or on a force-by-force basis; and the 
reason for this is that the variability of the dam between forces, including in the definitions they use, 
makes comparisons unsafe. 
With limited inforrnation on arrests as such, we know still less about the proportion of arrests which 
lead to any further action; and what there is tends mostly to come from special, one-off, local studies. 
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it is apparent both that arrests are much more common for some types of crime than others and that 
they account for widely differing proportions of total clear-ups depending on the type of crime. Thus, 
in the Met, between 1994 and 1995, there were 12 arrests per 100 notifiable offences; but the clear- 
up rate for all notifiable offences was 22 per cent. Not all of these arrests will have led to further 
action; so it can safely be inferred that arrests overall account for under half of all clear-ups. Clear-up 
rates were highest for crimes of violence (at 67 per cent) and the corresponding figure for arrests (30 
per 100 recorded offences) is also high. Relative to the figures for all notifiable offences, though, it 
suggests that the proportion of crimes of violence are cleared up by means other than arrest is 
actually higher than average (that is, well over half). At the other end of the spectrum, only 14 per 
cent of recorded robberies were cleared up; but there were 12 arrests per 100 robberies Thus (with 
the exception of the miscellaneous and somewhat exceptional 'other' category) clear-ups for robbery 
in the capital seem to depend more on arrests than any other notifiable offence. 
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Table 5: 1 
Arrests and clear-ups for notiflable offences 
MPD 1994-5* 
Offence Number recorded(l) Arrests per 100 
recorded offences(l) 
Percentage of 
recorded offences 
cleared up(2) 
Violence against the, 
person 
42679 30 67 
Sexual offences 6820 26 64 
Robbery 26139 12 14 
Burglary 166120 6 20 
Theft and handling 
stolen goods 
394344 12 16 
Fraud and forgery 32472 26 43 
criminal damage 159854 7 15 
Other 8777 79 91 
Total 1 837205 12 1 22 
(1) Commissioner's Annual report 1994/5 
(2) Criminal Statistics for England and Wales 
Figures from (1) cover the period April 1994 to March 1995; (2) relate to the calendar year 1994. 
Reference has been made in the previous chapter to Brown's useful summary of research into the 
operation of the 1984 Police and Criminal Evidence Act (Brown 1997). Ibis also outlines the main 
areas of debate in the linfited research literature on arrests as such. It shows that arrests are the main 
route in to the criminal justice process for the vast majority of suspects rather than the alternative 
route of a summons. Beyond that, however, many important questions remain unresolved. Tlere is 
soffr dispute arriong researchers about the extent to which arrests meet the requirement of 'reasonable 
suspicion' that an offence has been committed and about the strength of the evidence in which officers 
ground these suspicions. Associated with this is the question of the extent to which arrests result from 
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information received from the public - including victims of crime - and how much they are generated 
by proactive policing. There is also considerable variation between forces in the extent to which 
arrests result in no further action or draw suspects more deeply into the criminal justice process; and 
there is further debate about the reasons for this. 
Phillips and Brown's own study of entry into the criminal justice process (forthcoming) sheds light 
on some of the questions raised by earlier research. It provides information on more than 4,000 
people detained in ten police stations in England and Wales between September 1993 and March 
1994, six of which were in three Metropolitan areas (two in each), thus providing some opportunity 
for in-force comparisons. The offences for which suspects had been arrested tended to vary between 
stations, reflecting local patterns of crime. However, 13 per cent of the sample had not been arrested 
in connection with a criminal offence: they were detained mainly for reasons such as breach of bail, 
immigration offences or as a place of safety measure. Another 13 per cent were arrested for more 
than one offence, typically the original grounds for arrest along with a further offence committed in 
the, course of the arrest or which came to light subsequently. (Thus an arrest for affray might lead to 
a further arrest for assaulting a constable; or an arrest for burglary might result in a further arrest for 
related theft and handling offences. ) 
particularly important in the context of the present discussion are Brown's findings on the related 
questions of. the circumstances which led to arrests; and the balance of proactive to reactive policing. 
overall, nearly three quarters of arrests resulted from reactive policing - nearly 30 per cent in 
response to calls put out from control rooms, only slightly fewer from information which came 
directly to patrols from members of the public and 16 per cent happened when officers came across 
incidents in progress. Of the remainder, 13 per cent of arrests were made on the basis of surveillance 
work or the investigation of an offence; and 11 per cent resulted from stop and search. However, 
there was considerable variation between stations, with proactive policing accounting for 32 per cent 
at one end of the scale and only 18 at the other, differences which Brown suggests reflect not only 
132 
differences in local offence profiles' but also 'real differences in policing tactics'. 
Brown's study does not cover the earlier stage of search prior to arrest; but published force level 
figures (White 1996) show considerable variation in the proportion of recorded PACE searches which 
result in arrests. Matched with (unpublished) data for total arrests held by the Research and Statistics 
Directorate of the Home Office, further marked inter-force differences emerge. Table 5: 2 omits the 
Met, where figures for total arrests are available only for notifiable offences (whereas the PACE 
figures cover arrests of all types); but it illustrates the considerable range in the 'yield' from PACE 
searches and in the contribution this makes to all arrests - even among forces which record the most 
extensive use of these powers. 
A high proportion of arrests at the station where only 18 per cent resulted from proactive policing related to shop 
thefts reported by stores. 
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Table 5: 2 
Arrests from PACE searches as a proportion of all arrests 
Selected forces 1995* 
Force PACE Arrests Arrests as All arrests PACE 
searches following per centage arrests as 
PACE of PACE per centage 
search searches oftotal 
City of 4625 1092 23.6 6028 18.1 
London 
Cleveland 12539 910 7.3 31174 2.9 
Greater 49234 5724 11.6 109650 5.2 
Manchester 
Northumbria 32285 3431 10.6 71676 4.8 
Surrey 14878 1836 12.3 15307 12.0 
Warwickshire 6642 709 10.7 15772 4.5 
West Mercia 12024 1909 15.9 40878 4.7 
England and 690343 80985 11.7 1651354 4.9 
Wales I I I I I I 
Forces with at least 8 stops per 1000 white population in 1994.95 
What remains unclear, however, is the extent to which these variations reflect real inter-force 
- differences in the contribution stop/searches make to overall arrests; for they are likely to be driven 
(at least in part) by inter-force variations in the recording of PACE searches, or by the problems 
already noted with force arrest data, or both. For that reason, Brown's figures may be more accurate 
inasmuch as they were collected on the same basis in all forces and their count of PACE searches in 
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relation to arrests is likely to be more complete than the published figures'. Yet he too shows 
variation, even %ithin forces; so there are three possible reasons why his figures for arrests resulting 
from searches are higher than the estimated national average shown in Table 5: 2. These are: 'police 
under-recording of PACE searches; higher arrest rates from searches at the stations he sampled than 
the overall rate for the forces in which those stations were located; and a combination of these two. 
Ethnicity and Arrests 
The research evidence on ethnic minorities and arrests summarised in evidence to the Royal 
Conuilission on Cdminal Justice (FitzGerald 1993) reflects the relative paucity of more general 
research on arrests. A major source has been the Met data, as published ad hoc so far in two Home 
Office Statistical Bulletins (Home Office 1984,1989). Both these and other sources have consistently 
shown higher arrest rates for black people relative to whites in proportion to their presence in the 
population at large, whereas the rates for Asians tend to be lower. Ile impact of socio-economic and 
demographic factors has not been rigorously explored; but some sources have suggested that the 
disparity between black and white arrests is greater still in the younger age group and in areas with 
relatively few black people. 
phiuips and Brown's study of entry into the criminal justice system (op. cit. ) again casts new light on 
some of these questions and it is useful to consider these in conjunction with the data currently 
available from the Met (Cotton and Povey, forthcoming). Figures for arrests in London shown in 
Table 5: 3 relate to notifiable offences only; and they are subject to a further important limitation in 
that they cover only those arrests which resulted in further action 3. That is, they may not fully reflect 
the overall pattern of arrests by ethnic group. Moreover, this limitation is singularly frustrating since 
if it were possible to set the available figures in the context of the overall pattern it could indicatc 
whether minority arrestees were more or less likely than whites to have no further action taken 
As noted in the previous chapter, under-recording of PACE searches may in part be due to officers' failure to 
complete a PACE slip in addition to recording an arrest resulting from a search. 
TWs important limitation has been insufficiently appreciated in the literature to date (including my own study 
for the Royal Commission) since it was not hitherto made explicit in the Home Office Bulletins referred to. 
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against thern. 
Subject to these caveats, though, the Met data are uniquely important. Since the first Statistical 
Bulletin twelve years ago, the number of arrests shown per ethnic group" has consistently pointed to 
an over-representation of black people and an under-representation of Asians relative to their 
presence in the London population5 which was around 8 per cent in 1991 (see Table 3.2). They have 
also consistently replicated patterns of ethnic differences between different categories of offence 
which in some respects pre-figure the prison statistics. Reýative to their numbers in the population, 
black people have been over-represented in all categories of arrest; but the over-representation is 
particularly marked for robbery where they account for the majority of those arrested in two of the 
three years shown. 
As with the stop/search figures, it is important always to remember that these relate to individual arrests rather 
than to individual people. A Leicestershire Constabulary report on their ethnic monitoring data (Leicestershire 
1996) gives a figure of 254 arrests of black young adult males in 1995/6. If each of these events had related to 
a different individual, 93 per cent of the relevant black population would have been arrested in one year. Further 
research showed that the figures related to 139 individuals, 35 per cent of whom had been arrested more than 
once. According to Census data, this represented 51 per cent of young black adult males in the county - still a 
very high proportion, but nearly half that originally inferred from the arrest figures as such. 
it will also be noted that the proportion of arrestees whose ethnic origin was not recorded not only varies between 
offence group, it has also been steadily growing over the years. 7his is matter of some concern: but it does not 
significantly call into question the overall pattern shown consistently by these data. 
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Table 5: 3 
Arrests for notifiable offences, London 1990-1994 
by ethnic appearance and offence 
Offence group Year N (000s) 
t 
White Black Asian 
I 
Other 
I 
Not recorded 
Violence against the 1990 17.4 65 22 6 5 2 
person 1992 14.0 59 23 6 5 8 
1994 12.5 53 23 6 5 14 
Sexual offences 1990 2A 69 17 6 7 1 
1992 1.8 57 21 7 7 9 
1994 1.6 52 21 7 7 13 
Robbery 1990 3.0 42 50 4 3 0 
1992 2.7 44 47 4 4 1 
1994 2.8 32 56 3 3 6 
Burglary 1990 12.6 73 20 3 3 1 
1992 11.3 65 20 3 3 7 
1994 9.4 64 22 3 3 8 
7heft 1990 53.1 70 16 6 7 1 
1992 46.2 65 17 5 7 6 
1994 47.0 62 19 5 7 7 
Fraud and forgery 1990 8.9 60 24 8 6 2 
1992 8.5 53 26 7 5 9 
1994 7.8 49 28 8 6 9 
Criminal damage 1990 13.9 77 14 4 4 1 
1992 10.9 70 15 4 4 7 
1994 10.7 65 16 3 3 12 
other offences 1990 5.5 64 25 4 5 2 
1992 4.9 56 26 5 5 8 
1994 5.5 59 24 6 5 6 
Total offences 1990 116.9 69 19 5 5 1 
1992 100.1 62 20 5 6 7 
1994 97A 59 22 5 6 9 
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Nor can the overall pattern of black over-representation be explained by age. Povey shows that the 
age group most frequently arrested were 10 to 20, accounting for 34 per cent of notifiable offences 
in 1994. Nine per cent of the Greater London population aged 10 to 20 were black and 12 per cent 
Asian at the time; but they accounted respectively for 25 per cent and 6 per cent of arrests in that age 
group. (Arrests of whites were 60 per cent of the total although whites made up 68 per cent of the 
relevant population. ) 
in Brown's sample, black people comprised 13 per cent of all arrestees but their represention was 
slightly higher in arrests for notifiable offences, at 14 per cent. This is lower than the Met figure of 
22 per cent, although the main reason for the difference is probably the lower proportion of black 
people in the populations from which his sample was drawný. However, the pattern by offence type 
within this is broadly similar, with very high levels of over-representation in particular for robbery 
where black people in Brown's sample accounted for 46 per cent of those arrested. 
Brown also found that black people were more likely to have been arrested than whites and Asians 
as a result of being stopped and searched. 7bey accounted for 18 per cent of this type of arrest, 
cornpared with 13 per cent of the total; and this pattern was true even in the 17 - 20 age group where 
fully a quarter of all arrests were the result of stop/searches. It is not possible to make exact 
cornparisons with the Met since arrest data by ethnic group are available in London only for notifiable 
offences, whereas the PACE arrest data cover both notifiable and non-notifiable offences. 
Nonetheless, if the nun-ber of PACE arrests per 100 notifiable arrests is in any way indicative, Table 
5: 4 would suggest that higher proportions of black people and Asians in London may be brought into 
the net through stop and search than whites. 
Two of Brown's ten police stations were in London, two more were in the West Midlands and two in Greater 
Nbnchester. In each case one of the pair was in an area where the Minority population was predominantly Asian, 
as will have been the case for his Bedfordshire site; and the proportion of minorities overall will have been lower 
than average in the remaining three. 
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Table 5: 4 
PACE arrests and arrests for notiriable offences 
MPD 1994 
Arrests following 
PACE search 
Arrests for 
notifiable offences 
PACE arrests* per 
100 arrests for 
notifiable offences 
White 20223 57588 35.1 
Black 9359 20994 44.6 
Asian 1 2066 1 494 1 41.8 
N. B. These arrests cover both notifiable and non-notifiable offences 
It must still be bome in mind, though, that stop/search arrests only account for a minority of all 
arrests; and Brown does not report any marked ethnic differences in the other main sources of arrest. 
On the other hand, he does show that significantly higher proportions of both black and Asian 
arrestees have no further action taken against them. Ibis was true of a quarter of the black sample 
and nearly a third of Asians compared with only about a fifth of whites. Yet these differences were 
not directly attributable to ethnicity: of several other deciding factors, the most important were the 
type of offence and whether it was admitted. Thus NFAs were more likely in cases where the police 
had insufficient evidence to charge without further investigation unless the suspect acknowledged 
their responsibility; and this tended to vary between offence categories. Only 44 per cent of black 
suspects (and 48 per cent of Asians) admitted the offence compared to 58 per cent of whites. 
Additionally, robbery was the offence for which the evidence was most likely to be insufficient for 
the police to charge without an admission. 
ironically, the only one of our case study areas which had begun systematically to grapple with the 
question of ethnic monitoring of arrests was the force with the smallest ethnic minority population. 
All items of ethnic information were collated into a report to an Equality of Service Monitoring 
Group, set up in line with the recommendations of the ACPO-CRE working party report of 1993 
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referred to in Chapter Three. Arrest inforrnation was collated by force statistical officers trawling the 
custody records on each of the four BCUs at the end of each month to provide an ethnic breakdown 
for the following: 
total arrests for notifiable offences 
total other arrests 
total arrests (notifiable offences) cautioned 
total arrests (notifiable offences) NFA and refused charge 
total arrests (notifiable offences) delayed charge - bail 
total arrests (notifiable offences) disposed of by other means - informal action 
PACE stop/search - number of arrests resulting from searches, by reason for arrest. 
Each of these categories was further broken down by age range (Youth, Young Adult and Adult). 
Results to date had shown over-representation of black people and, to a much lesser degree, of 
Asians in the arrest data relative to their presence in the county as a whole. Black people formed 1.2 
per cent of the total population and Asians 1.5 per cent in 1991 but they accounted for 3 per cent 
and 1.7 per cent respectively of arrests in a s* month period in 1994. Numbers were small, however, 
with a total of 227 black arrests and 129 Asians; and total figures for recorded PACE stop/searches 
were 68 black and 23 Asian, most of which would not have resulted in an arrest. Clearly this limited 
the scope for any useful further breakdown by offence type and/or disposal. 
In sum, the Met data: h4ve l6ng established ethnic difference in arrest data which seem likely to be 
replicated elsewhere: black people are' over-represented relative to their presence in the force 
population and there are further 
differences in the types of offence for which different groups are 
arrested, with strikingly high figures 
for black suspects in the robbery category. However, the few 
forces which have begun vying to look systematically at the 'meaning'of ethnic differences in their 
figurcs are finding thcrnscIves confronting much wider problems with arrest data. 
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CAUTIONS 
Variations in cautioning practice 
Where further action follows an arrest, the option to caution is available to the police only in certain 
circumstances. The suspect's eligibility will depend largely on the seriousness of the offence, their 
offending history, whether they admit the charge and whether the victim is willing for them to be 
cautioned. Cautions are a much more common form of disposal among younger suspects (who are 
less likely to have previous cautions or convictions and may be involved in more minor forms of 
offending). There is, however, scope for discretion within these criteria. This is reflected in the 
variation in force practice and policy on cautions. There are differences between forces (both overall 
and by offence category) and even within the same force from one year to another. These variations 
cannot be accounted for solely in terms of variations in the type of crime the force is dealing with or 
the age structure of its local offending population. In 1994, for example, the proportion of males 
between 10 and 18 cautioned for indictable offences (excluding motoring) as a percentage of all those 
found guilty or cautioned was 66 per cent overall; but the average for England and Wales masks a 
range between forces from only 44 per cent to 85 per cent. For adults (aged 21 and over) the average 
was only 25 per cent; but again it was much higher in some forces- reaching 37 per cent in two - than 
in others (with a lowest rate of 10 per cent. ) (HO 1995). The analysis by Patrick Collier of the means 
of disposal in 16 forces and the Metropolitan police between May 1994 and October 1995 provides 
the figures in Table 6 which further illustrate the variation in the use of cautioning over time, by type 
of offence and between forces. 
0 
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Table 5: 5 
Use of caution by selected police forces May 1994 - October 1995 
(Males, all ages) 
16 Non-Metropolitan forces* Metropolitan Police" 
1994 1995 1994 1995 
All notifiable 
offences 
22 21 26 24 
Robbery 7 6 16 7 
Drugs 23 
_31 
9 19 
Figures given as a percentage of all arrests and offences reported 
Figures given as a percentage of arrests only 
(Source Home Office Statistical Findings Z/96) 
Research published in 1990 (Evans and Wilkinson) showed that the threshold below which offenders 
have no further action taken against them was set at different levels and for different reasons at force 
and at sub-divisional level. Compounding the difficulties which this creates for interpreting any 
national figures is the use of infonnal warnings by a growing minority of forces as an alternative to 
the caution. The proportion of cases in which this happens, though, is not clear since informal 
warnings are not recorded consistently - if at all. 
Of the cases observed by Brown (op. cit. ) 17 per cent were cautioned; but the proportion varied by 
seriousness of offence and between police stations, with further observed differences related to the 
socio-demographic characteristics of the suspects. Only 6 per cent were cautioned for offences 
classed by Brown as 'serious', compared with 30 per cent of 'less serious' cases; and the differences 
between stations in part reflected the type of offences they dealt with. However, this did not entirely 
explain local variations: cautioning rates for burghuy, for example, were 2 per cent at one station and 
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19 per cent at two others. Predictably, young people were much more likely to be cautioned (with 
an overall rate of 38 per cent for juveniles); but suspects who were unemployed when they were taken 
into police custody were noticeably more likely to be charged instead. Although a much higher 
proportion of those who admitted the offence were cautioned than those who denied it, the many 
other factors which come into play still meant that only 28 per cent of those who admitted were 
disposed of in this way. Interestingly 5 per cent also were cautioned despite denying the offence; but 
a much higher proportion who denied the offence (36 per cent) had no further action taken against 
them than those who admitted it (7 per cent). 
immediately following the completion of Brown's fieldwork, however, a Home Office Circular 
(18/94) introduced changes to cautioning policy which might in principle have changed the picture 
he observed. The circular aimed primarily to reduce cautioning overall (by curtailing its use after the 
first caution and in 'inappropriate cases') but it also tried to achieve greater consistency between 
forces in the use of formal cautions and to improve recording practices. It was followed up early in 
1995 by detailed guidance from ACPO's Crime Committee. This recognised the lack of consistency 
both between and within forces; and it proposed the use of specified gravity factors as a more 
objective (and, implicitly, standardised) approach to cautioning. A preliminary evaluation of the 
irnpact of these initiatives (Evans and Ellis forthcoming) suggests that cautioning overall has, indeed, 
gone down; but it shows little evidence of change in the extent of local variation. 
part of the reason for area and sub-area differences - and one of the reasons why they remain so - 
entrenched - is the multi-agency approach to cautioning which has strongly reinforced the localisation 
of this particular area of police decision-making. Not all forces consult other agencies to the same 
extent before cautioning - reflecting the disposition of local agencies towards involvement with the 
police and vice versa; but, especially for the purpose of cautioning young people, systems of quasi- 
joint decision making have become well established, involving the police in many areas with other 
local stake-holders and, in particular, social services departments. These arrangements (usually in the 
form of juvenile cautioning panels or fully-fledged juvenile bureaux) will per Se compound local 
variation - especiaRy where a 
force (as often happens) covers a number of local authorities. But they 
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may also make it more difficult significantly to change police practice unilaterally without jeopardising 
the relationships on which such arrangements depend. 
Ethnicity and cautioning 
Research to date on ethnic differences in cautioning is scant, and defives from three or four local 
studies dating back as far as 1978 (see FitzGerald 1993). All - with one exception - fail to take 
account of whether or not defendants admitted the offence. They have consistently found that black 
juveniles are significantly less likely to be cautioned than whites. However, reference has already been 
made to the rmst recent (CRE 1992) which covered juvenile cautioning in seven police forces. 17his 
found that the differences effectively disappeared in the one force which controlled for admissions, 
since twice as many black defendants as whites denied the offence. 
Brown's finding of ethnic differences in admission rates has already been mentioned; and his overall 
finding of slightly lower cautioning rates for minorities is therefore unsurprising. Sixteen per cent of 
his black suspects were cautioned, compared with 19 per cent of whites; and, although the figure for 
Asians was lower still (14 per cent), a higher proportion of Asians had no further action taken against 
them7. Only 20 per cent of his juvenile sample were initially referred to the officers responsible for 
deciding whether to pass the case to the juvenile panel and a major deciding factor in this was 
admission (although 20 per cent of those referred had, in fact, denied the offence). Yet, of 40 black 
juveniles who had adrritted their guilt, only 2 (5 per cent) were referred to the panel, compared with 
56 out of 233 whites (24 per cent). It is difficult with relatively small numbers, however, to take full 
account of all of the other factors which - even if the offence is admitted - may militate against a 
caution, even forjuveniles. 
-Ibe West Midlands police had published data on ethnicity and cautioning in a report profiling young 
offenders in the force area which it produced jointly with the Pobation Service and the local 
FIgures for Asians were 31 per cent, compared with 25 per cent of black suspects and 21 per cent of whites. 
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authorities (West Mdlands Joint Data Team 1995). This provides a raw breakdown of the proportion 
of young offenders in each ethnic group who were cautioned - the 'core diversion rate'. It then gives 
an adjusted diversion rate'which takes account of. the nature of the offence; offending on bail/arrest 
on warrant; admission of the offence; and divisional policy (since divisions may refuse to caution for 
offences which are a matter of particular local concern). T'he core rate for all young offenders in the 
West MkUands in 1995 was 47 per cent; but the adjusted rate was 87 per cent. The ethnic breakdown 
is only presented in graphic fonn; but the 'core' rate is clearly much higher for Asians relative to 
whites and that for black young offenders is much lower; yet the 'adjusted rate' appears to iron out 
the black/white difference and to leave Asians only marginally more likely to be cautioned than the 
other two groups. It should, however, be noted that this pattern was not consistent thoughout the 
sub-areas within the force and separate analyses are not presented for different offences'. 
For the purposes of the ethnic monitoring research, the Met gave me access to figures for juvenile 
cautioning of different ethnic groups in 1993. Tle scope these provided for more detailed analysis 
has yielded important new insights into the relationship between the type of offence for which 
juveniles have been arrested, adn-fissions, and outcomes. Of a total sample of 16,798 juveniles ethnic 
origin was not known in 2,196 cases. If these cases are not proportionately spread across all ethnic 
groups, this could, of course, introduce bias into results based on the remaining 87 per cent of the 
sample. We have no way of knowing the spread; but it is important to remember that this question 
overhangs all of the discussion which follows. Fifty nine per cent of the sample were recorded as 
white, 20 per cent as black and 6 per cent as Asian; and the overwheln-dng majority of these were. 
males (80 per cent and 83 per cent in the case of white and black suspects, rising to 91 per cent of 
the Asians). The black sample were the least likely to have no previous cautions or convictions and 
the most likely not to admit the offence. A much higher proportion of black juveniles were also 
charged rather than being cautioned or having no further action taken against them; but the results 
for Asians were broadly comparable with those for whites. The gap between black cautioning rates 
It is also difficult to ascertain the nurnbers in each ethnic group. Nor is it clear what proportion of young offenders 
overall were captured by the baseline data information; and no information is given on the proportion of the sample 
for whom ethnicity was not recorded. 
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relative to whites reduces dramatically when account is taken of whether the offence was admitted - 
although it does not entirely disappear - whereas it opens up further for Asians. 
Table 5: 6 
Juv. eniles arrested in MPD 1993 
White Black Asian 
No previous 
cautions or 
convictions 
62.9 57.4 72.3 
Offence not admitted 54.0 69.8 45.6 
Charged 19.8 38.2 20.8 
Caution (all) 66.0 47.6 67.3 
Caution (offence 
adrýnitted) 
69.7 63.5 80.9 
NFA 11.7 13.1 10.8 
Number 9856 3397 1080 
As with the data published by the West Midlands, it would be easy simply to infer from Table 5: 5 
that the rermining differences once adrnission is taken into account are explained by whether suspects 
had any previous cautions or findings of guilt. However, in addition to the factors already cited which 
fommlly determine whether a caution can be given, Brown identifies a number of other considerations 
which also come into play on a discretionary basis within the limits of these formal requirements". 
others include custody officers'view of the likely court outcome, of the imPact on the victim and of the remorse 
shown by the suspect. 
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Further analysis of the Met data shows that ethnic differences in the offences for which they were 
arrested also have a significant effect on overall levels of cautioning. Ille differences broadly mirror 
those for total arrests (see Table 5: 3) although, in the case of juveniles, they are based on all arrests 
including those for non-notiflable offences. Given the importance of offending histories and the 
different patterns of offending among females, Table 5: 7 compares like-with-like by restricting the 
analysis to male juveniles with no previous cautions or convictions. It also gives figures only for 
offences where the number of black juveniles was 50 or more. With the exception of 'other' offences, 
the main crime category for all groups is 'theft and handling' where arrests of Asians are higher 
relative to other offences than they are for white and black juveniles. Whites appear to be more 
involved in burglary; and, again, the proportion of black arrests for robbery is strikingly higher than 
for either of the other groups. 
Table 5: 7 
_ 
Juveniles with no previous offending history 
Arrests by offence type and ethnicity 
(Males only, Met 1993) 
Column per centages 
White Black Asian 
------------ 
Violence against the 
person 
7.4 8.4 3.8 
Robbery 1.6 10.5 3.8 
BurglarY/ going 
equipped 
12.0 9.1 8.6 
Theft/ handling 29.5 32.8 37.5 
Other notifiable 
offences 
7.5 4.4 7.0 
All other offences 
- 
32.0 29.7 30.9 
-------------- 
Number 4011 1172 640 
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Each of these offences has a different likelihood of resulting in a caution - even where the offence is 
admitted and all other things (such as the suspect's criminal history) are equal - and this will have an 
impact on overall cautioning outcomes for different ethnic groups simply because, as Table 5.7 has 
shown, the proportion arrested within each offence category varies from one group to another. 
Robbery (which is the offence group in which black juveniles are most strongly over-represented) is 
per se much less likely to attract a caution (for any ethnic group) than burglary or theft. However, 
the chances of different ethnic groups receiving a caution will also vary within each of these offence 
categories inasmuch as the pattern of differential admission. rates obtains even among juveniles with 
no previous offending history. Again black juveniles have lower admission rates than whites in all 
three categories - and this is especially marked in the case of robbery. Asians also have lower 
admission rates for robbery and burglary (although their numbers in these categories are small); but 
they are comparable with whites in the main offence category which is theft and handling of stolen 
goods as Table 5.8 shows. 
Table 5: 8 
Admissions and cautions by offence type and ethnicity 
(Male juveniles with no previous offending history) 
White Black Asian 
Robbery % of offence 57 25 32 
group cautioned 
% admitting 60 33 50 
Burglary/going % of offence 87 76 70 
equipped group cautioned 
% admitting 81 68 69 
Ileft/handling % of offence 96 88 94 
group cautioned 
% admitting 89 76 88 
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One would expect, with previous offending already controlled for in this subsample, that once 
account is taken of admissions, cautioning rates level out within offence categories. Yet, as Figure 
5.1 shows, this happens in the case of theft/handling and burglary"'. Yet in the case of robbery 
cautioning rates remain markedly lower both for black and Asian juveniles with no previous offending 
history (and who have adnitted the offence) than they do for whites. The fact that arrests for robbery 
are already so much higher among the black group will, therefore, have a major impact on the extent 
to which they get tracked in to the criminal justice process rather than filtered out at the cautioning 
stage (see Figure 1 in Chapter Two). 
Figure 5.1 
Cautions: male juveniles in MPD 
(Offence admitted + no previous) 
100 
80 
60 
40 
20 
0 
10 The apparent slightly lower rate for Asians is based on relatively small numbers and should not be regarded as 
significant. 
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Theft Burglary Robbery 
Finally, the Met data also afford some insights into the related question of other forms of disposal, 
although these are fairly limited even within a data set of this size. They confirm the overall pattern 
noted earlier of higher prosecution rates (and correspondingly fewer NFAs) for more serious 
offences. Of the subsaniple analysed in this instance (that is, males with no previous findings of guilt 
and who did not admit the offence) just over 60 per cent had no further action taken against them 
where the arrest was for theft or handling; but for robbery the figure was only 23 per cent. 
Unfortunately, numbers in most offence categories are too small to break them down further by ethnic 
origin in this way, with the exception of the largest group - that is those arrested for theft/handling. 
Of the subsample of 132 whites in this category, 64 per cent (85) had no further action taken against 
them while the corresponding figure for the 94 black arrestees was 55 per cent (52)". Without 
detailed knowledge of individual cases, it would be possible to infer either that the police were more 
punitive in the case of the black juveniles and/or (following Brown) that the evidence against them 
was stronger. However, it is still worth noting that, in the case of robbery - where the NFA average 
of 23 per cent is already largely driven by black arrestees - the NFA average for the black group as 
such was actually slightly higher, at 26 per cent. There is no obvious reason to suppose that the police 
would be more punitive against black juveniles in some offence categories but less so in the case of 
robbery-, so one is left to infer - however tentatively - that these 21 black young people who had no 
previous convictions were arrested for robberies for which the evidence against them was especially 
weak. 
aearly, once one begins to unpack the figures systematically in this way, they do not lend weight to 
any printafacie assumption of significant discrimination in cautioning overall. The case of robbery, 
however, is the exception to this and raises a number of questions. These have wider implications 
which are explored in the next chapter. 
11 The base number for Asians is too small safely to make comparisons for that group. 
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SUMMARY ANI) DISCUSSION 
Arrest data have been little used in official statistics for two main reasons. The first - which reflects 
their limited value at national level is that they are collected on very different bases between forces. 
71be Home, Office team was alerted to this problem in the course of evaluating the pilot trials and took 
the opportunity to standardise returns once monitoring became compulsory by narrowing the 
information required to a specific range of arrest categories. Problems of interpretation seem set to 
remain for some time, however. The information will not be broken down by offence category; and 
inter-force comparisons will be meaningless unless they, Eke the stop/search data, are shown as a rate 
per 1000 population. Even then, many of the same problems will obtain of comparison with local 
populations, along with the many unknowns which attach to the reasons for any observed ethnic 
differences. In the case of arrests, these difficulties will be compounded for at least the first two years 
by the fact that the Met will be unable to provide data even on the range of arrests specified but only, 
as now, on arrests which resulted in some further action. This will create a major deficit in the ethnic 
data because of the proportion of ethnic minorities overall - and of black people in particular - who 
live in the capital. 
The second reason arrest data are so little used locally is that, in the context of the performance 
culture, they constitute only a proportion of the total clear-ups which forces overall use to measure 
whether they are meeting their objectives. Yet individual officers are also becoming ever more 
performance-conscious (see Chapter Ibree); and f6i many their arrest rate will be a significant 
yardstick - if not the main criterion - by which they may increasingly perceive themselves to be 
judged. This seems likely to amplify any existing ethnic bias (however unconscious); and it could 
impact especially on robbery since arrests as such may contribute more significantly to meeting overall 
force objectives for this offence than for most others. All the evidence suggests that the impact of this 
would fall more heavily on the black population than on other ethnic groups. 
Ethnic data on cautioning are, in turn, likely to be at least as difficult to interpret as on arrests. Some 
of the reasons for this are similar to those which will 
beset interpretation of data in the other two 
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areas of monitoring - in particular (as with stop/searches) the very different cautioning practices 
between forces. Beyond this are two further major limitations to the national returns which could 
leave them open to inferences which are misleading or even dangerous. One is that supplementary 
information will not be available to control for the proportions of those arrested in each ethnic group 
who were actually eligible for a caution because they admitted the offence. The other is that it will 
be impossible to tell what proportions of those who were not cautioned were respectively NFAd or 
prosecuted. 
Locally - where it may be possible to make the cautioning data more meaningful by placing them 
better in context, the ethnic patterns they show may still raise more questions than it is possible to 
answer, for many factors other than admission of the offence come into play in determining who gets 
cautioned and, even where information is available on these, the actual numbers involved may make 
it impossible to control for these statistically in most forces. Indeed, for important sub-categories - 
such as analysis of cautions by offence type - numbers could still defeat the most sophisticated multi- 
variate statistical approaches even in large forces with substantial minority populations. Yet the new 
analysis presented in this chapter highlights both the general necessity of subjecting the cautioning 
figures to this type of scrutiny and the specific possibility that the extent to which different groups 
are cautioned for robbery (relative to other offences) may be far more significant than has hithero 
been appreciated. 
These issues - along with those previously raised about the interpretation of the stop/search figures 
are taken up in the next chapter. This revisits the outstanding questions in the 'race' and crime 
debate described in Chapter One and looks again at the gaps in the answers identified in Chapter Two 
in the light of the research material presented in the thesis so far. It concludes by giving critical 
consideration to the extent to which police ethnic monitoring may contribute to filling those gaps. 
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Chapter Six 
The truth at last ? 
This thesis was submitted before publication of the first 's95' ethnic monitoring returns from police 
forces; but internal access to the data which have been submitted to the Home Office since April 
1996 had yielded no suprises. That is, police ethnic monitoring have simply confirmed long- 
standing patterns of ethnic differences in British criminal justice data. That is, overall, black people 
are over-represented in comparison with their proportions in the population at large; and Asians 
are not. Chapter One summarised the different approaches taken by previous commentators to 
% explaining' the differences and identified four main strands to these, as follows: 
1. Discrimination by the criminal justice system 
2. Structural factors 
3. 'Cultural' factors 
4. Some combination of the previous three. 
Chapter Two then described the relevant statistics and research findings published to date. 
Despite their many limitations, they tend to point strongly towards the fourth explanation. 
However, there is no consensus on the weight which attaches to each of the three elements in this 
combination; and the nature and dynamics of their 
interactions remain largely unexplored. 
Chapters Three, Four and Five have focussed mainly on the introduction of police ethnic 
monitoring but this has generated material which allOws us to revisit these 
'explanations, shedding 
some new light on eacý and tentatively pointing to ways 
in which they may interact. Given that 
the focus of the research (i. e. police ethnic monitoring) 
is centrally concerned with the question 
of discrimination, this final chapter 
begins by re-examining the structural and cultural arguments 
as the contat for reviewing the role of 
discrimination. This approach raises more questions than 
it answers; but it does pennit us to 
look again at the more theoretical approaches described in 
Chapter one. It would be tempting to indulge in a detailed and critical evaluation of the previous 
literature in the light of the complex picture which emerges even from the limited evidence 
available. For that real-world complexity 
is only dimly reflected - and, in some cases, seriously 
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distorted - by some of the theories on offer. My main concern, though, is with the possibility of 
finding real-world solutions to problems whose history cannot be re-written and whose dynamics 
are social, political and economic forces over which policy makers and practitioners alike may 
have little or no control. This is not to write off theory and certainly not to dismiss everything that 
already exists as irrelevant to the real-world. Rather, by combining, refining and building on those 
elements of existing critiques which offer the 'best fit' with the real world, it is possible to draw 
some preliminary conclusions about the processes at work and to identify some of the key issues 
facing not only policy makers and practitioners but researchers as well. In the light of these 
understandings, the chapter concludes by trying to answer the central question which hangs over 
the introduction of police ethnic monitoring - that is, whether and to what extent it is likely to 
realise the expectations which have been raised that it can a) identify discrimination if it is 
occuring and b) ensure that it is tackled effectively. 
THE MAIN'EXPLANATIONS'REVIEWED 
1. STRUCTURAL FACrORS 
The socio-economic and demographic characteristics of different ethnic groups 
Chapter one has described how many commentators have genuflected in the direction of socio- 
economic explanations for the over-representation of black people in crime statistics, in view of 
the known strong correlation generally between socio-economic factors and offending 
(Dahrendorf 1985, Box 1987, Farrington et al. 1986) - even though this has sometimes led them 
directly into difficulties in trying at the same time to explain the apparent under-involvement of 
Asians. They have employed these explanations fairly loosely, however, and the implications of 
the specific (and often contrasting) socio-economic circumstances of different minority groups 
have not yet been fully explored in the context of the 'race' and crime debate. 
Structural factors, though, go beyond immediate socio-economic circumstances. They have an 
Important demographic component; and 
I would additionally argue that the relationship with 
patterns of cfiminal behaviour 
has, a time dimension which has largely been overlooked. This 
154 
time dimension, moreover, is doubly important since it is related also to the 'cultural' factors 
discussed in the following section and adds significance to the links between the two. For the 
correlation between the criminal activities of individuals and the economic cycle (Field 1990) are 
only one dimension of the association between socio-economic factors and crime: the relative 
fixity of the historic position of different groups from one revolution of the economic cycle to the 
next needs also to be considered. 
chapter Two has already pointed up important dfferences between the various minorities in terms 
of the main socio-econonic indicators, especially those concerned with employment (i. e. SEG and 
unemployment). However, in order to appreciate the association with the crime statistics currently 
available, to hypothesise about possible links with underlying patterns of ethnic offending and to 
consider the likely implications for the future, it is necessary to go beyond these two measures. 
That is, account needs to be taken of the many additional socio-economic factors where there are 
differences between the different minorities themselves, as weU as differences between each 
minority and the diverse (but undifferentiated) 'white' majority: 
The 1996 publication by the Office of National Statistics (ONS) entitled'Social Focus on Ethnic 
minorities, contains a comprehensive snapshot of ethnic diversity which lists the basic statistical 
facts trawled from a range of the main existing sources'. "Mere are separate sections on: 
population structure; cultural identity; geographical distribution; families; homes; victims and 
offenders; education; economic activity; type of employment; unemployment; income; resources; 
health; and lifestyles. 
Taking all these factors together, it would possible to Produce distinctive thumbnail sketches of 
each of the main groups. To do so is, however, potentially dangerous for two reasons. One is that 
there is a fine line between descriptions based on group averages and cruder forms of 
stereotyping. Few members of any group, 
including - and perhaps especially - 'whites', would 
recognise themselves from such a composite picture. It reduces individuals to a statistical norm, 
, lbough there are no acknowledgen=usý I can claim credit for a significant input to the structure and 
con= of the ONS report. While preparing this thesis, I provided much of the interpretation of the 
data, especially with regard to the sections which cover demographic, socio-economic and criminal 
justice statistics. 
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obliterating the diverse pennutations of, for example, gender/ age/ class/ area of residence/ family 
of origin/ current living arrangements/ educational experience and employment status; and these, 
in turn, say nothing of the individual differences of temperament, personal circumstances and life 
experience which mean that no two people sharing a set of socio-economic and demographic 
characteristics will be 'the same'. The other objection is that collapsing groups in this way to a 
statistical norm composited around a single, arbitrary variable implicitly denies what the different 
groups share. For most of these characteristics cross-cut all groups, even though the balance 
between them may be different, such that individuals will often have more affinity with some 
members of other groups than with many individuals in their 'own'. Tlius, a white and a 
Bangladeshi girl of the same age attending an inner-city comprehensive, each with a father 
unemployed long-term will have far more in common with each other than either would have with 
the privately educated wife of a diplomat from the same group. 
Nonetheless, since the criminal statistics show crude patterns of difference on an aggregated 
ethnic Igroup'basis, it is appropriate systematically to explore the extent to which these averages 
might be expected to change if allowance was made for the relevant socio-economic and 
demographic differences between the groups. Certainly, socio-economic and demographic factors 
need to be controlled for before reaching for the two ethnic-specific explanations for these 
patterns (i. e. discrimination and cultural factors). In the case of victimisation, it has been shown 
that most ethnic differences effectively disappear once such controls are applied. Moreover, many 
of the remaining 'ethnic' differences in victimisation do not obtain for the group as a whole: they 
are often accounted for by the experience of subgroups (defined, for example, by age, gender, or 
area of residence), often in interaction with other variables (FitzGerald and Hale 1996). 
Ideally one would want to construct a statistical model which could indicate the extent of any 
disparity between the patterns observed in the criminal justice statistics and those one would 
expect from the characteristics of the 
different groups. 
The three key components of the model would be: 
Age and levels of relative deprivation. 
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Other relevant social factors. 
Area of residence. 
The rationale for including the first of these in a model to predict likely involvement in crime is 
self-explanatory. The second would attempt to capture at least some of the factors which are 
known to compound (or to offset) the likelihood of delinquency which would be predicted by the 
first. However, many - if not most - such factors cannot be captured in socio-economic terMS2 ; 
it would probably be important here to allow for relevant gender-related differences between 
groups since the criminal justice figures relate overwhelmingly to the male section of any 
population. 
The third element in the model reflects a factor whose central importance has been largely 
neglected to date in the discussion of ! race' and crime. The B CS analysis repeatedly highlights the 
role of area of residence as an explanatory factor in explaining ethnic differences in victimisation 
(FitzGerald and Hale op. cit. ) and this has again emerged strongly from the research presented 
here in connection with offending. Despite all that is known about the differences in crin-drial 
justice policies and practices from area to area3 and the growing evidence of differences in 
criminal justice outcomes for different ethnic groups between areas", no attempt has yet been 
made systematically to explore the 
impact of these differences on groups whose geographic 
distribution is so very uneven. 
one would not expect that the model would show a complete fit between these characteristics and 
For example, formative emotional experiences, the type and consistency of discipline within the 
family, relations with delinquent or non-delinquent peers are among important factors shown to be 
correlated with delinquency - though, as with socio-economic: factors, they do not determine it. (see 
Utting et a] 1995).. 
The phrase Justice by geographY coined with regard to the variation in juvenile cautioning practices 
more flm ten years ago (Tutt and Giller 83) still has resonance. 
Here Hood is especially relevant. In the West Midlands, he found parity of treatment for all groups 
at the Crown Court centre which dealt with the majority of the cases in his sample: so the average 
residual 'ethnic' effect in sentencing once relevant factors are taken into account is driven by 
apparently much higher levels of bias in other centres (op. cit. 1992). Although limited, the 
cautioning data from the same area reported in Chapter Five of this thesis tends to confirm these 
patterns of sub-area variation. 
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the criminal justice profile of any subgroup within the population since it could not take into 
account, on the one hand, the many factors which influence levels of delinquency and, on the 
other, the many factors which shape the criminal justice statistics. However, measuring the gap 
between these 'observed' and 'expected'rates for different groups would be a useful starting point 
for defining the most profitable areas for further work5. 
Clearly, constructing such a model would be a rmjor enterprise in its own right and is well beyond 
the scope of this thesis. So, despite the dangers of the thumbnail sketch referred to above, 
therefore, it is worth recapping on some of the key differences between the main ethnic groups 
of concern to this thesis6 and whose significance such model might usefully test more 
scientifically. Many of the basic data are contained in a further, four volume publication by ONS 
which analyses in detail the picture of the different ethnic groups which emerges from the 1991 
Census (ONS 1996 and forthcoming). The second of these volumes, entitled The Ethnic Nfinority 
Population of Great Britain', is edited by Ceri Peach and the summary at the end of his 
introductory chapter is especially relevant and worth quoting at some length: 
'The socio-economic position of the nine ethnic categories differs significantly. Ile 
Chinese, Other-Asian, Other-Other, Black African and Indian men are strongly 
represented in Class I (the professional group). Advantages and disadvantages are not 
uniformly distributed across all variables, however. Pakistanis, for example, who are 
poorly placed in terms of socio-economic class and unemployment, stand out strongly in 
terms of owner occupation of homes and self-employment. However, there are some 
groups who do consistently well in terms of socio-economic well-being and some who do 
exceptionally badly. 'Ilie Indians, Chinese and Other-Asians are among the groups of high 
performers, well-educated, property-owning and professional. ' 
As the case of the PaIdstanis already hints, though, it is possible to slice these differences in 
different ways and thereby to produce very different pictures of which groups are most like each 
Ibis further work might require more qualitative approaches, although further modelling based on 
existing sources and the possibility of generating data from special surveys might also be appropriate. 
it could begin to look at explanations beyond the socio-economic and demographic; but it might still 
be hpor= to examine the reasons why these factors 'explain' as much as they do and the possible 
implications of this. 
-nis is not to say diat the experiences of minorities other it= those subsurned within the Slack! and 
-Asian' categories used in the criminal justice data are currently of no concern. Indeed, the relative 
size of these groups and their rate of growth adds urgency to looking at these for the future. However, 
they are often very heterogeneous in their make-up, there are few statistics or research findings to 
draw on generally and almost none in the area of criminal justice. 
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other. 
Depending on whether the criteria for categorisation are social or economic, the grouping 
of ethnicities differs considerably. The key social differences come between those groups 
who might be considered encapsulated and those with an open structure. Ile Indians, 
Pakistanis, Bangladeshis and Chinese show traditional family patterns. Single person 
households are rare. There are few ethnically out-married households and few single- 
parent households, while extended families are significant. Self-employment is above 
average. The Black groups have a more open and assimilated social structure. Single 
parent households with dependent children are common. Ethnically mixed households are 
frequent and muld-family households are rare. 
'However, if the applied criteria are economic rather than social, the Asian social group 
becorms split into contrasting sections. Ile Indians and the Chinese occupy a much more 
advantageous position than the Bangladeshis and the Pakistanis. The Indians and Chinese 
have above average professional percentages and relatively low unemployment rates. The 
Black social group is similarly divided between the more professional Black-Africans and 
the more manual Black-Caribbeans and Black-Others. ' 
(Emphasis added) 
Peach also acknowledges two sets of gender differences which have important economic 
implications for the respective economic proffles of the three poorest groups. 
Religion and gender intersect to designate Bangladeshi and Pakistani women as the least 
participant groups in the formal labour market... At the other end of the scale, all three 
Black groups have the highest level of participation [i. e. relative both to other minorities 
and to whites]. ' 
(op. cit. p. 23) 
Moreover, in striking contrast to the pattern in all other groups, Black-Caribbean women have 
'a higher socio-economic profile than Black-Caribbean men. ' 
There are many points of detail on which one tifight quibble with Peach's typology - and many 
others one rright wish to add or unpack, 
but it serves its present, illustrative purpose well except 
for the omission of any reference to age differences and geographic distribution. These are, in 
fact, covered elsewhere by Peach and, because of their iniportance, his coverage is worth touching 
on here before exploring what the model might show. 
Reference has already been made to the finportance of differences in age structure between ethnic 
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groups and details provided in Table 2: 2; but Peach presents these data in the form of age 
pyramids (op. cit. pp 12-13) which illustrate more vividly the fact that four groups in particular 
have abnormally large bases of young people - that is, where those aged under 25 in 1991 
outnumbered those above that age (op. cit. pp. 12 and 13). These ranked as follows in order of 
the total size of the group: Pakistanis; the Othei-Other group; Black Others; and Bangladeshis. 
The chapter on Pakistanis notes that, although it may be beginning to fall, 'the Pakistanis'high 
level of fertility [is] such that to date their birth rate has been running at approximately double 
replacement lever (Ballard, in Peach, op. cit. p. 129). The Dther-Other' group is amorphous and 
not relevant for present purposes (though see footnote 5). The Black Other group is also 
heterogeneous and it is difficult to tease out its component parts; but the majority appear to be 
oernixed black/white origin7. This is the group with by far the widest base and Owen comments 
on its 'extreme youth.. with the numbers of pre-school age children greater than the numbers aged 
5-9 and 10-14, suggesting that [its] rate of growth is accelerating' (Owen, op. cit. p. 72). Of the 
Bangladeshis, Eade conrmnts I... the numbers of Bangladeshi children born in Britain [i. e. by no 
means all] doubled from 16,000 to 32,000 between 1981 and 1985-87 and doubled again between 
1985-87 and the 1991 Census. He forecasts that the rapid rise in this population is likely 'to 
continue for some time'because its overall age structure is so young and large numbers'will be 
approaching marriageable age.. during the next 10 years' (Eade et al. op. cit. pp 150 and 152). It 
should be remembered that, at the time of writing, six of those 10 years had already elapsed. 
inasmuch as the projected future growth of any of these four groups will affect their numbers in 
the criminal justice system, it will be more significant currently than it was in 1991 and is likely 
to become more so in the near future. 
yvritilyegard to geographic distribution, Peach takes his analysis considerably beyond the question 
of tfie urban concentration of the minorities (and the variations within this) remarked on in 
Chapter Two. He stresses that 'unlike the USA, there are no towns or cities in which ethnic 
minorities constitute a majority and this 
is also true at district level'; but he echoes Brown over 
Of the children in this group, 44 per cent were shown to be living in households with a white head 
and black partner (or vice versa); but a further 27 per cent lived in households with white heads and 
white partners, a high proportion of whom, Owen speculates (plausibly in my experience) may be 
white women who 'have had a child in a relationship with a black man and then gone on to another 
relationship with a white man once the first partnership has ended, suggesting that over 70 per cent 
may be of mixed race of black-white origins. (Owen, op. cit. p. 70) 
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a decade earlier (see Chapter Two) in drawing out the fact that 
'A very high proportion of the ethnic minority population is concentrated into a relatively 
small number of districts, which, in turn, contain a small minority of the White 
population.... for the Indians, Black-Caribbeans, Black Africans, Pakistanis and 
Bangladeshis, about 70 per cent are found in wards which contain less than 10 per cent 
of the population. ' 
(Peach, op. cit. p. 14) 
The likely criminal justice implications of ethnic differences in socio-economic and 
demographic characteristics 
Unpacking the ethnic differences outlined in Chapter Two in the light of Peach's overview 
provides the following pointers to the level of involvement by different minority groups (and of 
subgroups within these) which one might expect to observe in the criminal justice statistics simply 
on the basis of their socio-economic and demographic characteristics. 
The black group overall is younger than the white population (although the proportions in the 
age groups of most interest for current purposes are not significantly different) and it is on 
average much more disdavantaged. There are, however, exceptions within this. The Black- 
Caribbean group is the most comparable minority with the whites in terms of age structure but 
has always been and remains relatively deprived. It is still the dominant subgroup within the 
overall Slack' category but seems to be actually declining in size, due to some combination of: 
increasing mortality-, ernigration on retirement; merging with the white population into the Black- 
other category in the younger age ranges; and an undercount of young men in the Censuss. The 
black African con4)onent tends to be more highly qualified and is also very young; but the Census 
undercount of this group is thought to be exceptionally high" and those omitted seem especially 
likely to include illegal immigrants and others (such as refugees) whose socio-economic position 
is likely to be very marginal. Hard facts are, of course, very difficult to obtain; but anecdotal 
This also significantly affected the count of young Pakistani and Bangladeshi men. For a full 
discussion see Simpson, in the first of the ONS volumes (Coleman and Salt 1996). 
Daley, in Peach (op. cit, p. 49) refers to an estimate that 15 per cent of African men aged 20 to 24 
were not recorded and that this rose to 17 per cent in the 25-29 group. 
161 
evidence suggests that these numbers may have grown further since the Census was takenlo. The 
Black-Other component is, on average, relatively deprived and is one of the youngest and the 
fastest growing of aU the groups. 
Bearing in mind the limitations due to problems of enumeration referred to in the previous 
paragraph, the following additional factors related to the second element in the model may also 
be significant. Average levels of econorric and educational attainment within the dominant Black- 
Caribbean group are boosted by the rates for females. That is, the level of disadvantage among 
black males is higher than may at first be apparent. There are much higher levels of single 
parenthood among both the Black Caribbean and Black Other groups: 57 per cent of Black- 
Caribbean children aged 16 and under (and those who had stayed on in education to 18) and 51 
per cent of Black Other children lived in lone parent families in 1991, compared to 17 per cent 
of white children and less than 10 per cent in the Asian groups (ONS 96 p-20). The fact that 
women headed the vast majority of these household will per se contribute to lower black 
household incomes although this may be offset to some extent by higher levels of economic 
participation among black females 
". With regard to possible criminal justice implications, 
however, this may in turn be offset by the implicit reduction in scope for surveillance by parents 
of the whereabouts and activities of their children" and the ability to accompany them at a police 
station or at court on occasions when the presence of a parent may influence a decision one way 
or another (see section on discrimination below). I'lle much higher proportion of single young 
men and of school exclusions in the younger age groups also suggest that the Black Caribbean 
group in particular will be more likely than their peers from other groups to be 'available' as 
objects of police attention (see Chapter Four). 
10 In the first of the London fieldwork areas I was told that local people had become aware in the past 
couple of years of a growing number of French Africans who had drawn the attention of the police. 
Their immigration status was unknown and they were, of course, inflating police records of the 
'Black'group relative to the enumerated local population. 
it 66 per cent and 58 per cent respectively of Black-Caribbean and Black-Other women with children 
under 5 were economically active, compared to 46 per cent of whites (ONS op-cit pA I) 
12 The self-reported offending study referred to in Chapter Two was part of a wider study of the 
lifest)Jes of young people. Unpublished results in response to qucstions about parental supervision 
are instructive. 7hose aged under 16 were asked whether their parents knew a) where they were and 
b) who they were with when they went out in the evenings. Numbers are small for black respondents 
aged under 16 (29); but the proportion SaYing 'always'to, both questions (50 per cent and 43 per cent 
respectively) was noticeably lower than for whites in the same age group (64 and 59). 
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Finally, with regard to the 'other relevant' social factors in the model, it is worth considering the 
possible implications of the levels of 'integration'of both Black-Caribbeans and the Black-Others. 
Rates of inter-ethnic union are higher than for any other ethnic group, including whites". A much 
higher proportion of both men and women work in public sector jobs where equal opportunities 
policies are likely to have created a more ethnically mixed work-force than the private sector. This 
means that, in comparison to the Asian groups, they are less likely to be concentrated in ethnic 
'niches' in the private sector (including in businesses owned by - and often mainly serving - co- 
ethnics). Indeed, as Peach (above) implies, the majority of the white population lives in areas 
where there are very few people from ethnic minorities and they are much less residentially 
, encapsulated'than the Pakistanis and the Bangladeshis (see below). Together, all of these factors 
suggest that the Black Caribbean and Black Other groups are the most 'integrated'of all main 
ethnic groups considered here. That is, these black people will, on average, have very many more 
contacts with whites than whites, on average, will have with them. Morrover the number and the 
range of black contacts with whites will be very much greater than contacts between Asians and 
whites 14. This suggests that black offending is more likely to be inter-racial than for any other 
group. As such, it is likely in general to excite the attention of the majority and, specifically, to 
be more susceptible to any ethnic bias in crime reporting (see Chapter Two). 
Inasmuch as anything can usefully be said about the impact of area of residence, the thesis has 
made frequent reference to the fact that nearly two thirds of the black group overall lives in 
London. Policing traditions and practices which may be particular to the Metropolitan police, 
therefore, will impact very disproportionately on this group, although it is important to recognise 
that further, significant diversity between and within divisions will be masked in any apparently 
distinctive Met-wide pattern. Certainly this London effect will have a dramatic impact on the rate 
at which black people nationally are recorded as being stopped and searched under PACE; for the 
Met figures are not only well in excess of any other force, they nearly match the total for all the 
13 Fbr example, of Ctnsus respondents who were married or cohabiting, 32 per cent of black males and 
23 per cent of black females had partners from other groups compared with only I per cent each for 
whites. Figures for the Asian groups were slightly higher than for whites but all were under 10 per 
cent. 
14 The rate for Indians will be higher than that for Pakistanis and Bangladeshis, but mtes of inter. 
marriage are much lower than for black People, implying lower levels of social contact generally. 
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rest put together (see Chapter Four)". Less measurable is the effect of living in areas which may 
simply be more densely policed than others and where de facto the chances of coming to the 
attention of the police will be higher (see, for example, Cicourel 1968). The figures for London 
(see Table 3: 1) already suggest that this may be the case for black people and this hypothesis 
seems also to be supported by my own unpublished analysis of a question asked in the 1988 BCS 
but not subsequently. This indicated that a quarter of black respondents had personally seen a 
police officer within the last three days, compared with 14 per cent of whites (and 18 per cent of 
the combined Asian group). On the other hand, it should always be bome in mind that concern 
has largely centred on the Black Caribbean group and by extension (and increasingly for the 
future) the Black Others. In 1991,58 per cent of Black Caribbeans lived in London while 55 per 
cent of the Black Other group actually lived elsewhere; but the overall 'black' figure for London 
was pushed upwards by the Black Africans, where fully 77 per cent of those enumerated lived in 
the capitaL Although still largely urban based, the Black Others also tended to be more dispersed 
than the other two black groups outside London (Owen, op. cit. 93). 
The Asian group is not only as internally diverse as the 'black! group, it is starkly polarised in 
socio-economic terms and the group at one of these poles (the Indians) 
is actually larger than all 
three 'black! groups combined while the two groups at the other pole (the Pakistariis and 
Bangladeshis) are, together, nearly as large as the total Black group and they are growing rapidly. 
In terms of their socio-economic characteristics, the Indians may be assumed to be more 
comparable with whites than any other group. They are, however, the largest of all the groups 
and, as with whites, there are distinctive subgroups within this total; and some of these Indian sub- 
groups share many of the charactersitics of the 
Pakistanis and Bangladeshis, although they tend 
to be longer settled. Nonetheless, their basic socio-economic profile suggests that, taken as a 
groupsq their rates of offending would appear 
in the model as no higher than those of whites 
(also taken as a group), except inasnwch as their age profile is younger. Yet 'other factors' suggest 
a degree of 'encapsulation' which would tend actually to 
lower the 'expected'rate in ways which 
is My forthcoming BCS analysis with Chris Hale. however, finds that black people are no less likely 
to be stopped and searched outside London. This suggests that records of PACE searches are kept 
more assiduously in the capital than by provincial forces - possibly because the latter resented this 
aspect of pACE in particular, seeing it as a sledgehammer to crack a London nut. 
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are explored in more detail below with regard to the Pakistanis and Bangladeshis. 
The geographic distribution of the Indian population also in part reflects its greater affluence. 
Although a third lives in London, nearly three quarters of these live in outer London rather than 
the inner city areas (which is where the majority of the black and Bangladeshi population of the 
capital are found). Robinson points out that, of the main minorities, the Indians 'have the highest 
percentage of their population in non-Metroplitan districts (over 31 per cent), are well represented 
in non-metropolitan cities and have an above average presence in other urban areas and rural 
areas' (in Peach op. cit pp 103-104). Thus, although the Indians tend to be more socially 
encapsulated than the black groups, they are less physically encapsulated than the two other 
, Asian, groups. However, this also means that the Indians live in lower crime areas than the other 
main minorities". These are likely to be less intensively policed; so, given that criminal activity 
by Indians may be relatively low anyway, where it does occur, it may be less likely to come to 
police attention. 
The socio-economic profile of the Pakistani and Bangladeshi populations defacto makes them 
a much more obvious cause for concern in the criminal justice context than the Indians. This is 
compounded by their age structure, although two important points are worth noting here. As has 
already been emphasised, it is only recently that much larger numbers than previously have come 
into the peak age group for offending: in 199143 and 47 per cent of these groups respectively 
were aged under 16 
17. The other is that the numbers may increase considerably in the future: by 
16 Of the 1992 BCS sample, II per cent of w1iites lived in ACORN bigh crime risk areas. Figures were 
43 per cent for Indians and 58 per cent for black respondents, rising to 61 per cent and 66 per cent 
respectively for Pakistanis and Bangladeshis (AtzGerald and hale 1996). 
17 This compared with 30 per cent of Indians, 29 per cent of the black group overall (but only 22 per 
cent of Black Caribbeans), and 19 per cent of whites. 
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1991 there were already 280,000 Pakistanis and Bangladeshis aged under under 16, whereas the 
combined total in this age range for all the black groups was only 261,000. 
It is possible nonetheless that the these socio-economic and age characteristics may have less 
effect on the Pakistanis' and Bangladeshis' showing in any criminal justice statistics than might be 
expected. For they may, to some extent, be offset by factors in the second element in the model 
in terms both of farrily structures and of 'encapsulation'. It is true that Pakistani and Bangladeshi 
families tend to be much larger than average and extremely overcrowded (ONS 1996 op. cit. pp. 
19 and 26) and this would normally tend to predict higher levels of delinquency. However, 
Pakistani and Bangladeshi households also contain a higher proportion of adults than in any other 
group, except for the Indians. Like the Indians again, the proportion of children living in single 
parent households is much lower than average; much higher proportions of those over 16 are 
married than in any other group and their mean age at marriage is much lower". By contrast with 
the Indians, rates of female economic participation are lower than for any other group (at 20 per 
cent overall for Bangladeshis and only slightly higher for Pakistanis in 1995) and the proportion 
of working mothers was only about a third of that found among Indian women (ONS op. cit. 
p. 39). The combined effects of these family characteristics seem likely to contribute to higher 
levels of surveillance of the young people in all three Asian groups; and this is borne out by 
unpublished findings from the Youth Lifestyles Survey (see footnote 12) where much higher 
proportions than in the black and white groups said that if, at age 15, they went out in the 
evening, their parents always knew both where they were going and who they were with. Table 
6: 1 combines the responses from the under l6s with the over 16s; and the lower rates shown 
previously for black respondents aged under 
16 disappear (whether as an effect of hindsight or 
of some particular characteristic of the 
black sample). However, the combination gives much 
larger numbers in all the minority groups and this adds to the robustness of the findings in respect 
,I of the Asian groups which 
is of particular interest here. 
is paldstani and BangWeshi men are the only group whose mean age at marriage was under 26 in 1991 
(ONS op cit p. 22). 
166 
Table 6: 1 
Parents' knowledge of children's whereabouts 
White Black Indian Pakistani Bangladeshi 
When you go/went out in the evening 
(aged 15) do/did your parents ..... 
..... always 
know where yo&re 
56% 55% 77% 77% 76% 
going 
..... always 
know who you're with 51% 48% 71% 75% 66% 
N 1342 191 245 243 127 
Source: Home Office: Youth Lifestyles Survey (unpublished data) 
, me Pakistani and Bangladeshi groups are also the most ý encapsulated' of all the n-dnorides, with 
higher levels of residential segregation than any others and the lowest rates of inter-marriage of 
any minority at all ages (though it should also be noted that this remains relatively rare for the 
Indian group as well). Rates of self-employment are also high in absolute terms - extraordinarily 
so for groups who are among the poorest of any"; and the proportion of adults speaking English 
is markedly lower than for the Indians, although this seems to be true mainly of women and older 
men (ONS 1996 p. 13). Although there is no evidence from the B CS that rates of crime reporting 
among the Pakistanis group is lower than 
for others, it seems very likely that the most 
encapsulated members Of this group may not have been covered by the Survey since it did not use 
interpreters. Just as the black offenders may be more involved than any other group in inter-ethnic 
crime because of their level of 'integration', 
it seems equally likely that offending among the 
pakistanis and Bangladeshis may be intra-ethnic and under-reported not least for this reason. 
Certainly the evidence from the second of my fieldwork areas in London and discussions (at HoUy 
Royde and elsewhere) with officers from other forces suggested that the under-reporting of intra- 
ethnic crime and problems of 
investigating it when it came to light were becoming an increasing 
matter of concern in forces with significant 
Asian populations. If this is true, it would defacto 
19 In the 30-44 age range, self-employment rates for economically active Asian men in 1991 were: 
Indian 26 per cent; Pakistani 30 per cent; and Bangladeshi 29 per cent. The corresponding figurc for 
whites was 16 per cent (Ballard in Peach, op. cit. p. 139). 
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mean that the offenders from these groups would (disproportionately) be unlikely ever to show 
up in criminal justice statistics. 
There are, then, strong similarities between the Pakistani and Bangladeshi group and they are 
often lumped together for statistical purposes, especially since the numbers of Bangladeshis in 
sample surveys will often be too small for separate analysis. However, the major difference 
between them for purposes of this discussion is that the largest group (the Pakistanis) is much less 
concentrated than any of the other minorities in London. Around 19 per cent of the total lived in 
the capital in 199 1, with a similar proportion in the West Midlands and only slightly fewer (17 per 
cent) in West Yorkshire. Of the Bangladeshis, by contrast, not only do more than half live in 
Greater London, nearly half of these again lives in a single borough. That is, for nearly a quarter 
of the total Bangladeshi population, their experience of policing may be driven by the policies and 
practices of a single division of the Metropolitan force and may be very different from that of the 
Pakistanis. 
PACE stop/search figures are again the only (very crude) indicator currently available of the 
possible implications of these differences in the geographical distribution of the Pakistanis and 
Bangladeshis. As Table 4: 1 shows, the West Midlands and West Yorkshire are both forces with 
recorded rates of stop/search which are 
lower even than the provincial average. Stops of whites 
were less than one fifteenth of those 
in the capital in the same year and those of minorities one 
twelfth and one twentieth respectively" and this suggests that, all else being equal, Pakistanis 
overall would have much 
lower rates of stop and search than other minorities simply as a result 
of where they live - with the knock-on effects this may 
have in terms of overall arrest rates (see 
Chapter Five). For the Bangladeshis, on the other hand, the picture may be entirely different. 
Unpublished data produced by the Metropolitan police suggests that the use of the PACE power 
in'1995 was much higher overall in the Division covering the area in which the Bangladeshis are 
rnost heavily concentrated than 
for London as a whole. (Details are contained below in Table 6: 3 
in the section on 'Discrimination' which discusses the ethnic breakdown within this total. ) 
20 This difference between the two forces - which are identical in their recorded stops of whites - may 
be explained by the inflationary effect of stops of black people in the West Midlands where their 
proportion in the local population is three times that in West Yorkshire (see Table 3: 2). 
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In sum, the argument made here is: 
a) that it is imperative to take socio-economic and demographic factors into account in trying 
to explain ethnic differences in criminal justice statistics 
but 
this account needs to be set in the context of the area differences in policing policies and 
practices highlighted in Chapters Four and Five of this thesis, not only in relation to PACE 
searches but arrests and cautions also. 
Bearing in mind that the criminal justice statistics relate mainly to the male section of any group, 
we already know enough to make some sensible assumptions about the implications of a) for the 
ethnic differences one would expect to find in these statistics if all else were equal. These should, 
in principle, be testable through the statistical model proposed - although it is not clear that 
information is yet available on differences in policing policies and practices at sufficiently refined 
area levels to provide the necessary further controls at b). 
Broadly speaking the Black-Caribbean and the Black-Other elements within the generic 'Black' 
group are, on average, heavily marked by both socio-economic and demographic characteristics 
which would predict higher levels of 
involvement in crime. There is little evidence of any 
characteristics which might mitigate these effects. Rather, family circumstances and much higher 
levels of 'integration' with the white mainstream of society may exacerbate them. The pattern is 
already well established among the 
Black-Caribbean group whose demographic 'bulge' at the peak 
age 
- for offending came toward the end of the 1970s and beginning of the 1980S2' but the pattern 
for the future will be increasingly driven by a 'Black-Other' group which is British born, very 
young and growing fast- 
It is largely of mixed race origin and less London based than the Black- 
Caribbeans. The effect of the Black-African group on the figures now and for the future is more 
21 The 1991 Census shows a cohort of 28,419 Black-Caribbean males aged 25 to 29 (i. e. those who 
would have been 15-19 in 1981), compared with only 21,308 in the age group above and 22,599 in 
the age group below. The 15-19 age group numbered only 15,326 by 1991; so the'bulge' in the black 
Caribbean group at the peak age for offending came in about 1981 and the numbers currently may 
only be about half of what they were at this peak. 
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difficult to define and has to date received far less attention than it may merit. It too contains a 
large proportion of young people and may grow in importance for the future, with a significant 
impact on the figures for the 'Black' group in the London area. The socio-economic profile of 
those Black-Afficans who were enumerated in the Census suggests that they will be less involved 
in crime and could, therefore, be keeping the 'Black' average down. On the other hand, nothing 
is known of the size or the criminal activities of those Black-Africans who were not enumerated. 
If, as seems possible, their imn-flgration and economic status is marginal and their number is 
growing, especially in the capital, they could drive up the 'Black! figure quite significantly in two 
main ways. One is that they may have higher rates of criminal involvement than the other two 
black groups; and the other is that their inclusion in criminal statistics for the Black group will 
distort comparisons with the enumerated population (especially at local level), suggesting an 
exaggerated degree of Black 'over-representation'. 
Overall criminal justice figures for Asians will tell us very little since the 'Asian' group is 
dominated by the Indians. With the exception that the Indian group is younger than the white, 
their socio-economic and demographic characteristics on average combine to predict relatively 
low levels of criminal involvement. In contrast, the Pakistani and Bangladeshi groups share many 
of the economic disadvantages of the Black Caribbean and Black-Other group and may actually 
experience them more intensely. The ftffl impact of these, however, may in part be offset by other 
social factors, including the much higher than average family responsibilities carried by men in 
these groups from a very early age, by a lower proportion of crime within the group coming to 
the attention of the police in the first place and by closer family surveillance of young people. 
, ven 
if it were possible to tell what was happening from the existing criminal justice statistics, the F 
age profiles of these groups suggest that one would have expected to pick up any significant 
gover-representation' only in the last few years. If there is such a trend, though, it is likely to 
increase (possibly quite markedly) for the future; and this may already be signalled by the higher 
proportion of Pakistani young offenders relative to adults shown in the unpublished prison 
statistics in Table 2: 7. 
We can say far less on the critical question of the impact of area differences in policing and more 
general criminal justice policies and practices 
in conjunction Wth differences in the relevant socio- 
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econornic and demographic characteristics of the different groups. Broadly speaking, any 'national' 
profile of the Black group will largely be shaped by the policies and practices" of the 
Metropolitan police (and, in particular, those divisions with the highest levels of contact with 
black people). For the 'Asian' group 'national' profiles would be required for each of the three 
groups separately. That for the Bangladeshis would again strongly reflect the Met and (to an even 
greater degree than for the Black group) particular divisional patterns within this. 'Me Pakistani 
figures, on the other hand, would be shaped as much by policing in the West Midlands and West 
Yorkshire as by patterns in London. Only the Indian profile would come near to being a truly 
Onational' picture comparable to some (limited) extent with that for whites. 
ICULTURALFACTORS 
Three inter-related concepts need to be considered in discussing the role of 'cultural, factors with 
regard to ethnic minorities, criminal activity and criminal justice statistics. These are: the nature 
of -culture'per se in the specific context of ethnicity; the interaction of culture (thus conceived) 
with structural factors; and the influence of society at large and (in particular) its institutions on 
the development of the 'cultures' of different ethnic groups. 
Notions of 'culture'and ethnicity 
The terms of the debate about the role of 'cultural' factors in explaining ethnic differences in 
criminal statistics were set from the outset 
by the conservatives referred to in Chapter One. That 
is, academic commentators from this perspective and their political and popular counterparts -have 
shared the view that the propensity 
for criminality (or for different styles of criminal activity) 
somehow inhere in different ethnic groups. 
Ile terms in which these views are expressed vary 
between extremes of stridency and subtlety depending on their source. Only the crudest, however, 
have advanced biological explanations (Le. 'race) for these differences; for the most part, they are 
linked to notions of 'Culture' (i. e. 'ethnicity') - perhaps because the 'race' and crime debate in 
]3ritain originated in an era when the retreat from biological to cultural racism was already well 
22 One ironic corollary of this, however, has been pointed out to Me by my colleague Chris Kershaw. 
nis is that the presence of black people in forces with relatively low crime clear-up rates could 
actually depress their showing in any mtional picture. 
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undcrway (Gordon and Klug 1991). 
As the debate over ethnic monitoring implies (see Chapter Three), the liberal and radical 
protagonists in the debate were ambivalent about engaging with notions of ethnic difference at 
all until well into the 1970s and therefore, perhaps, less than confident in debating the meaning 
of such differences in criminal justice statistics. That is, they have effectively been pushed into this 
particular arena on terms set by the conservatives; and they have felt obliged to do so for two 
main reasons. The first is in order to counter what they perceive to be the dangerous - and often 
wilful - stereotyping implicit in the conservative argument. The second is that the accumulated 
evidence does, indeed, point to ethnic differences which cannot readily be explained away either 
by socio-economic: factors or by discrimination. For example, as this thesis has repeatedly 
illustrated - whatever their ! real' rate of involvement in crime relative to other groups - all the 
available sources have consistently shown black people's involvement in robbery (compared to 
other forms of offending) to be much higher than that of their white counterparts. 
As Chapter One describes two broad types of response to the conservative argument. Liberals 
have effectively offered alternative arguments based on notions of ethnicity. These are more 
benign than the criminal-prone group profiles offered by the conservatives; but (as Lea and 
Young's explanation for 'Asian' crime rates cited in Chapter One illustrates) these often have a 
similar potential for stereotyping. As such, they have sometimes attracted as vitriolic criticism as 
the conservatives from the radicals, although this appears to be driven as much by ideology as by 
a demand for greater intellectual rigour23. For the latter, in turn, have tried to make a virtue of 
necessity by interpreting apparently disproportionate criminal activity by black groups in two 
ways. In one version, it is a statistical artefact produced by discrimininatory policing and, 
possibly, manipulation of the figures, both of which are examples of state oppression (Carr-Hill 
23 As Reiner puts it: 
Iza and Young have been subject to a torrent of criticism, accusing them of capitulating 
to "the weight of racist logic" and of lending sociological credibility to police racisrn"_ in 
this plethora of vituperative criticism there is no serious attempt at a rebuttal of Lea and 
youngs argument. Any such engagement with the issue of explaining the black arrest rate 
as the outcome of anything but a protean and all-pervasive racism is dismissed as 
"empiricist haggling over official crime statistics". 
(Reiner 1992 p. 164) 
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1988). In another version criminal activity is portrayed as a form of political action - even if the 
radicals are forced to concede that the political motive is not always conscious ( see Hall et al 
1978, as cited in Chapter One). 
Insofar as crinnnologists have need to draw on the 'race relations' literature to establish concepts 
of 'culture' which are relevant to the debate about ethnicity and crime, they have not been well 
served. For much of the debate here' has centred on: defining real (as opposed to 'imagined') 
, ethnjcitý in relation to 'race'; on quibbling over what range of shared group attributes should be 
included in the definition; and on identifying the situations in which ethnicity has greater or lesser 
salience (whether for groups or for individuals). This last, although it is not central to our 
umediate concerns, is at least potentially of some relevance to the 'race' and crime debate; and 
Yinger's contribution to Rex and Masons 1986 collection of essays on 7beories of Race and Race 
Relations' seems especially useful in its definition of 'ethnicity' (see Chapter One). That is, an 
ethnic groUP: 
,... exists in the full sense when three conditions are present: a segment of a larger society 
is seen by others to be different in some combination of the following characteristics - 
language, religion, race and ancestral homeland with its related culture; the members also 
perceive themselves in that way, and they participate in shared activities built around their 
(real or mythical) common origin and culture. ' 
(Yinger 1986 p. 22) 
The definition coined by Bulmer is not dissimilar. 
, Ethnicity is a more inclusive concept than that of race. An "ethnic group" is a coUectivity 
within a larger society having real or putative common ancestry, memories of a shared 
past, and cultural focus on one or more symbolic elements which define the group's 
identity, such as Idnship, religion, language, shared territory, nationality or physical 
appearance. ' 
(Bulmer 1986 p. 54) 
I 
yet - critically in the present context - 
Bulmer ornits the first condition laid down by Yinger which 
is the, way in which the group is seen by others in the larger society. Missing, in turn, from 
Yinger ,s is an element which is implicit in his first condition and which underlies much of the 
24 See, for example, Ratcliffe's introductory essay in his edited volume -Race-, Ethnicity and Nation' 
(Ratcliffe 94). 
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discusson of ethnicity - though it is frustratingly rare to find it explicitly recognised. That is, 
ethnicity (and the 'cultural' characteristics which attach to it) is not a static and immutable 
property- its very essence is that it is constantly shaped and reshaped from one generation to the 
next and from one set of historic, economic, political and social circumstances to another both at 
the macro (international and national) level and at the micro level of the local authority or even 
neighbourhood. Hall captures some of this in rather grandiloquent terms with the following 'view 
of cultural identity' among the Caribbean diaspora: 
'.. as well as the many points of similarity, there are also critical points of deep and 
significant difference which constitute "what we really are"; or rather - since history has 
intervened - "what we have become". We cannot speak for very long with any exactness, 
about "one experience, one identity", without acknowledging its other side - the rupture 
and discontinuities which constitute, precisely, the Caribbean's "uniqueness". Cultural 
identity, in this.. sense, is a matter of "becoming" as well as of "being". It belongs to the 
future as much as to the past. It is not something which already exists, transcending place, 
time, history and culture. Cultural identities comefrom somewhere, have histories. But 
like everything which is historical, they undergo constant transformation. ' 
(emphasis added) 
(Hall 1990 p. 225) 
A further corollary of Yinger's definition is that the shaping of minority identities - precisely 
because it is interactive - may itself modify the environment to which it is adapting. This is 
captured in some of the literature on culture in terms of the arts and popular culture (see for 
example Back 1996) but is more rarely acknowledged 
in the political literature other than in terms 
of struggle and contest. Yet societies themselves and their 
institutions are constantly in the 
process of change; and the forces at work 
in shaping that change may include their interactions 
with minorities' - depending on the 
length, the intensity and the nature of their contact with 
them. 
Jý the context of the 'race' and crime debate, we cannot avoid the question of cultural factors 
which have been such a major source of comfort to the conservatives and such a major source of 
discomfort to the liberals. Yet we also need to avoid the simplistic interpretations offered by either 
25 It would be instructive, for example, to look at a major institution in an area with a significant ethnic 
minority population in terms of changes over the last 25 years in: the language used to rcfcr to 
minorities; recruitment and selection procedures; and the food served in the canteen. 
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- not only because of the dangers of stereotyping, but in order again to do justice to the compexity 
of the real-world situations with which we are concerned. A starting point may be to take some 
of the notions of adaptation and reaction which underpin the radical position; but the end point 
is not to politicise (or even romanticise) the type of anti-social activity whose immediate damage 
to its victims may at least be matched by the longer term damage to the groups from which the 
perpetrators come. In short, my approach to the question of 'cultural' explanations is based on five 
main premises: , 
Ethnicity is not a 'thing', it is a process. 
lie direction of the process is shaped by a range of forces in the particular environment 
in which an ethnic group finds itself. 
The process may also have an effect on the environment in which it takes place. 
Ibe collective experience of the process may be at least as important to outcomes as any 
collective set of references which the group originally brought to the process. 
Experience of the process at the level of individuals and subgroups rmy differ very 
significantly from any collective account. 
This approach, then, emphasises two sets of 'ethnic' characteristics - the different groups' 
adaptation over time a) to their particular structural position and b) to their experiences of 
interaction with the wider society and its institutions (including its criminal justice system). In both 
instances it is assumed that changes in the wider environment may have an influence on this 
process of adaptation. Any values, practices and expectations particular to the group will also 
have sorne influence; but it is essential to remember that these values, practices and expectations 
will also change over fim and that the nature and direction of that change is often determined by 
the wider environment-Miat 
is, the present cannot be understood primarily by reference to some 
generalised (and often simplistic) characterisation of those values, pmcfices and expectations in 
the past and in different social, political and economic circumstances. The main key to 
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understanding hes in the process of adaptation since the point of immigration and the combination 
of intemal and extemal influences which have shaped it. 
The interplay of 'cultural'with 'structural'factors 
Thus the structural factors covered in the previous section have a particular - and central - 
relevance to the 'cultural', to the point where it is often difficult to disentangle the two. Family 
structures and area of residence, for example, may to a considerable extent reflect culturally based 
preferences. Patterns of employment, in turn, may reflect some combination of the job 
opportunities available to the immigrant generation; but job opportunities themselves may either 
have dictated the immigrants' area of settlement26or been dictated by them and a further factor 
which will (to some degree) have come into play is the skins they brought with them, including 
their levels of fluency in English. Exclusion from employment and other opportunities by the 
indigenous population may have been partially offset by opportunities directly offered by co- 
ethnics (within families and more widely) or by access to ethnic markets. Subsequent, wider 
economic developments may in turn have affected developments including, for example, the 
decline of the textile industry on which the Pakistani group were so dependent, employment 
opportunities in the public sector which disproportionately affect the black groups, and - more 
apparently ethnic specifile - the collapse of BCCI which affected not only considerable numbers 
of large and small Asian businessmen but those they employed (and their dependents) also. 
There is no room here to explore the full criminal justice implications of the influence of their 
structural position on the 'culture' of each of the ethnic groups with whom we are concerned. 
Much of what can useftffly be said without lapsing into dangerous generalisations has already been 
covered in the previous section which discussed structural factors per se. It is only worth adding 
26 This will apply especially in the case of immigrants recruited directly into certain employment 
sectors, including those West Indians who first came into public health and transport and different 
Asian groups into certain industries. Both will have triggered a certain chain migration in which 
fwtjer recruitment was largely initiated among co-etluiics and which, thereby. further reinforced the 
pattern. 
27 It should be remembered, though. that some commentators allege that the dependency of many Asian 
businesses on BCCI reflected the obstacles they had encountered in the mainstrearn of British 
banking. 
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to these the following two sets of observations. 
Many of these structural factors (employmc-rit sector, unemployment, large families, single parent 
families, area of residence etc) disproportionately characterise certain minorities; but in numerical 
tenns they affect very much larger numbers of the majority population. Thus my earlier analysis 
of the 1991 National Prisons Survey found that there was far greater similarity in the socio- 
economic characteristics of white and black (British) males sentenced to prison than between the 
averages for the same groups in the population at large (FitzGerald and Marshall 1996). To focus 
on the criminal justice implications of these structural factors only for minorities, therefore, as 
Lustgarten implies in his critique of Scarman (see Chapter One), is mistaken to the point of being 
perverse. 
On the other hand, the previous section brings out that the particular configurations of these 
structural factors varies between groups in ways which are so distinctive that they may be 
conceived of as 'ethnic'per se. Moreover this squares with the notion of ethnicity as process 
inasmuch as these configurations shape opportunity structures differently (Merton 1957, Cloward 
and Olin 1960). One implication is that these will also shape the groups' opportunities for crime 
differently: not only will they influence levels and patterns of crime they may also determine the 
likelihood of these crimes coming to the attention of the police. This observation is so unoriginal 
that it seems hardly worth making except for the fact that it so rarely seems to have been applied 
in Britain to the case of ethnic minority involvement in crime. It has been acknowledged largely 
in the context of passing attempts to explain differences between figures for'black' and'Asian' 
Crirne based on official statistics (Lea and 
Young, op. cit. "). These have short-circuited (and, to 
mix a metaphor, could even backfire) precisely because of their fail= a) sufficiently to 
differentiate within these broad groups in terms of their structural position and the effects of this 
over time and b) to acknowledge the particular 
limitations of official statistics on offending by 
these groups. Some ethnographic studies have tried to explore the issues with regard to individual 
groups (Robins 1992), although their specific 
focus on criminality rather than its context may limit 
28 7hus also, more recently: 
The theory that Afro-Caribbeans but not Asians are singled out for discriminatory treatment 
by crime victims and the police does not fit with the widcr picture of racial discrimination 
and disadvantage in Britain' 
(Smith 1995) 
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their contribution to the debate. Adequately to explore this topic would require a full-scale 
comparative study such as that conducted of poor Latino, black and white youths in three 
separate neighbourhoods of New York by Mercer Sullivan which explicitly 
I ... situates the undifferentiated 
"subcultural delinquents" of previous studies in specific 
local contexts of economic opportunity and social organization' 
and asks 
'.. not just whether different individuals choose to invest in education and training and 
whether they choose crime or employment as their- sources of income but also how these 
choices are conditioned by the social environments of the neighbourhoods in which they 
grow up and by the relationships of those neighbourhoods to the education system, the 
labour market, and the criminal justice system 
(Sullivan 1989 p. 15) 
interactions with the wider society and its institutions 
A comparative, fully contextualised study such as that suggested above should not only identify 
the actual offending Patterns of different ethnic groups (and their relationship to official statistics), 
it should aim to track the role of the interactions over time between the different groups with 
society at large and its criminal justice 
institutions in particular. That is, it would fully recognise 
yinger, s first condition of ethnicity by focussing on the ways in which society and its institutions 
have viewed these groups as 'different' over time in the context of crime and criminal justice. It 
would give at least as much emphasis to the ways 
in which the views of the majority shape (and 
are shaped by) interactions with minorities as 
it would on the views of the minorities themselves. 
In our current state of knowledge, it is easier to trace the outline of what such a study might 
uncover with regard to interactions 
between the black group of Caribbean origin with the 
criminal justice system than 
for any other ethnic minority. Chapter One describes the history of 
the early concerns about relations between the immigrant generation and the police. These were 
perceived in the first instance 
(the 1950s and 1960s) in terms of Police attitudes towards and 
treatment of this group; but a descending spiral seems then to have set in where cause and effect 
become ever more difficult to disentangle. Distrust and public criticism of the police seem to have 
increased among this group, carrying over to and amplified within the second generation as young 
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people began to come in larger numbers to police attention at the end of the 1970s and beginning 
of the 1980s. These reached a critical peak (as this chapter has shown) which coincided with the 
first major riots on the British mainland since long before the Second World War. Meanwhile, the 
police and the media alike had moved during the 1970s to a well-publicised view of heightened 
black involvement in crime and, in particular, in street robbery. These mutual perceptions were 
powerfully reinforced in turn by the experience of the riots of the first half of the 1980s, all of 
which were immediately triggered by police action involving black people. 
The actual events which shaped these mutual perceptions took place in a very limited number of 
areas, mainly in London. In. terms of the riots, Brixton and Tottenham are perhaps the main 
symbolic locations in London although they have their provincial counterparts - Toxteth in 
Merseyside, St Pauls in Asistol and Handsworth in Binningharn. But the images they created 
nationally were probably very powerful indeed; and several personal n-cmries from the late 1970s 
and early 1980s. serve to illustrate the points I wish to make about legacy of that period. 
During the period of the Scrap Sus campaign, a black community worker expressed to me his 
concerns (and those of coReagues) that boys as young as eight and nine were playing at being in 
detention centre since this was the lot of the Only role models they knew. I was at that time 
personally acquainted with black young men in a hostel for homeless young people (and defacto 
already very disadvantaged in terms of support networks and opportunity structures). Picked up 
for, sus', they began to take the line U they [the police] can do that to me when I've done nothing, 
next time I may as well 
do 
soinething. ' At around the same time I was the victim of an attempted 
mugging which I reported. Before I could offer a description of my assailant, I was asked by the 
ic r, though, investigating a burglary of my police officer Was he black? '. 
. 
It was a different off. e 
home, who volunteered the opinion reported in Chapter One '[Street robbery] is what they're 
good at: theyýre just very quick with their hands. ' 
A couple of years later I delivered my cousin's son back to his home in an all-white London 
suburb at the height of the Brixton riots. His family was watching television coverage of events 
29 One in particular, a young man of fairly limited intelli8ence, cried himself to sleep regularly after his 
arrest and compounded his plight by failing to pay his fine, reasoning that he didn't have to pay for 
an offence he hadn't committed in the first place. 
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with evident consternation and I was struck by the realisation that for my cousin and her 
neighbours, her entire social milieu and, indeed, the majority of the white population of the 
country, these were almost the only images they had of black people - and they would probably 
remain among the most powerful. 
Shortly afterwards, I was involved in the development of race relations training at the 
Metropolitan Police College where the maJority of new recruits at that time also came from areas 
where they had no direct, personal experience of social contact with black people. These young 
people were full of natural apprehension about the challenges of the job they were taking on and 
(Eke my cousin's family) would similarly have been exposed to the same recent, dramatic images 
of black-police conflict. They were about to be launched into the immediate post-Scarman world 
of policing the capital where they would meet many experienced colleagues who were (as Chapter 
Three has described) bruised,. battered and defensive in the light both of the experience of the riots 
and of the many criticisms of the police handling of them. On the streets, many faced heightened 
sensitivities - and often outright hostility" - in their first encounters with black people. Yet these 
same black people were themselves often bruised and battered by the riots, by the heightened 
perceptions that all of them were not merely 'criminal' but violently so, by the police's role in 
reinforcing these perceptions and by the increased hostility and suspicion the police displayed 
towards them. Far from dissipating, these mutual tensions were reinforced three years later by the 
experience of Tottenham. 
ýI 
-Ibe research reported on in this thesis took place ten years and more after the riots. By this time, 
the negative views of the police held by black people were well-documented: already by 1988,81 
per cent of black people aged 16-24 
did not believe the police treated everyone fairly and 67 per 
cent thought they did did not give black people equal treatment, compared to 51 per cent and 10 
per cent respectively of white young people of the same age 
(FitzGerald and Hale op. cit. p. 29). 
particularly striking throughout my own research, though, were the corresponding attitudes of 
the police. on the one hand, poRce officers still took the riots as their point of reference and these 
seemed to provoke very powerful memories 
(or, in the case of younger officers, folk memories) 
30 An inspector I mterviewed had been brought up in Scotland and had come to London for the first time 
cn joining the Met in 1982. He paiiihilly recalled the hurt and bewildement he had felt when he tried 
as he saw it - to assist a black member of the public and was greeted with abuse. 
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of collective trauma; and, on the other, they persistently referred to more recent experiences of 
hostility in encounters with black people which some clearly found personally hurtful. A wariness 
had set in which derived directly from officers'individual and collective dealings with black people 
and which had, however unconsciously, generated negative expectations. 
Some of the implications of this forty year history of deteriorating relationship are explored 
further in the discussion of discrimination; but before turning to the question of relations between 
the police and the Asian groups, it is worth drawing together in this context the findings of this 
research with regard to robbery. The origins of black involvement in street crime are unclear-, but 
the documented history reported here (including the history of 'Sus' and the moral panics about 
'blacle muggers) have something of the flavour of a self-Riffilling prophecy; and the analysis of 
juvenile cautioning in the Met (Chapter Five) tends to confirm increasing evidence fi-om other 
sources 31. Not only has a particular culture grown up around street robbery 
for young black 
people, it has its echoes too 
in the police response. That is, black young people offending for the 
first time are far more likely than their white peers to be involved in robbery; they are far more 
likely to forfeit the chance of a caution because a higher proportion refuse to admit this particular 
offence than any othe? 
ý Yet, in the case of robbery, black first-time offenders who are apparently 
eligible for a caution from the police are much 
less likely to get one than whites - by contrast with 
other offences where the rates are the same. 
Clearly their involvement in robbery does not explain 
away the over-representation of 
black people in the criminal statistics. However, my own 
calculations based on the 
1995 prison statistics suggest that, if robberies are excluded, the 
contribution of Black British males to the total prison population 
drops from 9.2 per cent to 8 per 
cent - an overall 
decrease of 13 per cent. 
31 See, for example, Elizabeth Burney's ? utting Street Crime in its Place, (1990). The television 
programme 'Me Black Bag' (25 October 1996) reviewing the results of 'Eagle Eye, reported that 
young black boys were being forcibly coerced into this type of activity. Police officers in the first of 
my fieldwork areas had similarly spoken of black boys being required to commit a robbery as a sort 
of initiation rite to gain acceptance into a group. 
32 some of their involvement is driven by peer pressure this may also be a factor in the If, indeed, 
implicit defiance in refusing to admit the offence - although it does not rule out the alternative 
explanation which is that a higher proportion are actually not guilty. The latter hypothesis receives 
some S, 4)port from comparing the Met arrest data with the prison statistics. Black arrests for robbery 
run at three times the rate for whites, sen en ed, th g but by the time the cases have been tried and tce ap 
appears to have narrowed to two to one. However, convictions in such cases are notoriously 
dependent on the suspect admitting the offence, so higher black non-admissions will account for at 
least some of this difference. 
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The role of interactions with the police in the ethnic development of the Asian groups is less well 
documented than that of black people, probably because those interactions have been fewer. 7bis 
is not to say, however, that there have been no such interactions but I have to fall back heavily 
on personal observation to outline: the reasons why interactions have been fewer, the distinctive 
aspects of those interaction which have taken place; the current situation; and some possible 
implications for the future. 
Levels of contact with the police in part reflect overall levels of integration within society; and this 
may, in part, explain why the immigrant generation is observed in many societies to have lower 
levels of criminal involvement, although others have put different interpretations on this 
phenomenon (see Tonry 94 p. 99). Especially if crime is taking place largely within the group, the 
majority population will have little reason to invoke police intervention; and group members, 
rather than report on each other (and uncertain, in any case, in their expectations of police powers 
and likely behaviour) may try to deal with the problem among themselves. Problems of 
cornmunication will often act as a further inhibitor on both group members and the police while, 
as far as the police are concerned, it may be easier to leave such groups to themselves as far as 
possible. 
This description would appear to fit the case of the Asian groups in general and the Pakistanis 
and Bangladeshis in particular. This chapter 
has already shown that even the Indian population 
is less 'integrated' than the black groups of Caribbean origin and that their socio-economic 
characteristics in any case mean that they are much 
less likely to come to police attention in the 
role of suspects. Police dealings with the 
immigrant generation of the Pakistani and Bangladeshi 
groups - whether as suspects themselves or as the parents of suspects - are relatively 
undocumented. However, observation 
from my own involvement in the 1970s in a local 
Community Relations Council and other, related activities in an area with a sizeable Pakistani 
cornmunity suggests the following. 
Police encounters with these groups this will often have 
requh-ed involving interpreters, thus 
formalising contact to some degree. In many cases, this lent 
itself over time to the police establishing regular contacts with a limited network of agencies and 
individuals. They relied on these people to manage situations which might otherwise have been 
diffIcult to deal with using their normal resources while, within the force itself, they might turn 
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also to officers who appeared to have a particular aptitude for or willingness to engage in the 
difficult process of communication and/or who were formally recognised as having this 
responsibility. That is, police-Asian contacts were for many years far more limited than those with 
the groups of Caribbean origin; and those which neither side could avoid were often more 
formalised. What at first was a matter of necessity developed, over time, into an established 
system of involving 'brokerson the community side and specialist officers on behalf of the police. 
Factors in the wider social and political context conspired not so much further to limit the amount 
I 
of police-Asian contact as to minimise the likelihood of its politicisation. In the first place, the 
timing of immigration meant that theproblem'of police-immigrant relations was already defined 
in terms of the black community before the major increase in immigration from the Indian 
subcontinent displaced that group in terms of sheer numbers. Ile political profile of this 'problem' 
was heightened immeasurably towards the late 1970s and early 1980s for immediate, 'race'- 
specific reasons which have already been identified. Account needs also to be taken, though, of 
the wider political context in which the issues were being raised -a context of almost 
unprecedented confrontation between central and local government, with left wing local 
authorities and their associates urging the case 
for increased police accountability. The 
involvement of black people in these wider political developments was significant and several 
individuals rose to political prominence around this time. So the specific concerns of the black 
group were a feature of these wider political 
developments while the Asian groups remained more 
'encapsulated' in the political sphere also (see FitzGerald 1988), as was perhaps symbolised in 
1987 when their much-vaunted breakthrough to parliament saw ethnic minorities 'represented' by 
four MPS, only one of whom was Asian while three were black (FitzGerald 1989). 
Thus the high political profile of conflictual black-police relations which led to heightened 
. sensitivities on both sides 
in encounters on the streets had no obvious equivalent in police-Asian 
relations. Moreover, 
insofar as there was conflict, the police were by now anxious to avoid 
creating such an equivalent and 
had set in place mechanisms for containing any danger of it 
happening. The disturbances involving Asian youths (of Indian origin) which took place in 
Southall in 1977, for example, never assumed the symbolic importance of the subsequent riots 
involving their black counterparts. (11iis rmy have been in large measure because the damage was 
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inflicted on an area where homes and businesses were largely Asian-owned, because they were 
not triggered by pohce action and because the poUce were able to contain them through a network 
of local brokers. ) 
Inasrnuch as there has been any equivalent area of tension in relations between the police and the 
Asian groups, it has tended to concern the problem of racial harassment. The issue reached the 
national political agenda also at the end of the 1970s and beginning of the 1980s, though it is of 
much longer standing (FitzGerald 1997). Whether in terms pf the activities of far right parties or 
(much more comrnonly) individual incidents of hostility - from verbal abuse and graffiti to serious 
violence - the poorer sections of the Asian communities have been the most vulnerable and the 
, 
qdality of the police response has been a constant source of complaint by these groups. Analysis 
of the 1988 and 1992 British Crime Surveys (FitzGerald and Hale 1996) has shown that 
Pakistanis are more likely than Indians to be victims of crime in geneM133; and those who had been 
-victirniýsed 
were much more likely to say the offence had been racially motivated (31 per cent, 
compared to 18 per cent of Indians). Table 6: 2 describes some of the most important results in 
the context of this thesis. Of all the minorities, the Pakistanis were the most dissatisfied with the 
police response when they reported crime of any sort and they were much less likely to report 
racially motivated crime34, though dissatisfaction with the police was greater in all groups where 
victims thought the crime had been racially motivated. The Pakistanis gave the lowest overall 
rating to the job done' by police in their area 
3' and those who had been victims of crime were 
particularly negative. 
33 40 per cent of Paldstanis bad bccn victims of household offences and 15 per cent of personal offences 
widlin the previous year compared with figures of 36 per cent and 12 per cent respectively for the 
Indians. (Tbere were too few Bangladeshis to analyse separately. ) 
34 pakistani victims reported 44 per cent of the crimes against them which they did not think were 
racially motivated but only26 per cent which were. For Indians the first figure was slightly lower (42 
per cent) big the reporting of racially motivated offences was much higher, at 57 per cent. It is worth 
noting that, because of the relative size of the Indian group, the aggregated 'Asian' totals are 43 per 
cent for non-racial crimes and 42 per cent for those thought to be racially motivated. That is, the 
Asiaw figure completely masks a significant problem of under-repon g ong the mo vn ble in am st ul Cra 
group 
35 It should be noted that older Pakistani respondents were more likely to give this response: among 16- 
24 year olds the proportion was only 23 per cent. 
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Table 6: 2 
Rating of police performance by ethnic group 
(BCS 1998 and 1992) 
Victims' rating of police response to 
reported crime (fairly/very dissatisfied) 
Rating of job done by police in 
respondents' area (very/fairly poor) 
All Racially 
motivated 
All Victims, of crime 
White 33 18 23 
Afro-Caribbean 40 62 20 28 
Indian 45 54 1 
19 26 
Pakistani 50 54 
1 26 34 
Until the 1994 BCS white respondents were not asked whether they thought the crimes they referred to had 
been racially motivated 
The police response to racial incidents has long been recognised as a cause for concern and has 
been taken up, for example, by the government! s inter-departmental Racial Attacks Group on 
which ACPO is represented. With the exception of our BCS analysis, however, little or no 
research attention has been given to the implications for Asians' views of the police and the 
possible repercussions of these. Yet already in the 1970s incidents in which Asians claimed to 
have been attacked had led to demonstrations in East London; and the early 1980s saw two 
celebrated cases - theBradford 12'and the Newham Eight'- in which groups of young Asians 
(presumed from their 
. 
area of residence to be of Pakistani origin) were prosecuted for various 
offences, including in the first instance making petrol bombs- In both cases, the defendants 
clafined to have been defending their communities from attack - by implication because they could 
not rely on the police to do so. 
-Ibere has since been conflict between Asians and the police in demonstrations over the Rushdie 
affair, and - most recently and significantly - the riots in Bradford of June 1995 which involved 
young Asians (again of PaIdstani origin) and were triggered by allegations of insensitive policing. 
one of the complaints expressed increasingly by young people in this area and elsewhere was that 
the police did not listen to their complaints but expected to continue to 'manage' them through 
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unrepresentative intermediaries (Webster 1995). The police themselves - as my discussions at 
Holly Royde and elsewhere have confimrd - have in recent years become increasingly concerned 
about the involvement in crime of young people from these groups and about gang rivalries 
between thern. On the ground, there are signs of a corresponding shift in attitudes among police 
officers, with growing perceptions of groups of young Asians on the streets presumed (as an 
Inspector in my second London fieldwork area put it) to be 'up to no good'. And it was 
significant that one of the young people witnessed by Andy Zurawan alleging that the police were 
'only picking on him because he was black' was, in fact, a young Asian. 
Concerns about police-Asian relations may not attain the same polifical pro He as those s iated f, as oc 
with black people earlier. This is in part because concerns about police-black relations already 
occupy that political ground, but the political circumstances are also different and the patterns of 
crime involved will (as this thesis suggests) necessarily be different in some respects. In part, 
though, lessons may have also been learned from the pasO6 and some of the amplification which 
rnay have affected the black groups may thus be avoided. Yet similar issues are beginning to come 
9ght have expected, given the respective age to the fore - and in the sort of time scale one m 
profiles of the groups involved. 
one possible indication of the shape of things to come emerged from the analysis I did with Chris 
Hale of police stops reported by BCS respondents in London and elsewhere (FitzGerald and Hale, 
forthcoming). This showed that in London, once multiple stops and access to vehicles were taken 
into account, the rate at which Bangladeshis were stopped in cars by the police was at least equal 
to the rate for black people. This corresponds with the unpublished data from the Met's 
perforrnance Information Bureau cited earlier which showed that the police Area with the largest 
Bangladeshi population recorded a rate of PACE stop/searches which was well above the London 
av I erage in 1995., ne more detailed 
breakdown in Table 6: 3 shows that, while black people in the 
area had the highest rate of stop/searches of any ethnic group, the excess over both the London 
average and that for the local police 
Area was actually less for black people than it was for whites. 
36 In a closed meeting I attexided4 a police commander in an area which had a major problern of serious 
fighting between different Asian gangs spoke openly about the strategy he adopted with the local 
media to avoid the issue reaching the national press. 
186, 
For Asians, though, (at least 80 per cent of whom, on my reckoning were Bangladeshis"') the 
figure is fully four times the rate for London generally. 
Table 6: 3 
Recorded PACE Stop/Searches by ethnic group in one London division 1995 
% of total % of stops per 1000 
population stop/searches ethnic group 
White Met 81 61 33 
Area 79 59 35 
Division 57 37 80 
Black Met 7 26 151 
Area 8 23 136 
Division 5 12 276 
Asian Met 7 8 45 
Area 10 14 68 
Division 35 51 180 
Source: Metropolitan Police Perfoffnance Infonnation Bureau (unpublished data) 
DISCRIMINATION 
Discussion of discrimination is usually subdivided into direct and indirect discrimination, which 
are defined as follows in the 
Home Office's original guide to the Race Relations Act 1976: 
Direct discrimination arises where a person treats another person less favourably on 
racial grounds than he treats, or would treat someone else. 
37 ne figure is arrived at using an undated ethnic breakdown at divisional level based on the 1991 
Census produced by the Mefs Performance Information Bureau. I have included'Othcr Asians, in 
my base figure as well as the Mans and Pakistanis, and the Bangladeshi population is likely to have 
grown since 1991 relative ' 
to these other groups, so the 80 per cmt figure is conservative. it is 
possible, though, that the figures may need revising in view of changes to the divisional boundaries 
since their publication. 
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indirect discrimination consists of treatment which may be described as equal in a 
formal sense as between different racial groups but discriminatrory in its effect on one 
particular racial group. 
Indirect discrýation is a fairly complex concept which many institutions initially had difficulty 
in grasping (see Lustgarten 1980, Young and Connelly 1981). Broadly speaking, it applies where 
some condition is attached to a service which 
would be applied equally to all groups but 
where the proportion of persons in a particular hcial' group (in the terms of the Act) who 
can comply with it is considerably smaller than the proportion of persons not of that group 
who can comply with it and 
this is to the detriment of the victim and 
it cannot be shown by the discriminator to be justifiable irrespective of the colour, race, 
nationality or ethnic or national origins of the person to whom it is applied. 
All four of these criteria must apply for an action or practice to constitute indirect discrimination 
but the fourth, clearly is critical for most purposes since it implies that apparently discriminatory 
outcomes in the delivery of services may not constitute indirect discrimination where they are 
justifled, by non-racial considerations. Thus, for example, foreign nationals may be excluded from 
certain public service posts on grounds of national security; or, more mundanely, in Britain it 
would be illegal to suspend a requirement for applicants to have relevant qualifications in order 
to enter a profession simply because members of a particular minority were disproportionately not 
so professionally qualified. 
The research did not yield any first-hand evidence of direct discrimination; nor would one have 
expected it to do so. However, legal actions successfully brought against the police continue to 
. confirm that it can and does occur. Whether or not some of our more general finclings constitute 
188 
indirect discrimination is a fine legal point on which I would be reluctant to pronounce". Far more 
important are the insights yielded into how such discrimination can occur and these can only fully 
be appreciated in the light of the conclusions drawn above about the role of socio-economic and 
cultural factors. 
Discussion of the Hood report (op. cit. 92) has tended to focus on the amount of direct 
discrimination in sentencing he uncovered once other factors were taken into account (and, 
iýdeed, whether statistically this provided significant proof that discrimination was taking place 
at all). This is reminiscent of what Jefferson graphically describes as 
'.. the currently dominant approach to investigating ethnicity and criminalization centred 
on attempting to uncover by ever more sophisticated techniques the purely "racial" 
dimension [which] is a bit Eke sieving flour with ever finer meshes; eventually there is too 
little getting through to enable anything to be made... or.. to construct a very meaningful 
account' 
(Jefferson 1993) 
This type of approach risks missing the real point of Hood in respect of direct discrimination and 
which is central to the discussion here. That is, inasmuch as direct discrimination does occur, it 
does not occur across the board. For the most part the criminal justice system (in the context of 
Hood, the Crown Court and, in the context of this thesis, the police) treats the individuals it deals 
with equitably. The majority of police officers who are genuinely - or who genuinely believe 
themselves to be - behaving professionally may strongly resent any accusation that this is not the 
case. This was manifest throughout the research, especially in their repeated, aggrieved references 
to the taunt 'You're only picking on me because I'm black'. Importantly, it seems to be strongly 
associated with the deep undertow of resistance the research 
found to the introduction of ethnic 
monitoring and which is described in 
Chapter Three as the 'stick to beat us with' syndrome. 
Hood's model - backed by the observations of this research - suggest that direct discrimination 
38 rnus Hood (op. cit 1992) raised the possibility that the practice of discounting sentences where the 
offender pleads guilty might constitute indirect discrimination because of the disporportionate 
number of black offenders who pleaded not guilty. lbough logical. the idea was fanciful and its 
practical implications, perhaps, unthinkable. Anecdotally, this offered a hostage to fortune by 
distracting attention from his core conclusions about discrimination in sentencing. 
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will be perpetrated only by a minority of officers (and probably only a very small minority at that). 
For few officers will jeopardise their careers by consciously abusing their powers to satisfy their 
personal prejudices unless they are operating in an environment where management systems are 
so inadequate and/or the prevailing culture is such that it is possible to indulge in serious forms 
of unprofessional behaviour with impunity. Hopefully such situations are rare but, where they 
obtain, acts of direct racial discrimination would need to be tackled as a symptom of wider 
problems if they are not to recur, possibly in a different guise. Hence the cynic I quote in Chapter 
Four was in effect making the point that targetting the wrong people for insufficient reason would 
not be in an officer's own interests: by implication, if this regularly resulted in no further action 
or subsequent acquittal s/he would, at the very least, begin to appear inefficient and unproductive 
relative to their peers. 
The research most obviously raises the possibility of indirect discrimination in the context of the 
-effect of area differences 
in criminal justice practices which imply that ethnic minorities may 
experience a different quality of 'justice by geography' than whites (although there are likely to 
be variation between different ethnic groups within this). However, as yet, it remains unclear to 
what extent the uneven distribution of the different minorities concides with variations in policing 
policies and practices in ways which act to their detriment. The most obvious example is the 
impact on black people of the extraordinarily high use by the Metropolitan police (and the City 
of London) of their PACE stop/search powers. Strictly speaking, however, this might only be 
interpreted as indirect discrimination if the extent to which the power is used by these forces can 
be shown to be unjustified, irrespective of its disproportionately adverse impact on a particular 
group. Moreover, this research suggests that the apparently differential use of the power between 
London and provincial forces may partly due to different recording practices (see Footnote 15). 
perhaps all that can usefully be said on this point is covered by Elizabeth Burney's famous phrase 
about ethnic minorities as 'the barium meal 
in the system' (Burney 67). That is, inasmuch as the 
i uneven distribution of these groups may result 
in very unequal criminal justice outcomes relative 
to each other and to the population at large, it raises questions about the operation of the criminal 
justice system as a whole and thereby adds urgency to the wider concerns about inconsistency 
being raised, among others, by ACPO and HMIC (see Chapter lbree). 
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At the level of the individual, though, the research has highlighted a diverse range of factors which 
influence key decisions made by the police. These may stack up disproportionately against 
particular groups in ways which have not adequately been appreciated but it may not always be 
possible to characterise these as discriminatory. Some are relatively clear-cut: as my report to the 
Royal Commission pointed out, where unemployment is a criterion in the criminal justice process 
(for exan4)le in remanding suspects in custody or finposing a custodial sentence rather than a fine) 
this may impact adversely on groups who are disproportionately unemployed (FitzGerald op. cit. 
p. 37). On the other hand, such criteria tend to apply at later stages of the system, after the police 
have netted the suspects the system deals with. 
it is this netting process which is of central concern; for the ethnic make-up of the 'catch' which 
the police defivers'tiY tWcfirninal justice system largely determines the composition of the human 
of ý 
material which flows thiough that system from that point onwards. 7be research has 
acknowledged that socio-economic and demographic factors play a paramount role in determining 
this and that these are related to and compounded by cultural factors. One of the main 
consequences of these is the higher than average level of black involvement in the crimes which 
come to the attention of the police in the first place. Yet the police, in turn - both in response to 
reported crime and in pro-active mode - further amplify this pattern in three main ways. 
The first set of factors which produce amplification concerns police notions of ' suspiciousness'. 
Ii, 
These, strongly. influence the process of stop and search and, by extension, may critically affect 
who is netted at the arrest stage also". The 
history described in Chapter One, the views of officers 
recorded in Chapters Four and Five and the 
discussion in the previous section (on 'cultural, 
factor s) all provide ipsigHts into the development over. decades of heightened levels of police 
39 Reiner critically reviews the part played in clear-ups by Matza's two modes of police investigation 
(Matza 1969) thus: 
me second method is that of stereotyping and suspicion. People are apprehended because 
they fit the investigat&s preconceived mfion of particular kinds of offender. 7bese methods 
undoubtedly play a part in crime work, but are mainly limited to specific types of offence.... 
(T)he more minor and vague "public order" offences. (and especially such amorphous 
categories as the notorious "sus" law) which form a high proportion of patrol arrests, are 
heavily dependent on "Suspicion". But the majority of e more serious otir ble'- offences th 
are not cleared up by any of these modes of detection: 
(op. citp. 151) 
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suspiciousness with regard to black people (see also Smith and Gray 1983). 
The second set of factors concerns the application of informal criteria in decision making and the 
role of custom and practice. Chapter Five has already referred to some of the reasons given by 
custody officers in Brown's study (Brown, forthcoming) for cautioning suspects. The full list can 
broadly be divided in two, as shown in Figure 6: 1: matters of hard fact; and items open to varying 
degrees of subjective interpretation. Nearly as many fall into the second category as the first; and 
interpretation of two in particular (the question of 'remorse' and the issue of 'community support 
arrangements) might adversely impact on black suspects. In addition to these, one officer made 
the point to me that juveniles could only be cautioned in the presence of a parent and that, in the 
case of black young people, it was often more difficult to track one down, leaving the police no 
alternative but to charge them. This sounded plausible and was clearly volunteered in good faith 
as a factor which disproportionately disadvantaged black young people and helped to explain their 
lower rate of cautioning. Yet, on checking, it would appear that this is not a hard and fast 
prerequisite but rather a matter of custom and practice. 
Figure 6: 1 
Reasons given by custody officers for cautioning suspects 
Reasons based on hard fact Reasons based on officers' interpretation 
1. Victim conscrits to caution 7. Triviality of the offence 
2. No recent previous convictions 8. Token court penalty likely 
3. Offender admits the offence 9. Little or no harmAoss to victim 
4. Offender/parents consent to caution 10. Offender shows remorse 
5. Offender is a juvenile II- Community Support arrangements 
6. Force policy 
I 
Taken from Brown (op-cit. forthcoming) 
The potential effect of these types of criteria. can be illustrated by reference to the cautioning data 
frorn the Met analysed in Chapter Five and, in particular, the results shown in Table 5: 8. What is 
remarkable here is that rates of cautioning 
for black ands white male juveniles with no previous 
cautions or findings of guilt who have admitted the offence actually equalise for two of the three 
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main offence categories. Yet they remain significantly lower for robbery. That is, the Met sample 
is selected on the basis of reasons 2,3 and 5 in Brown's list and force policy is clearly not an 
impediment; so only two of the more objective criteria on the list will have come into play and the 
main factors which determined these outcomes will probably have been the five factors based on 
the , more subjective interpretation of custody officers. 
Even with a data set of this size, absolute numbers become relatively small at this level of 
disaggregation. If the black sample had been cautioned for robbery at the same rate as their white 
peers the actual nwnber additionally cautioned would have been eight; and if it were possible 
actually to identify which eight these would have been, any of the seven relevant criteria from 
those listed at Figure 6: 1 might plausibly appear to explain the police's choice not to caution in 
each individual case. The effect of these largely subjectively-based decisions, though, appears to 
be that, at a point which may critically shape their future paths, about 20 per cent fewer black 
boys may be cautioned relative to whites for an offence in which, as a group, they are 
disproportionately involved (and where they may already have compounded their own 
disadvantage because of their much lower rates of admission). If the same effect were to occur 
over years and in other areas"O, 
its cumulative impact on the respective criminal careers of these 
groups over time could be very significant. 
The third set of factors which may add to the process of amplification is strongly related to the 
other two S. mce it concerns the exercise of police 
discretion. Individual police officers not only 
have the opportunity to exercise a considerable degree of personal discretion, doing so is actually 
a professional requirement. 
For they often need to make fine (and sometimes urgent) decisions 
in cases which may not be at all clear-cut and/or where several 
different courses of action are 
available to them. Ibus a. custody officer 
in one fieldwork area mused to the arresting officers 
who had brought in a (black) 
juvenile accused of assaulting his mother: 'So, charge or caution or 
what? 'He typed 'obtain evidence' onto the custody record, commenting 
'Tbat way we don't bum 
our bridges, do we? 
'Tlie juvenile was dealt with infomially and, after considerable effort by the 
police to negotiate suitable arrangements, taken to an uncle's. 
40 it shoWd be remembered here that other evidence in this thesis points to a black over-rcprescntation 
in robbery which is not confined to London and which has persisted over time. 
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It. is unclear to what extent this discretion is exercised, quite legitimately, in the direction of 
lenience or whether its overall impact tends to be punitive'. The anecdote above, though, chimes 
with the general impression from observations from the fieldwork and squares, in turn, with some 
of the main problems identified with the recording of stop and search. That is, where officers had 
(or could create for themselves) the option of dealing with matters informally they would most 
often take it. Reasons for this are varied, but three in particular are worth citing. One is avoidance 
of the additional work which further action would require, especially where officers expected little 
end result - as is reflected in the first two criteria listed at Figure 6: 1 - and in the failure to record 
stop/searches where there was no arrest. The second is a preference for keeping interactions with 
members of the public low-key, often driven by a perceived need to avoid inflaming situations or 
actively to defuse them. This is illustrated by the treatment of stop/searches as 'voluntary' 
wh enever possible; and it may often come into play when dealing with people who are 
dangerously agitated or in handling disputes between members of the public. 71be third - of which 
we witnessed several examples and which is strongly reflected in the criterion of 'remorse' in 
Figure 6: 1 - is a genuine concern to spare those who cause them no trouble (and for whom they 
'my actually feel some empathy) 
from any formal action which might unnecessarily be deleterious. 
Inasmuch as this discretion is exercised in the direction of lenience, it seems possible that this does 
not happen as frequently in the case of 
black suspects as whites. The most obvious example from 
this research comes in the greater likelihood that stop/searches of black people will be formally 
recorded. In the course of the research, my colleagues and 
I were repeatedly given two reasons 
for this and both are worth unpacking in the light of the discussion so far in this chapter. For, if 
they apply also to police decisions which rmre 
directly detem-Line who is fed through to the next 
stages of the criminal justice system, their 
implications for the presence of black people in the 
system as a whole may be profound. 
The first reason we were given for recording searches of black people was to 'cover one's back'. 
This reflects the heightened sensitivities of the police in dealing with black people which were a 
41 The hypothesis, that the system generally may tend towards lenience is borne Out at later stages in 
the criminal justice process. Moxon's study of sentencing in the Crown Court (Moxon 1988) 
identifies 192 factors which taided to ýnitigate! the likelihood of sentencing at the more punifive end 
of the spectrum of judgesdiscretion whereas only eight were identified as 'aggravating'. 
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recurrent theme- of the previous section of this chapter. They run deep and go back a long way; 
and the specific fear which underlies them is that an encounter with a black person is much more 
likely to have repercussions than a similar encounter with a white. 
The second reason - which is often used to justify the first - is that such encounters are more 
likely to be confrontational. The police perceive black people as behaving more aggressively 
towards them and/or (as the first reason already implies) they anticipate this aggression. 
Ironically, there is a parallel perception of the police on the part of black people: my analysis with 
Chris Hale of police stops in London (op. cit. ) shows that black people are less likely than whites 
to say the police behaved politely towards them on these occasions; they were markedly less likely 
to say the police treated them fairly; and they came away from these encounters significantly less 
satisfied overalL Moreover, when all else was taken into account, black people who had perceived 
the police to be impolite were actually more dissatisfied than similar whites who shared their 
perceptions of police discourtesy. Ibis suggests that an element of mutual tension and hostility 
(whether explicit or not) is present in a larger proportion of police searches of black people; and 
confrontation, therefore, may be a self-fulfilling prophecy". 
This is not to say that most black-police encounters are confrontational. Thus Norris et al., in an 
observational study of police stops of 158 white and 42 black people, found no ethnic differences 
in the demeanour either of the members of the public or the police officers involved (Norris et al 
1992). 1 personally witnessed one stop where the initial demeanour of the officers could have 
been interpreted as aggressive but which appeared to de-escalate, probably as the combined result 
of my presence and the fact that the black young people involved did not respond in kind. Set 
'against this were two cases in different areas involving black juveniles. Both showed officers at 
__their 
best, displaying resourcefulness, tact, patience and a good deal of genuine kindness - even 
"though I had observed at least one of them engaging with colleagues on several occasions in 
42 Thus Reiner cites Lee! s claim that young people from ethnic minorities are likely to becomepolice 
property' (Lee 198 1) and adds 
'.. once conflicts become common a vicious cycle develops whereby police officers and their 
"propay approach encounters warily with pre-existing hostility and suspiciousness, and 
interact in ways which only exacerbate the tension: 
(op. cit. p. 170) 
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racist banter so routine that it was almost compulsive. It is easy to forget that, although the 
proportion of black people who are dissatisfied with the police is consistently greater than it is for 
whites, only a minority are dissatisfied in either group. Ilis is apparent in BCS respondents' rating 
of the job done by the police in their area (see Table 6: 2); and in my further work with Chris Hale 
referred to above 64 per cent of black men stopped in cars in London' in 1993 were actually very 
or fairly satisfied with the way the police handled the incident, although the figure was higher for 
whites (at 78 per cent). 
This does not, however, undermine the argument being made here which is that, for a mixture of 
reasons, the police may be more inclined to formalise their encounters with black people. Iley 
may simply set limits on the discretion they would normally apply in equivalent situations with 
white people, feeling that they are better safeguarded if they 'play it by the book'. Alternatively, 
they may deny the full benefit of that discretion to black people who, in their view, forfeit it by 
their perceived behaviour - irrespective of whether this perception is correct (or whether the 
behaviour is triggered by the perceived behaviour of the police). Whatever the reason, it means 
that black people will not equally benefit with whites from the exercise of police discretion. There 
is no reason to assume that this pattern is confined to stop/search situations; and if it takes place 
also at later and more critical decision-making points in the criminal justice process shown in 
Figure 2: 1, this may have significant repercussions on the individuals involved. This is especially 
the case since it is likely to develop a cumulative momentum from one point to the next (see 
Chapter Two). Despite this, if a higher proportion of cases involving black people are played 
strictly ý by the book', this would not necessarily raise any question of discrimination as such. 
Tflis analysLs suggests we may need to extend Reiner's scepticism about the quest for the 'wil o' 
the wisp of "pure" racisnf (Reiner 1992) to indirect discrimination also. Both types of 
discrumnation undoubtedly occur, as this part of the discussion made clear at the outset; but 
neither win adequately 'explain' any over-representation of black people in the crirninal justice 
system relative to their actual (albeit still unknown) involvement in crime. At the actual point of 
43 of greater concern, though is the figire for black men outside London where the fig= drops to only 
just over half. Numbers are relatively smaU, with a total sample of 243 black men in London and 166 
elsewhere, onlyaboutathirdof whom had been stopped, but we found a consistently more negative 
pattern outside the capital. 
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entry to the system the role of the police in this is more constrained than is often acknowledged 
inasmuch as it is largely reactive. Also, the options available to the police in respect of their 
'catch' is constrained by a wide variety of factors including: the type of offence involved; the 
strength of the evidence (and cost-benefits of the effort of searching for it); codes of practice, 
guidelines and force priorities; and not only the circumstances of suspects but the decisions they 
may make on their own behalf. However, the conclusion of this research must be as follows. 
inasmuch as the police have any control over who they net in the first place and which of their 
catch they retain to feed further into the system it seems that two factors may come into play 
which will amplify both the rate at which black people are netted in the first place relative to 
whites and the rate at which they are fed further into the system. These are: heightened 
perceptions of black 'suspiciousness; and a failure by the police to exercise discretion towards 
black suspects with the same degree of lenience as they would show towards whites. The reasons 
for both are deeply rooted in the history of black-police relations described in the section on 
tculturar factors. As yet, no equivalent has been documented in police relations with Asian groups, 
although some evidence is accumulating of a similar process beginning to occur in certain 
localities. 
CoNCLUSIONS 
The discussion so far confums that all three of the 'explanations' for the over-representation of 
black people in criminal justice statistics listed at the beginning of this chapter are at work. The 
first two, however, (die structural and the cultural) are primordial and are closely inter-related. 
-The role of 
the third factor (discrimination) is secondary and is only significant if the concept is 
extended well beyond the terms 
in which it is usually defined. 
Each of these factors, though, makes 
it more likely that (by comparison with white avcrages) 
black people will. - be imre involved in crime; come MOre readily to the attention of the police; and 
of become more deeply enmeshed 
in the criminal justice process once the police have netted them. 
N4oreover, these factors have been at work now for nearly half a century, interacting with each 
other in an apparently endless cycle 
in which the results of one phase of amplication fuels the next. 
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Only a minority within the Asian group broadly occupy the same structural niche as the black 
groups (albeit a n-finority which is growing fast). However, they came to occupy that niche about 
20 years later, so the social, economic and political circumstances in which they embarked on the 
same cycle of relationship formation and development, were inevitably different. There have also 
been important differences of detail in the social circumstances and geographic distribution of the 
Pakistanis and Bangladeshis and of the black (Caribbean origin) group. At least equally as 
knportant, society at large and its institutions have held different perceptions and expectations of 
different minority ethnic groups, including different expectations of their involvement in crime. 
The evidence so far suggests that for all of these reasons, levels of criminal involvement among 
the Pakistanis and Bangladeshis have not been amplified by the factors which have contributed 
significantly to the now well-established picture for the black groups. If anything, a number of 
factors may have mitigated the likelihood of this happening. It is possible, therefore, that history 
will not repeat itself in the case of the Pakistanis and Bangladeshis; but, inasmuch as it does, one 
would not expect it to take exactly the same form. 
That is, the root causes of over-representation lie in a structural framework set by a particular 
set of social, economic and political circumstances which have changed over time and which may 
continue to do so. Within this framework, the relationships between society at large and its 
institutions on the one hand and ethnic minorities on the other have been shaped by a n-dxture of 
direct and indirect experience and observation at the individual and (more importantly) the group 
level. They rnay be fuened by prejudice but this derives, at least in part, from the received wisdom 
and folk memories en gendered 
by these experiences and observations. Inasmuch as there is a 
problem to be addressed, then, 
it lies primarily in a set of long-established relationships based on 
mutual perceptions which reflect the 'cultures' of the different parties. 
-Ibe challenge for policy makers and practitioners alle, therefore, is not so much to reverse the 
pattern for black people - for it is now unlikely that this will change significantly in the forseeable 
future. Rather, it is to halt the spiral of arnplification in respect of black people and, if it is not 
already too late, to avoid getting 
into the same cycle with Pakistani and Bangladeshi youth in 
particular. 
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Within this, the specific and immediate challenge with regard to the police is for policy makers 
and practitioners (both within the police and outside) is to re-think the concept of discrin-dnation. 
Only a minority of officers will be responsible for direct racial discrimination. Those who are will 
probably be behaving unprofessionally in other ways also; and they need to be identified and dealt 
with effectively - not only for the sake of the public but for the sake of their colleagues also. For 
there is a deep resentment among the majority of officers at assumptions that they too are 'racist, 
in the sense that they actuaUy or potentia. Hy abuse their powers in pursuit of their prejudices. This 
resentment, in turn, reinforces unconscious prejudice and subtly but powerfully undermines and. 
discrimination and equal opportunities initiatives. 
The over-representation of black people in police statistics, for the most part, cannot now be 
attributed to discrimýation against black people in the strict sense of the term. Rather, the figures 
may inflate the proportion of black people relative to their actual levels of involvement in crime 
not because they abuse their powers in relation to black people but mainly because they choose 
to invoke them. 
-Me issue of police discretion in deciding whether or not to enforce their powers to the full (and 
the choices they make as between the different powers available) is central to informed debate 
about policing generally. Thus 
Lustgarten: 
'The discretion not to enforce the law - which in terms of the working constable means 
not to arrest someone who has in a strict sense broken the law - may also arise from the 
substantive breadth and vagueness of the law itself ..... (N)otions of breach of the peace, 
threatening behaviour, obstruction and the like are so wide that virtually any action can 
justify an arrest. The result is that the police invariably under-enforce the law. This is 
normally regarded as simple common sense, essential to avoid dragging the law into 
disrepute, yet the result is to turn conventional thinking about policing on its head. The 
equation of policing with enforcement of the Law... becomes untenable. For most less 
serious offences under-enforcement is the nonrg precisely for that reason, enforcement can 
be a serious abuse of power. The "common sense" which tempersfull enforcement may 
readily become a cloak for conscious or unconscious discrimination on the basis of 
political opinion, personal appearance, demeanour, social status or race. Under. 
enforcement becaomes selective enforcement. ' 
(op. cit 1986 p. 15) 
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Yet these considerations hardly seem to have entered the ' race' and crime debate at the academic 
level and still less at the level of policy and practice. To accommodate them would, indeed, 
require turning 'conventional thinking.. on its head'. Certainly it will mean asking different 
questions of the statistics we have already and those which we are about to receive. 
POST SCRIM THE ROLE OF ETHNIC MONITORING 
Set against this background, the introduction of ethnic monitoring by the police may seem an 
irrelevance at best. At worst, it could be a danger. it has raised expectations which it will almost 
certainly fail to meet and it could actually rebound, further amplifying precisely the problem it is 
intended to address. For Reiner may to some extent understate the case when he observes that 
ne degree of police discrimination is less than would be implied by a superficial reading of the 
social distribution of stops, arrests and other exercises of police power' (op. cit. p. 162); but the 
inference he draws from this is telling in its implications for the role of ethnic monitoring: 
'To recognise that the police statistics have some basis in a reality of black crime is 
important because it underlines the point that more needs to change than just setting 
straight mistaken police stereotypes or prejudices. ' 
(emphasis added) 
(op. cit. p. 165) 
The thesis concludes by looking briefly at: 
the mismatch between the problem, as understood here, and the expectations currently 
riding on ethnic monitoring; 
the limitations of the system which has recently been introduced and the dangers which 
may arise if those limitations are not sufficiently appreciated; and 
the potential contribution ethnic monitoring might nonetheless make. 
Unrealistic expectations 
-Ibere is an explicit expectation that ethnic monitoring will uncover discrimination (see Chapter 
Three) and this in turn seems to rest on an implicit assumption that discrimination is a significant 
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factor in explaining the over-representation of black people in criminal justice statistics. Yet this 
is not supported by the evidence in this thesis. The role of the police over a very long period of 
time has undoubtedly been catalytic in the complex interplay of different factors which have 
produced the current level of 'over-representation'. Short of being able to rewrite history, 
however, the picture is now unlikely significantly to change; and, while, the police continue to 
have a significant influence on this cycle of amplification, they are by no means the only or the 
most finportant influence on it. Moreover their influence for the most part now takes the form of 
the legitimate exercise of their powers, albeit in a way which reflects negative expectations and 
attitudes. Whatever the origins of these negative expectations and attitudes, they have been 
constantly reinforced over decades in the development of the police's relationship with black 
people. That is, changing these attitudes and expectations would depend to a large extent on being 
able to break the vicious circle of that relationship; and this will necessarily be a two-way process. 
Limitations and dangers 
It is by no means certain how long it may take for the new system of police ethnic monitoring to 
generate statistics which are reliable. Inevitably there are teething problems; and some forces have 
experienced genuine difficulties related to wider problems such as the introduction of 
computerisation, changes to existing systems, problems Of staff turnover and resources. 'Mese 
may be compounded by misunderstandings about what is required of them (whether wilful or 
otherwise) on the part of the many individual officers who are responsible for making each initial, 
individual record. Awareness at this level may, in turn, reflect the priority given at more senior 
levels to introducing the system as quickly and as efficiently as possible and which vary 
considerably between forces (although there 
is no strong correlation with the size of their minority 
populations). Beyond these immediate difficulties, though, lies the fact that the monitoring data 
represent an ethnic breakdown of statistical series which are often themselves of dubious reliability 
and which it is often quite unsafe to compare 
from one force to another. 
Although there were good practical reasons for limiting the number of ethnic categories used as 
the basis for the system, the groups they capture are very broad. 7be 'Asian' group in particular 
spans three very disparate groups; but their relative sizes means that emerging problems with the 
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paidstanis and Bangladeshis may effectively remain hidden. Similarly any effects of the changing 
composition of the 'black' group will be missed. In addition, one of the many reasons why 
comparisons between areas may be unsafe is that the internal composition of the 'black' and 'Asian' 
groups may vary quite markedly from one force to another, and in some areas the 'Other' group 
may actually be as large as either of the two main minorities. 
It was also sensible to restrict monitoring in the first instance to a limited number of police 
actions. Yet the data which these produce will be difficult to interpret for four main sets of 
reasons. The first is the absence of data at other key decision-making points; the second is the 
limited information available within the data which have been asked for, the third is the absence 
of other information which may be essential to understanding the ethnic patterns shown by the 
data; and the fourth is a set of technical difficulties which might arise irrespective of whether or 
not the additional information were available. 
With regard to the three main areas of activity being monitored initially, the problems with the 
stop/search figures have been well rehearsed and, even if improvements are made, these may 
never be fully reliable. The arrest and cautions 
data, though, should in principle be more reliable 
than the pACE data and are, in any case, more crucially relevant to concerns about who is being 
netted by the police and the proportions 
in which they are being fed through into the criminal 
justice process rather than being filtered out at an early stage. These arrest and cautions data, 
however, (and the relation of one to the other) can only really be understood in the light of further 
information on other disposals. That is, to make sense of them, we need to know what proportion 
of those initially arrested in each ethnic group are cautioned relative a) to the proportion charged 
and b) to the proportion who 
have no further action taken against them. Beyond this, of course, 
it would also be important to know the proportions of those charged who were actually 
prosecuted - and what proportion of those prosecutions were successful. 
Without this additional 
information it is almost impossible to fi-ame any sensible questions about whether the rates of 
arrest and caution for different ethnic groups are equitable, still 
less to answer them. 
The most obvious problem of interpretation which arises within those data which are being 
collected is the absence of 
information on whether or not suspects admit the offence for which 
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they have been arrested since this is crucial to an understanding of the cautioning rates. It would 
also be important to know the types of offence for which different groups are arrested per se; and, 
in the case of arrests arising from stop/searches, it should be possible to compare this with the 
grounds on which they were searched. 
Sensibly to interpret the ethnic pattems shown by the data, though, will additionally require a 
large amount of contextual infonnation. The most obvious is population data since the main 
preoccupation is with trying to establish whether different groups are 'represented' in the statistics 
in more or less their proportions in the population at large. However, this research casts doubt 
on the value of these comparisons which, to date, have been the main focus of the monitoring 
exercise. The case is well established that the Black' group is 'over-represented' in relation to its 
presence in the national population and this pattern is probably set to continue. Further, the 
implications of the research are that these comparisons are unhelpful and potentially misleading 
for the following reasons: 
a) Census data already undercounted some of the groups of greatest interest. The figures are 
now out of date anyway and the numbers in precisely the age/ethnic groups of greatest 
interest may also have grown significantly since then. 
b) There are very significant variations in patterns of crime and police practices not only 
between forces but within them also; and the distribution of the minority population is 
very uneven. Ethnicity data, therefore, can only safely be analysed on a highly localised 
basis. Force-wide figures are likely to be effectively meaningless and in most instances the 
appropriate unit of analysis may be well below the level of the police BCU (Basic 
Command Unit). Yet at this level it is likely that many of the individuals captured in the 
statistics will not be local residents, so comparisons with population data may be 
irrelevant anyway". 
C) Even if there were no problem with a) and b), to interpret anY mismatch between the 
44 In one London division I was reliably informed that 40 per cent of all street crime take place in the 
one mile covered by the market which is visited by people from all over London (and beyond) and 
is directly served by several major bus routes and a tube and mil station. 
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proportions in the monitoring data and those from the population statistics, it would be 
essential to make allowance for a number of factors which would predict differential 
involvement in crime by different groups and any differential likelihood of their coming 
to the attention of the police. These allowances would themselves be based on 
assumptions which may not be accurate; and the factors which would need to be taken 
into account are not only the age and socio-economic characteristics of the groups 
concerned but other types of factors which may make them more or less 'available' to 
come to the attention of the police. One example is school exclusions; but there are 
lifestyle factors as well such as preferred forms of leisure activity, along with questions 
about the location of these, their frequency, modes of travel (which raise the further 
question of differential access to private transport) and the related implications for the 
presence of different groups in public places at different times of day and night. Much of 
the relevant socio-eco. nomic information may be available. Others of these items, though, 
may be at least as important and few will be documented at all, still less in quantitative 
form Beyond these considerations, though, lies the need to recognise the implications of 
abandoning the unrealistic expectation of 'democratic suspicion' (see Chapter Four); for 
an alternative approach based on realistic assumptions about those sections of the 
population who are most likely to be the (legitimate) objects of police suspicion would 
necessarily open a Pandoas Box (or can of worms) because it would require information 
about police targetting. 
Finally, two main types of technical difficulties would come into play even if all of the previous 
problems were surmountable. 
The first is quite simply that in most forces the actual numbers of 
ethnic minorities captured 
by the statistics will be too few for it to be worth undertaking the 
breakdowns which would give the crude totals any meaning (that is, as a minimum, breakdowns 
by su- b-area, by age and by type of offence). 
And the second is that, even where numbers are large 
as the analysis of juvenile cautioning 
in the Met has shown - the necessary application of 
j ff e ersons ever flner meshes' will only 
let any meaning through if quite sophisticated multivariate 
techrýiques are used which may be 
beyond the capacity of many forces. 
ibcse limitations will need clearly to be understood by those who compile the data and those who 
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then use it - whether for management, Policy Or more Political purposes. If they are not, there is 
an obvious danger that the crude picture which emerges Will simply reinforce prevailing 
assumptions on the one hand about 'black criminality' (as contrasted with the assumed 'non- 
criminality' of the Asian group) and, on the other, about discrimination. If it serves to reinforce 
assumptions about black criminality, the exercise would have resulted in an own goal. If it simply 
reinforces crude assumptions about police discrimination, it would at best have been a missed 
opportunity. At worst, if this fuels the strong undertow of resentment and suspicion towards 
monitoring among many of the officers on whom the system of monitoring depends, this could 
be tantamount to an own goal as well. 
The potential 
Ile high expectations raised both nationally and locally make it inevitable that the first year's data 
will be the object of intense scrutiny in which the main preoccupation will still be with questions 
of over-representation. This is particularly unfortunate since, as the previous section has shown, 
the data will probably be less than reliable; and it will, in any case, always be difficult to 
contextualise them in ways which can make sense of this apparent 'over-representation'. Instead, 
I would argue that we need to abandon any idea that we are looking for equity in the figuree', 
not least since this may, in any case, rebound by simply providing an incentive to fudge them, thus 
burying deeper any areas of concern which they might have uncovered. There are, however, two 
t ways in which ethnic monitoring might yet contribute to the goal of halting the spiral 
of amplification decribed here. 
The statistics are more likely to be meaningful (and of practical value) if instead of taking 
population data as the fi ame of comparison, the context used is the criminal justice system itself. 
As yet - given the limited number of police activities 
being covered and the absence of information 
on decisions by the CPS and the courts - there is relatively little scope for this, particularly at 
national level. However, data on decisions at different points in the system will come into their 
own when they can be seen in relation to each other. Especially where forces have computerised 
45 It can only be assumed that this was the naYve expectation behind HMrs introduction of the 
Performance Indicator for PACE. 
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custody records, many are already capable of realising this potential. That is, they can check for 
themselves on the rate of attrition from arrest to charge and prosecution. Indeed, if they were so 
minded, they could follow up cases beyond that without waiting for the CPS and the courts to 
begin monitoring; for the police eventually receive information on all case outcomes, for they are 
responsible for passing on to the Police National Computer. Such comparisons would tell forces 
far more about whether they are netting people equitably in relation to their actual involvement 
in crime than any amount of manipulation of local population data based on assumptions about 
likely involvement in crime. It might also be of more help in identffýing the decision-making points 
at which outcomes for different groups appeared to be more inequitable than others and, as 
necessary, how those decisions were arrived at and by whom. 
The importance of the statistics in relation to themselves rather than in relation to assumptions 
abo ut the outside world lies also in their value as time series data. Clearly this potential will not 
be realised immediately. Comparisons from one year to another will only be safe once the data are 
known to be stable (i. e. collected on the same basis and with the same degree of reliability) and 
again only where numbers are large enough to draw inferences about trends. Moreover, these 
inferences will themselves need to be drawn with care since they will be open to either of two 
interpretations (or a mixture of each). For they may reflect developments in the world outside; 
but they may also reflect developments in police practice, including the impact of any conscious 
efforts to ensure equity of treatmem If they can serve as a barometer in this way, though, their 
value could be considerable. 
Th , ere is a second way in which the monitoring exercise could help to halt the process of 
amplification, however, and one which 
is far more important than the statistical pictures it will 
generate. The conclusion reached by this thesis 
is that the police contribution to the process of 
ý 11 aI mplification is driven mainly by the cumulative 
impact of bias in literally thousands of 
&kretionary decisions made by individual officers in the course of their routine work. Many of 
these decisions will seem trivial (although their ultimate consequences as one leads to another may 
not be trivial for the suspects concerned); the 
bias involved may be entirely unconscious; most of 
the decisions win be entirely legitimate and, if challenged, the choice between the different options 
available, to the officer in a specific case will 
(technically) be entirely justifiable. That is, the issue 
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is not to measure discrimination so much as this discretion. For, as Fielding points out: 
'An effective response to institutionalized disadvantage relies on means to promote the 
fair exercise of discretion. ' 
(emphasis added) 
(Fielding 1991 p. 238) 
In the light of this understanding, it becomes more than ever important to remember that the 
statistics themselves tell us nothing. It is the interpretation of the statistics which gives them 
meaning; yet, even if they are interpreted intelligently, they might still reveal no pattern of 
improper behaviour which would justify formal action. However, interpreting them is itself only 
one part of the overall process of monitoring; and it is this process rather than the statistics it 
produces which may ultimately have the greatest impact on the problem. Ideally, the process of 
collecting the data in the first place will already act as an unconscious check by those responsible 
for collecting them on the ways in which they themselves are exercising their powers. More 
systematic forms of feedback might further enable them to reflect on their patterns of behaviour; 
and knowing that line managers were aware of that pattern too and able to compare it with others' 
could be an important additional factor. Similarly, the process of feeding back pattems from the 
aggregated data at more senior levels could allow action to be taken (discreetly and, as necessary, 
without reference to the monitoring data) which, by increasing vigilance or by constraining 
opportunities for the exercise of bias, might prove effective in changing the patterns originally 
observed in the date6. 
That is, internally, the process itself might act as a powerful force for self-regulation even if the 
statistics did not definitively reveal a specific problem and even if no formal action was (or could 
be) taken on the basis of them. As important, in view of the Gordian knot of the relationship 
which lies at the core of the problem, is the process of sharing the data. There are enormous 
sensitivities here, of which their limited explanatory value is by no means the largest. However, 
I 
as some forces have already begun to 
discover, the fact of showing a willingness to be open with 
the data in the first place and the opportunities which that has, in turn, provided for dialogue have 
46 Were this to occur, the force's inability to 'explain' the apparent trend would seem A small price to 
Pay - though the danger imPkit in inlagining spurious explanations for the changes when presenting 
them publicly! 
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of themselves contributed significantly to improving relationships with local groups who might 
have been expected to be most critical. 
The three large and inter-related questions which hang over whether or not ethnic monitoring 
realiseý this potential, though, are: whether the potential is adequately appreciated; whether there 
is the will to realise it; and whether the necessary resources are allocated to it - especially in terms 
of the time and attention it receives from senior managment and those in key operational 
positions. For, as Chapter Tliree has aW to draw out, there ge two major obstacles to surmount. 
One has been referred to as the deep undertow of resentment and suspicion which, as yet, 
monitoring evokes. For, even at more senior levels where plausible lip service is paid and there 
is some genuine enthusiasm for the principle, deep-seated fears are apparent. No-one yet really 
knows what may crawl out if they seriously and systematically begin to turn over the stones; and 
the'metaphor of stirring up a homet's nest which I used at the two national seminars (see Chapter 
Tbree) clearly resonated with many of the audience. Secondly, it is evident that for most forces 
the issues involved are not - and probably never will be -a subject of major concern, whether per 
se or in relation to other more pressing demands, including the new priorities being set for then-L 
Even in the small number of forces where they have greater salience, they are still competing for 
resources and for space on the policy agenda with these demands and priorities. In these 
circumstances monitoring may only succeed if ways can be found of tying it into the wider 
C oncems which currently exercise the police and of integrating them into new developments, one 
of which is the move towards increasingly 'intelligence-led'policing. 
This thesis has identified police notions of black 'suspiciousness' as one of the key factors in the 
amplification of the problem of 'race'and crime. It has also highlighted the enhanced role which 
notions of Isupiciousness' as such are likely to play in the context of 'inteHigence-led' policing. 
Despite its limitations, the question of whether or not ethnic monitoring 'takes', therefore - and 
the challenge of integrating it into wider deveopments - may be more urgent than has been 
appreciated. For, in the context of the relentless drive to Improve 'intelligence-led' policing the 
Spiro of amplification could ratchet significantly upwards again in the near future. 
Marian FitzGerald 
April 1997 
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